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This dissertation consists of three essays at the intersection of behavioral economics
and public finance. Two essays focus on the topic of income taxes, in particular,
income-tax salience and income-tax perceptions, and how these differ for federal
vs. state income taxes. These perceptions have potential implications for optimal
policy design and labor-supply decisions. The third essay uses a novel approach to
examine potential nonresponse bias in large government surveys that are a frequent
source of economics data.
In Chapter 1, I examine income-tax salience. Income taxes distort labor mar-
ket outcomes, sometimes as a primary goal (as in the earned income tax credit)
and sometimes as a secondary consequence (as a by-product of raising revenue).
However, for an individual’s decisions to be influenced by a tax, he needs to be
incorporating it in his decision-making. If the source of the tax—e.g., the state or
federal government—affects the consumer’s awareness of the tax in his decision-
making, then different income taxes might have different labor-market effects. This
chapter provides experimental survey evidence that state taxes are less salient than
federal taxes. Reduced-form estimates show a large difference between state and
federal taxes. Direct estimation of salience parameters in a preferred subsample
indicates that federal income taxes are close to fully salient, while state income
taxes are substantially and significantly less salient. The chapter also explores
evidence for individual-level explanations of salience and tax knowledge.
In Chapter 2, I examine income-tax perceptions. Income taxes are complicated
and potentially confusing to consumers. Individuals may rely on heuristics or
make systematic mistakes in their perceptions of their taxes. This chapter uses
experimental survey data to add to a literature seeking to understand federal
income-tax perceptions and adds novel evidence on state income-tax perceptions.
I find broad agreement in perceptions between state and federal income taxes.
Generally, individuals perceive too much progressivity in both federal and state tax
schedules. Estimating a model of federal tax perceptions yields results consistent
with a more complicated mental model than suggested in previous literature.
In Chapter 3, we examine nonresponse bias in large government surveys.
Economists are often interested in measuring outcomes such as unemployment,
labor force participation, obesity, and household expenditures. In this chapter we
study the sources of the relevant official statistics—the Current Population Survey
(CPS), the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), and the Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey (CEX)—and find that measurements of these outcomes
depend on whether we look at easy vs. difficult-to-reach respondents. These results
empirically substantiate the theoretical warning against making population-wide
estimates from surveys with low response rates.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Daniel Reeves was born and raised in Purlear, North Carolina. There he graduated
from West Wilkes High School. He attended the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, graduating with majors in economics and political science. After
college, he worked as a Research Associate at the Research Triangle Institute in
their Behavioral Health Economics Program. He then returned to school to pursue
a Ph.D. in Economics at Cornell University. He is joining Capital One in McLean,
VA as a Principal Associate.
iii
For the endless love, support, and guidance they have provided me. In honor of
Betty Beshears, and in memory of Daniel “D.F.” Beshears Jr., Mary Kate
Reeves, and Glenn “Jack” Reeves.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to begin by thanking my committee, all of whom deserve more thanks
than space will allow. Thanks to my advisor, Ted O’Donoghue, for giving so freely
of his time, energy, knowledge, and support across many years (and across many
more drafts and meetings). Without his assistance, this work would never have
been completed. I would also like to thank Ori Heffetz for his guidance and for
taking me on as a coauthor, which was an incredibly valuable learning experience.
Finally, thanks also to Tatiana Homonoff, whose insightful comments, support,
and encouragement were invaluable to the process.
While my committee members were the ones to guide me along the final step of
my educational journey, I also benefited from an amazing cast of educators along
the way. My sincere thanks to each of those wonderful teachers and librarians.
My very first and very best teacher was my mother, Debbie Reeves. Without
a doubt, the countless hours she spent reading to me throughout my childhood
instilled a lifetime love of learning in me. I can trace back every accomplishment
to the unconditional support both her and my father, Doug Reeves, have given me
in every endeavor. My brothers, Jordan and Jackson, are pretty cool too.
Also, thanks to the many wonderful and talented people I have met at Cornell.
In particular, to my first-year study group who got me through Q’s. Vesall and
Sally always provided a calm harbor amidst any storm. James, Michiel, and Anne
reminded me grad school can have a social side. And, finally, thanks to Miriam
for being always being Miriam.
Finally, thanks most of all to my constant companion of (almost) the whole
process, my travel buddy, my one-woman support system, my cooking partner,
my motivator, and my often-times counselor: Lin Xu. She has provided me more
assistance, in more ways, than anyone has ever deserved.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Biographical Sketch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
1 Are All Income Taxes Really The Same? An Experimental Inves-
tigation into State and Federal Income-Tax Salience 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Theoretical and Empirical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.1 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.2 Empirical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.4.1 Descriptive Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.4.2 Randomization check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4.3 Reduced-form Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.5 Model estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.6 Subsample Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.7 Heterogeneity in salience and tax knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.7.1 Heterogeneity in salience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.7.2 Heterogeneity in tax knowledge and errors . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2 How Do People See Their Taxes? Experimental Evidence on Fed-
eral and State Income-Tax Perceptions 44
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.2 Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.3.1 Relationship between ATR and MTR . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.3.2 Perceptions of progressivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.3.3 The proximity of kinks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.4 Estimating a model of perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.4.1 Model description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.4.2 Mixture results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.5 Subsample analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.5.1 Reduced-form analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.5.2 Model of perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
vi
3 Difficulty to Reach Respondents and Nonresponse Bias: Evidence
from Large Government Surveys (with Ori Heffetz) 72
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.2 CPS: Labor Force Participation and Unemployment . . . . . . . . . 80
3.2.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.2.2 Analysis by Difficulty of Reaching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.2.3 Robustness and Additional Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.3 BRFSS: Obesity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.3.2 Analysis by Difficulty of Reaching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.3.3 Robustness and Additional Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.4 CEX: Quarterly Household Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.4.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.4.2 Analysis by Difficulty of Reaching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.4.3 Robustness and Additional Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.5 Previous Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.5.1 Research Utilizing Difficulty-of-reaching Measures . . . . . . 110
3.5.2 Evidence on the Quality of Difficulty-of-reaching Measures . 115
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
A Appendix of Chapter 1: Are All Income Taxes Really The Same?
An Experimental Investigation into State and Federal Income-Tax
Salience 121
A.1 Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
A.2 Survey text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B Appendix of Chapter 3: Difficulty to Reach Respondents and
Nonresponse Bias: Evidence from Large Government Surveys 137
vii
LIST OF TABLES
1.1 Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 Rates and errors in reported current tax rate, by type . . . . . . . 19
1.3 Randomization checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4 State and Federal reports, by treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.5 Taxes included in round 2 answers (reported) . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.6 Taxes included in round 2 answers (reported), excluding zero tax
states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.7 Regression results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.8 Reported state rate as a function of actual state rate . . . . . . . . 28
1.9 Reported federal rate as a function of actual federal rate . . . . . . 28
1.10 Model results, primary sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.11 Randomization and results table, low error subsample . . . . . . . 31
1.12 Model results, low error sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.13 Comparing salience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.14 Treatment effects on change from R1 to R2, by state type . . . . . 36
1.15 Error in state current tax rate, by state type . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.16 Explaining error rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.17 Error in average current tax rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.1 Reported state and federal tax rates, by income level . . . . . . . . 51
2.2 Comparing average and marginal rate answers . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.3 Perceptions of local tax schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4 Perceptions of local tax schedule, progressive states . . . . . . . . . 55
2.5 Perceptions relative to kinks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.6 Mixture model results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.7 Latent class probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.8 Errors in federal report by location in income tax bracket . . . . . 67
2.9 Mixture model results, subsample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.10 Latent class probabilities, subsample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.1 CPS Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.2 Labor force participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.3 Unemployment rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.4 BRFSS Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.5 Obesity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.6 CEX Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.7 Total expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
A.1 Simulation regressions, full correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
A.2 Simulation regressions, doubled state error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
A.3 Simulation regressions, halved state error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B.1 CPS Demographics, with income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
viii
B.2 Labor force participation, self-reported only . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
B.3 Labor force participation, proxy-reported only . . . . . . . . . . . 141
B.4 Unemployment rate, self-reported only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
B.5 Unemployment rate, proxy-reported only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
B.6 Labor force participation, telephone interviews only . . . . . . . . 144
B.7 Unemployment rate, telephone interviews only . . . . . . . . . . . 145
B.8 Obesity, with controls for labor force participation . . . . . . . . . 146
B.9 Self-reported weight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
B.10 Self-reported height . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
B.11 Obesity, weighted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
B.12 Self-reported weight, weighted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
B.13 Self-reported height, weighted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
B.14 Obesity, interviewer-ID-controls sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
B.15 Obesity, interviewer-ID-controls sample with interviewer-ID controls 153
B.16 Total expenditures, second-interview difficulty . . . . . . . . . . . 154
B.17 Total expenditures, with additional interview controls . . . . . . . 155
B.18 Total expenditures, second-interview difficulty and additional in-
terview controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
B.19 Health expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
B.20 Food expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
B.21 Total expenditures, telephone interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
B.22 Total expenditures, personal interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
B.23 Life satisfaction, uncontrolled OLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
B.24 Life satisfaction, controlled OLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Experiment design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 Average absolute error in round 1 “Total tax” questions. . . . . . . 13
1.3 Actual rates and errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.1 Experiment design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.2 Type probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.1 Unemployment rate, by number of contact attempts and year . . . 119
B.1 Distribution of interview month, by location . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
B.2 Distribution of interview day of the month, by location . . . . . . . 164
B.3 Distribution of interview day of the week, by location . . . . . . . . 165
B.4 Distribution of number of contact attempts, by location . . . . . . 166
x
CHAPTER 1
ARE ALL INCOME TAXES REALLY THE SAME? AN
EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION INTO STATE AND FEDERAL
INCOME-TAX SALIENCE
1.1 Introduction
Public-finance research typically assumes that individuals know about and react
appropriately to all relevant taxes when they make decisions about which goods to
purchase and how much labor to supply to the market (Mirrlees, 1971; Diamond,
1980). However, recent evidence demonstrates that this classical assumption may
not always match how individuals actually make decisions. Indeed, recent studies
show that characteristics of both the individual and the tax can affect the way in
which people respond to a tax (Chetty et al., 2009; Taubinksy and Rees-Jones,
2017).
This paper studies whether people react differently to state and federal income
taxes. The source of an income tax should be irrelevant to labor-supply decisions
in a classical labor model. However, state and federal income taxes differ sub-
stantially in many domains: their discussion in national media, debate in political
campaigns, and in their average magnitudes. Any or all of these factors might
create a gap in salience between the two taxes. The difference in salience could
lead to differences in how individuals respond to each tax, despite the classical
assumption of equivalence. This paper examines individuals’ perceptions of taxes
using an experimental, incentivized elicitation of the individuals’ reports of vari-
ous income tax rates. I find evidence indicating individuals find state income taxes
substantially less salient than federal income taxes.
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The experiment has three main goals: (1) measure the relative salience of state
and federal income taxes, (2) measure relative knowledge and understanding of
state and federal income taxes, and (3) examine individual and structural deter-
minants of income-tax knowledge and salience. The online experiment uses the
Amazon MTurk platform to collect data from over 3,000 U.S. workers to elicit
their perceived total, federal, and state marginal income-tax rates. The MTurk
sample presents a relatively rare group of workers who are making intensive mar-
gin labor-supply decisions (choosing exactly how many MTurk tasks to perform for
pay). The experiment manipulates salience of the different types of taxes through
three conditions to test for salience differences. The two treatment conditions draw
the respondents’ attention to either state or federal taxes, depending on condition,
by asking them a series of five questions about what either the state or federal
rate would be at different incomes, and then asking the respondent to use one of
these rates in a simple calculation. The state treatment gets the state questions,
while the federal treatment gets the federal questions. In the control condition
respondents are not asked about specific income taxes, only total income taxes.
The initial effect of these treatments is measured by the change in reported total
tax rates.
I find several pieces of evidence consistent with a difference in the salience of
state and federal taxes. Respondents self-report the first piece of evidence when
asked what types of taxes they were including in their total tax-rate answers.
Overall, 55% of respondents include both state and federal income taxes in their
answers, while 35% report only including federal income taxes. Breaking down the
results by treatment group makes the differences in state and federal tax salience
much more stark. Participants in the control group include both state and federal
income taxes only 35% of the time, while including only federal income taxes 54%
2
of the time. Comparatively, these numbers dramatically flip in the state treatment:
respondents include both taxes 72% of the time, while only 17% of people report
including only federal taxes. Results in the federal treatment, in both cases, lie
between the state and control conditions and will be discussed in detail in Section
1.4. These self-reports indicate that respondents tend to ignore state taxes unless
something, such as the treatment, makes them more salient.
Regression analysis provides further evidence of a difference in salience. Re-
spondents are asked their perceived total tax rate before and after treatment.
Respondents in the state and federal treatment conditions have higher increases in
their reported total tax rate from pre- to post-treatment compared to the control
group. Treated groups’ reports increase by approximately 2.5 percentage points
between rounds (both significant at the 1% level); the control group has no sig-
nificant change. Notably, the change in the treated groups’ reports is of the same
magnitude as the median state income tax rate in the sample (4.5%). This result
suggests that many respondents were not initially including state taxes in their
estimates in round 1, but do so once the treatment makes state taxes salient. Ad-
ditionally, regressions show that individuals’ reported state rate is incorporated less
in their total rate answers than is their reported federal rates (i.e. one percentage
point of perceived state taxes increases their total less than one percentage point
of federal taxes). Specifically, in the absence of treatment, a one percentage-point
increase in a respondent’s reported state rate increases their total report by 0.1
percentage points, while an equivalent change in reported federal rate yields a 0.7
percentage-point increase. The state treatment substantially increases the effect of
reported state rates, giving it a total impact of 0.2 percentage points (statistically
significant at the 1% level). These estimates reflect a much stronger impact of an
individual’s federal rate on their beliefs about their total rate relative to their state
3
rate.
Finally, this paper builds and estimates a simple model of tax salience. In this
model, individuals’ perceptions of their state and federal tax rates are functions
of their true rates, but individuals may systematically over- or under-estimate a
given tax rate (empirically, respondents systematically over-estimate the state and
federal tax rates that they face). Total tax perception is a weighted combination
of specific tax rates, where the weight is a salience parameter specific to the tax.
If a tax is less salient it will have a lower salience parameter and, correspondingly,
have less effect on perceived total tax rates. Estimating this model yields salience
parameters consistent with state taxes being less salient than federal taxes. The
state salience parameter is 0.8 compared with a federal salience parameter of 1.1.
(A standard, rational agent would have full salience for both taxes: a salience
parameter of 1.)
This paper adds to a literature on the importance of salience in tax decisions.
Chetty et al. (2009) study the differences between state sales and excise taxes using
both experimental and field data. They find that individuals react less to taxes ap-
plied at the register (sales taxes) than to taxes included in the list price of the good
itself (excise taxes). The authors also highlight that salience affects optimal-tax
design, as less salient taxes distort consumer behavior by less. Similarly, Finkel-
stein (2009) finds that tolls that are paid in a less salient manner (electronically,
instead of in cash) create less response in consumer behavior, leading to higher toll
rates in areas with electronic payment. Recent contributions to this literature note
that characteristics of the consumer are also an important predictor of salience, as
low-income individuals pay attention and respond more fully to low-salience sales
taxes than high-income individuals (Goldin and Homonoff, 2013). This paper’s
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results further illustrate the importance of considering salience in tax design since
differential salience between groups has distributional welfare effects. This point
is reiterated in experimental evidence on sales taxes by Taubinksy and Rees-Jones
(2017), who find that there are heterogeneous types in the population with differ-
ent attentiveness to less salient sales taxes; this difference in attentiveness persists
even at artificially-created extreme tax rates.
A related literature explores individuals’ knowledge of and (mis)perceptions
of income taxes. Survey analysis in Gideon (2017) provides evidence that indi-
viduals do not correctly perceive the progressive nature of federal income taxes,
underestimating its progressivity, by overestimating average tax rates and under-
estimating marginal tax rates. Other work shows that the complicated nature of
the federal tax structure causes people to incorrectly react to tax credits (Feldman
et al., 2016; Miller and Mumford, 2015). While economic theory predicts that in-
dividuals will react to changing tax schedules by bunching at discontinuities, field
evidence shows that many taxpayers do not react to these changes (Saez, 2010).
Furthermore, experimental evidence from Rees-Jones and Taubinsky (2016) shows
the classical perception bias of ironing (using average rates instead of marginal
rates) in individuals’ reports of the tax schedule.
By presenting results from an experiment, this paper will contribute novel
evidence in the domain of state income-tax salience and knowledge, an area that
has been relatively unstudied (research has largely focused on sales and excise
taxes). State income taxes are important as both a policy lever and revenue
source for state policymakers. In 2014, state income taxes made up approximately
one-fifth of state government revenues and was the second largest tax source for
state governments, after only sales taxes (TPC, 2017). This number represents
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over $300 billion in annual state income taxes paid by consumers and highlights
the economic importance of understanding how consumers do or do not correctly
perceive and react to these state taxes.
Much like sales and excise taxes, different sources of income taxes should have
the same final effect on consumer behavior through their effect on the final price.
However, unlike sales and excise taxes, there is not an immediately identifiable
mechanism (e.g. posted versus register price) through which the salience operates
for income taxes. Therefore, this paper highlights a new potential channel for
studying salience in public finance and a new source for identifying factors influ-
encing salience. This paper begins this search for mechanisms through studying
a variety of individual and policy characteristics to determine what might effect
salience. While this paper’s initial findings on this front are inconclusive, the con-
sistent evidence of differential salience indicates that this is a potentially fruitful
area for future research.
1.2 Experiment
The experiment aims to measure individuals’ perceived marginal tax rates and ma-
nipulate the salience between state and federal income taxes. Figure 1.1 illustrates
the experiment’s overall design. The experiment’s core is divided into five primary
sections, each containing five questions. These questions ask about the marginal
tax rate at a given income for an example household, similar to the respondent’s
own. The primary question gives the respondent an initial income level and asks
“How much more would the [example household] have, after paying all income
taxes on the additional earnings, if it had made an additional $100?”, where the
6
Figure 1.1: Experiment design
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Round 2: Total Tax 
Knowledge
Round 2: Total Tax 
Knowledge
Federal Tax 
Knowledge
Federal Tax
 Knowledge
Total Tax 
Knowledge
Total Tax 
Knowledge
State Tax 
Knowledge
State Tax
 Knowledge
Total Tax 
Knowledge
State Tax 
Knowledge
Federal Tax 
Knowledge
Federal Tax
 Knowledge
State Tax 
Knowledge
p=1/3      p=1/3        p=1/3 
p=1/2          p=1/2             p=1/2            p=1/2            p=1/2   p=1/2 
R
1
R
2
S                       F                    C
S/F/C
Notes: This figure illustrates the experimental design. All participants begin with the same
three sections before being randomized to one of two treatment groups (State or Federal) or the
control group. By the end of the experiment, all participants receive each of the three main
sections R1, S, F, C, and R2. However, randomization controls the order that they receive S,
F, and C.
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specific type of tax is then varied by section.
Three sections use this exact question to ask about the combined total marginal
income tax rate faced by the household. In the figure these are sections Round
1 (R1), Round 2 (R2), and Combined (C). Another section focuses on federal
income taxes, labeled F (Federal) in the figure. The final section, State (S), asks
about state income taxes.
The treatments manipulate the salience of state and federal income taxes by
changing the order in which the respondents are asked for sections S and F. Asking
about a specific tax rate should make a less salient tax more salient to the indi-
vidual. However, if the tax was already fully salient, then asking about it should
not change its salience. Asking the respondent about no specific taxes in section
C serves as a control. Each section follows the same general format: marginal
tax rates are elicited at five income levels, centered on the respondent’s household
income. The sections differ only in which specific type of income tax is asked
about and at what income levels. Salience is initially measured by seeing how the
respondents’ answers in R2 change after being asked specifically about either state
or federal income taxes, depending on their treatment.
Respondents are recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform.
Respondents need to have completed at least 100 previous assignments on the
platform with an approval rate of at least 95% to be eligible to participate in
the experiment. Only residents of the U.S., as determined by Amazon’s address
verification, are eligible. Respondents can complete the experiment only once.1
Primary data collection occurred during the tax filing season for 2016: January
27th, 2017 through April 3rd, 2017. An additional data collection period aiming
1Respondents to early pilot versions of the experiment are not eligible to participate in the
final version of the experiment (as verified by the worker’s MTurk ID, assigned by Amazon).
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to collect at least 300 respondents from each of California and New York (the two
largest states with progressive tax schedules) continued until May 5th, 2017.
In many settings, including this one, there are concerns about the external va-
lidity of findings from online samples. For this specific question, however, online
workers provide an interesting sample of individuals who have control over their
labor supply on the intensive margin: they choose how many online tasks to com-
plete. Unlike most workers, who tend to have less intensive margin flexibility, the
marginal tax rates may be particularly relevant for this sample. (Although, given
potential for effort and measurement concerns, discussed later, I do not rely on
this claim and, instead, only note that this sample’s intensive margin flexibility
makes them an interesting group to study.)
The survey begins with a brief series of questions to determine the respondent’s
eligibility to participate and to elicit basic information on their household’s tax fil-
ing situation for 2016. The respondent is asked to provide the household’s state,
income, and basic tax filing information (number of dependents, filing type, and
disability status of household members). If the respondent knows and provides the
relevant information, the respondent is then introduced to the example household,
which serves as the basis for subsequent tax questions. The example household
is customized to be similar to the respondent in key features (household income,
state of residence, filing type and number of dependents), but has a (potentially)
simplified tax situation. The primary simplifications are that the example house-
hold only has salary income, uses only standard deductions, and lives in a location
without a city or county income tax.
Respondents must then demonstrate understanding of the example household
through a brief quiz on its tax-related characteristics. Respondents that pass
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the quiz are given two sample questions, along with feedback, illustrating how to
answer the tax questions that make up the bulk of the experiment. These training
questions differ from the real questions in that a randomly chosen tax rate is
provided and there is never a mention of a specific type of income tax (unlike the
sections S or F, but equivalent to sections R1, R2, and C).
Respondents are paid a participation fee of $1 for completing the entire sur-
vey.2 Each respondent can then earn up to an additional $0.50 depending on their
accuracy. Respondents are informed that one of the post-training questions will
be randomly selected for payment. Payment is determined using a quadratic loss
formula and how close the question’s answer is to the true answer.3 The training
questions include an explanation of the payment scheme and an example illustrat-
ing how wrong answers lead to a lower bonus payment. The correct tax rates were
determined using Taxsim9.4
After training, the respondent is asked to report on how much the household
would pay in marginal income taxes on $100 in additional income at five different
income levels as part of R1. The five income levels are the respondent’s current
income and that income plus and minus both five and fifteen percent. After R1,
the respondent is randomized to one of three sections (S, F, or C) which deter-
mines the type of taxes the questions asks about. In the first condition, state
treatment, the respondent is asked about state income taxes at five different in-
2This completion fee was initially $0.50 but was increased to $1 to recruit the target primary
sample of 3,000 respondents.
3The formula used was Payment = $0.50 − 10 ∗ (True tax rate −
Implied tax rate from answer)2 ∗ 0.50.
4Due to the timing of the experiment, designed to occur in the tax filing season for 2016, the
state rate estimates in Taxsim were not yet available, so state rates from 2015 were used. Prior
to making this decision, pilot data was used to back-test this strategy for the previous 10 years
of state rates changes and the effect on payment was shown to be negligible (with zero effect in
the overwhelming majority of cases). 2015 rates are also being used as the actual rates in this
analysis.
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come levels (presented in a random order) in section S. These five income levels
are also centered on the respondent’s income, but the other four levels are plus and
minus three and ten percent. The respondent is then asked to use one of their tax
rate answers in a calculation to determine how much the household would pay in
state taxes on an additional $600 of income. The other two treatment groups only
differ in the type of income tax the respondent was asked about. In the second
treatment group, the respondent is asked about federal income taxes in F. While
the third group, the control, receives C, and the respondent is again asked about
all income taxes (with no specific types mentioned).
After the treatment, all respondents proceed to R2 to receive the same five
questions about all income taxes that they had previously answered in R1. After
answering the tax-rate questions, the respondent reports on what types of taxes
they included in their answers for R2. The respondent then receives the two sets
(in random order) of specific tax questions (S, F, or C) that they did not receive as
an initial treatment between R1 and R2. All respondents then report the average
state, federal, and total taxes the example household would pay at the respondents’
current income level. Finally, the respondents are asked a series of more detailed
demographic and tax-filing questions.5
A total of 3,160 respondents complete at least R2 and pass the attention check
embedded in the first round of questions.6 To eliminate individuals who seem to be
misunderstanding the questions or not trying to answer the survey correctly, I focus
the primary analysis on the 2,326 respondents who are the most accurate on the
R1 questions (i.e. the most accurate before any treatment). These respondents are
identified by using an error index of the average absolute error on the five questions
5See appendix A.2 for full survey text.
6The attention check asks the respondent to enter the name of the example household instead
of a tax rate and occurs after the five other tax-rate questions in R1.
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Table 1.1: Demographics
Analysis Sample Full sample
Female 0.568*** 0.587
Age: 18–29 0.282 0.269
30–39 0.339 0.329
40–49 0.181 0.172
50–59 0.112 0.106
60 and up 0.058 0.054
Taxes prepared by: Self, by hand 0.057 0.056
Self, by software 0.613** 0.578
Other HH member 0.075 0.076
Tax professional 0.227 0.220
H.H. Income: $0– $29,999 0.216*** 0.240
$30,000– $49,999 0.216 0.224
$50,000– $84,999 0.304*** 0.289
$85,000 or more 0.264*** 0.247
Education: High school, or less 0.060*** 0.070
Some college or tech. school 0.286*** 0.298
College 0.425*** 0.390
Graduate or professional degree 0.216*** 0.188
Income source: Salaries, wages or tips 0.847** 0.839
Self-employment income 0.071*** 0.078
Government transfers 0.032 0.033
N 2,326 3,039
Notes: The right column contains the sample demographics from the individuals that completed
the survey and passed the attention check embedded in R1. The left column is the demographics
from the primary analysis sample which, in addition to finishing the survey and passing the
attention check, had less the 75th percentile of total error in R1. Stars indicate statistically
significant difference between analysis sample and excluded sample. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
in R1. Figure 1.2 presents a histogram this index. The median error per question
is approximately 17 percentage points. Respondents are classified as being part of
the “low error” analysis sample if they have less than the 75th percentile on this
metric; corresponding to a cutoff of less than 30 percentage points of average error.
The left column of Table 1.1 contains the demographics of the primary analysis
sample. The analysis sample skews female (57%). The bulk of the sample is
relatively young with almost two-thirds of the sample under the age of fifty. There
is a wide distribution of household income in the sample: 22% earn less than
$30,000 and another 26% earn more than $85,000 a year. This wide income range
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Figure 1.2: Average absolute error in round 1 “Total tax”
questions.
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Histogram of average absolute error in Round 1
Notes: The average error, in percentage point terms, of the five
total income tax questions in R1.
is useful for generating a variety of income taxes faced, as the federal income
tax system (and many state income tax systems) are progressive: higher incomes
lead to higher tax rates. In general, the sample is extremely highly educated,
less than 10% of the sample did not participate in at least some post-secondary
education. Usefully, two-thirds of the respondents are responsible for completing
their household’s taxes, either by hand (6%) or by using tax-preparation software
(61%). For comparison purposes, the right column presents the demographics of
the full potential sample (those who passed the attention check and completed
R2). In general, the full sample is somewhat less likely to prepare their own taxes,
is slightly less educated, and has a lower household income.
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1.3 Theoretical and Empirical Framework
1.3.1 Theoretical Framework
The experiment is motivated by the following theoretical model: Individual i faces
a true total marginal tax rate (τ ∗Ti) for labor income that is the sum of his federal,
state, and payroll marginal tax rates (τ ∗Fi , τ
∗
Si
, and τ ∗Pi respectively):
τ ∗Ti = τ
∗
Fi
+ τ ∗Si + τ
∗
Pi
(1.1)
In practice, there is not a sufficient amount of useful variation in the payroll tax
faced by households in my sample since only very high-earning households expe-
rience changes in their payroll tax rate. Additionally, I do not separately observe
participants’ perceptions of payroll taxes, therefore I limit my modeling focus to
the individual’s state and federal taxes.
For each specific tax type L, the individual has a perception (τLi) that may be
different from their true tax rate (τ ∗Li). Their perceived federal and state tax rates
are then:
τFi = βF,0 + βF,1τ
∗
Fi
+ δFi (1.2)
τSi = βS,0 + βS,1τ
∗
Si
+ δSi (1.3)
βL,0 captures the degree to which all individuals systematically either overestimate
(if βL > 0) or underestimate (βL < 0) the specific tax and δLi represents the
individual-specific error in perception around the true specific tax rate. If individ-
uals are fully rational then βS,0 = βF,0 = 0 as individuals will make no systematic
mistakes in perceiving their taxes. βL,1 represents the extent to which the true tax
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rate is reflected in the individual’s perception.
The individual’s perception of their total marginal tax rate is a weighted com-
bination of their individual tax rates, where each specific tax rate is weighted by
a salience parameter (θL):
τTi = βT,0 + θF τFi + θSτSi (1.4)
For fully knowledgeable, rational individuals βT,0 will equal τ
∗
P as they correctly
include their payroll taxes in their total tax perception. θF and θS will also both
equal 1 as each specific tax perception is fully incorporated into their perception
of the total tax rate. However, if individuals find some taxes less salient, then
perceptions of that tax will not be fully reflected in their total perceived tax rate
and θL may be less than 1.
Each individual i’s perception of tax rate L is elicited at trial j with error (ij),
so that the observed perceptions of tax rate L ( ˆτLi) are:
τˆFi = βF,0 + βF,1τ
∗
Fi
+ δFi + ij (1.5)
τˆSi = βS,0 + βS,1τ
∗
Si
+ δSi + ij (1.6)
τˆTi = βT + θF τFi + θSτSi + ij (1.7)
Substitution yields that the individual’s observed perception of total tax rate will
be:
τˆTi = βT + θF (βF,0 + βF,1τ
∗
Fi
+ δFi) + θS(βS,0 + βS,1τ
∗
Si
+ δSi) + ij (1.8)
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The experiment manipulates the salience of the taxes for individuals for whom
the taxes are not salient. Asking about specific taxes likely increases their salience
to the individual, so that being asked to identify their state tax rate will increase its
salience when the individual later gives an total tax rate. Therefore the salience
of a tax (θHL ) will depend on the treatment history, H, of the individual. This
predicts that θSS ≥ θCS and θSS ≥ θS: state taxes will be more salient for those in
the state treatment than in the control and will be more salient for those in the
state treatment than the untreated, respectively.
While not an ex-ante prediction, it also became clear during pilot testing the
experiment that thinking about any given specific rate increases the salience of all
the other rates, as it may remind the individual that other rates exist. Thus state
tax salience is higher in the federal treatment than it is initially or in the control
treatment: θFS ≥ θS and θFS ≥ θCS . The salience-increasing effect of asking about a
specific tax rate is likely to be strongest on that specific tax (relative to its effect
on the salience of other taxes) so that θSS > θ
F
S .
1.3.2 Empirical Framework
I focus on three primary regressions to get a descriptive estimate of the effect of
salience. The first examines the average impact of treatment on how answers to
the total tax questions changed between round 1 and round 2:
R2 −R1 = β0 + β1IS + β2IF (1.9)
The dependent variable is the total tax rate implied by the round-1 answer (R1)
subtracted from the round-2 tax rate (R2). A positive change indicates that the
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reported total tax rate went up between rounds, while a negative change indicates
that the tax rate went down. The two independent variables are indicators for the
treatment group the respondent is assigned to, either state (IS) or federal (IF ),
while the omitted category is the control group. If, as hypothesized, state taxes
are not initially salient to individuals and being randomized to the state treatment
group increases the salience of state taxes between the rounds then β1 should be
positive.
Regression 1.10, examines the degree to which respondents’ round-2 reported
total-tax rates reflect their reported state and federal tax rates, and the degree to
which treatment affects this:
R2 = β0 +β1IS +β2IF +β3τˆS +β4IS τˆS +β4IF τˆS +β5τˆF +β6IS τˆF +β7IF τˆF (1.10)
In this equation τˆS and τˆF are the respondents’ reported state and federal tax rates,
respectively. Once again, IS and IF are indicators for assignment to the state or
federal treatment groups. In this regression, treatment assignment is interacted
separately with the respondent’s reported rate for each type of tax. If individuals
are perfectly rational, i.e. both taxes are fully salient, then β3 and β5 would be the
only statistically significant coefficients and their value would be expected to be 1:
all respondents’ answers would include their reported state and federal income tax
rates. The degree to which these coefficients are initially less than one indicates
the relative salience of different taxes and the interaction terms indicate how much
the treatments impacted salience.
Equation 1.11 is identical to regression 1.10, except that reported rates (τˆ) are
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replaced with the respondent’s actual rates (τ ∗):
R2 = β0 +β1IS +β2IF +β3τ
∗
S +β4ISτ
∗
S +β4IF τ
∗
S +β5τ
∗
F +β6ISτ
∗
F +β7IF τ
∗
F (1.11)
If respondents perfectly knew their taxes, and reported them without error, then
regression 1.11 would be expected to yield the same results as 1.10. However,
individuals may imprecisely know their tax rates, or their reports might be an
imperfect function of the truth, so regression 1.11 will capture the amount the
effect of the actual rates on overall reporting behavior, which might systematically
differ from the effect of respondents’ beliefs about taxes.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Descriptive Results
Table 1.2 presents basic statistics about the actual tax rates faced by respondents
and their errors in reporting tax rates for the five marginal-tax questions at the
respondents’ current income. The rates presented are for the five different sections:
state, federal, total, round 1 and round 2. The error is equal to the reported tax
rate minus the actual tax rate. Positive values represent a reported tax rate higher
than the actual tax rate and negative values represent underestimates in reporting.
The first row of errors contains the median error for each report. The median
error in federal reports is to overestimate the federal income tax by 3 percentage
points and, similarly, the median state response is overestimated by 2 percentage
points. On the other hand, the total taxes paid by the household are consistently
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underestimated: the median errors are 3 to 7 percentage points below the truth,
depending on the section. The switch from over- to underestimating taxes when
going from specific taxes to total taxes is suggestive that the median respondent
may be ignoring payroll taxes in their estimate of total taxes; the payroll tax rate
is approximately the size of the net difference in reports.
Table 1.2: Rates and errors in reported current tax rate, by type
Actual rates:
Federal State Total
Median 15 4.6 28.7
Mean 18.3 4.1 29.3
25p 15 1.8 25.7
75p 25 6 36.0
Errors in reports:
Federal State Combined Round 1 Round 2
Median 3.0 2.0 -3.4 -6.7 -4.3
Mean 6.4 11.9 -1.3 -4.4 -2.3
25p -4.0 0.0 -11.7 -14.7 -12.7
75p 13.0 14.8 6.4 2.8 5.4
N 2,220 2,253 2,204 2,391 2,254
Notes: Error = Reported rate minus true rate. Positive value represent overestimates
of true taxes, while negative values represent underestimates of true taxes.
1.4.2 Randomization check
In order to verify that randomization is successful and that my analysis sample
selection did not lead to selection bias, I consider if round-1 answers vary by treat-
ment assignment. Table 1.3 regresses the respondents’ R1 answers on treatment
assignment. Since treatment occurs after R1, it should not have an impact. Indeed,
treatment does not have a statistically significant impact on the R1 answers.
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Table 1.3: Randomization checks
(1)
VARIABLES R1
State treatment -0.713
(0.878)
Federal treatment 0.025
(0.879)
Observations 2,326
R-squared 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable for the regres-
sion is the Round 1 total tax rate. Explanatory
variables are the individual’s treatment assign-
ment. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Another potential concern for the paper’s analysis is that treatment changes
the ordering of the specific rate questions. In the state treatment, the state rate
is elicited before the federal rate, while in the federal treatment the federal rate is
given before the state rate. To check if this ordering impacts the specific rates given,
the reported state and federal rates were regressed on the treatment indicators in
Table 1.4. As reported in the table, the treatment has no significant impact on the
overall reported state rate. In fact, the treatment does not interact significantly
with either of the reported rates that are used as inputs for further regressions.
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Table 1.4: State and Federal reports, by treat-
ment
(1) (2)
VARIABLES State Federal
State treatment 1.614 -0.534
(1.147) (0.895)
Federal treatment 0.489 0.608
(1.148) (0.895)
Constant 15.087*** 24.529***
(0.809) (0.631)
Observations 2,326 2,326
R-squared 0.001 0.001
Notes: The left column regresses the individual’s re-
ported state income tax rate on their treatment, while
the right column repeats this analysis with the individ-
ual’s reported federal rate as the dependent variable. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1.4.3 Reduced-form Results
Table 1.5 contains the first evidence that there are different levels of salience be-
tween state and federal incomes taxes and that the experiment successfully manip-
ulated salience. The table categorizes, by treatment group, individuals’ self-reports
of specific taxes included as part of their estimates of total taxes in round 2. Re-
spondents are asked to provide this information immediately after round 2. As
predicted, the state treatment made state taxes more salient: 72% of respondents
in the state treatment include both federal and state taxes in their round 2 esti-
mates, while only 35% of respondents do in the control. The federal treatment also
seems to have made state taxes somewhat more salient (albeit, less salient than in
the state group) and the proportion thinking about both types of taxes increases
to 56%. These changes correspond with decreases in individuals who report only
including federal taxes, shrinking from over half in the control to 17% and 35% in
the state and federal treatments, respectively. If we exclude respondents in states
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without income taxes, the share reporting both federal and state taxes increases
by about 5 to 10 percentage points across treatments with corresponding decreases
in those who report only federal taxes (as seen in Table 1.6).
Table 1.5: Taxes included in round 2 answers (reported)
Treatment
Thinking about: State Federal Control Total
Federal (N) 128 268 417 813
(% of column) 16.5 34.7 53.5 35.0
State 70 23 63 156
9.0 3.0 8.1 6.8
Federal & state 556 463 269 1,288
71.8 56.0 34.5 55.4
Neither 20 18 31 69
2.6 2.3 4.0 3.0
Total 774 772 780 2,326
Notes: Table presents respondents’ self-reports of which taxes they included in their answers
in R2, categorized as to whether they include federal income taxes, state income taxes, both
or neither (categories are mutually exclusive). The first three columns separate the sample by
treatment condition, while the third presents the results for the entire sample.
Table 1.6: Taxes included in round 2 answers (reported), excluding zero tax states
Treatment
Thinking about: State Federal Control Total
Federal (N) 73 179 309 561
(% of column) 11.5 27.5 47.5 29.0
State 59 22 59 140
9.3 3.4 9.1 7.2
Federal & state 484 434 258 1,176
76.5 66.7 39.7 60.8
Neither 17 16 24 57
2.7 2.5 3.7 3.0
Total 633 651 650 1,934
Notes: Replicates Table 1.5 but restricts sample to those in states with an income tax.
About 10% of respondents, across groups, answer in a manner inconsistent with
my original expectation: either only including state taxes in their answer (which
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runs counter to the hypothesis that federal taxes would be most salient) or in-
cluding neither federal or state taxes in their round-2 reports (seemingly implying
neither tax is salient to the individual). While some of these reports might be
explained by an unexpected model of salience (or combination of salience parame-
ters) for these individuals, it seems likely that many of these individuals remained
confused (or inattentive) to the experimental task. Further evidence for confu-
sion as an explanation is that the standard deviation in the errors in this group is
substantially higher than in the other groups (36pp and 27pp, respectively).
The results from regression 1.9 are presented in column 1 of Table 1.7. The
effect of being in the state treatment is, as expected, positive and significant:
answers go up on average by 2 percentage points between round 1 and round 2 for
participants in the state treatment relative to the control group. The impact of
the federal treatment group is also positive: answers in the federal group went up
3 percentage points on average. These results provide further support that state
taxes seem less salient to respondents. Reminding them that state taxes exist,
either by having them think explicitly about state tax rates or by reminding them
that federal tax rates are separate from total tax rates, increases their estimate of
total taxes.7
Column 2 of Table 1.7 presents the results from regression 1.10. Both treat-
ments increase the average reported rate, as the treatment effects are positive and
significant; further indication they are now including state taxes. These treatment
effects are once again roughly in line with average state income tax rates in the
sample. I also find that the respondents’ answers include a higher proportion of
their reported federal tax rate than their reported state tax rate. The coefficient
7Adding additional individual controls for age, gender, education and income yield qualita-
tively identical, and numerically similar results for all regressions discussed in this section.
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Table 1.7: Regression results
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES R2-R1 R2 R2
State treatment 2.392*** 2.835** 0.507
(0.807) (1.152) (2.252)
Federal treatment 2.745*** 4.341*** 5.903***
(0.807) (1.171) (2.274)
State rate, reported 0.097***
(0.029)
State Trt. * State rate 0.125***
(0.038)
Fed. Trt. * State rate 0.047
(0.037)
Federal rate, reported 0.680***
(0.035)
State Trt. * Fed. rate -0.127***
(0.047)
Fed. Trt. * Fed. rate -0.110**
(0.046)
State rate, actual 0.821***
(0.232)
State Trt. * State rate 0.383
(0.314)
Fed Trt. * State rate 0.062
(0.328)
Federal rate, actual 0.557***
(0.079)
State Trt. * Federal rate -0.006
(0.105)
Fed Trt. * Federal rate -0.174
(0.111)
Constant 0.529 7.442*** 11.866***
(0.569) (0.823) (1.635)
Observations 2,326 2,326 2,326
R-squared 0.006 0.486 0.100
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. The dependent vari-
able for each regression is either the Round 2 total tax rate or the difference
between Round 2 and Round 1. Explanatory variables are the individual’s
treatment assignment and either the individual’s actual tax rates or the in-
dividual’s reported tax rate (depending on the specific regression) interacted
with treatment assignment. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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for state taxes is 0.10, meaning total tax answers only increase 0.1 percentage
points for every 1 point increase in reported state rate. Federal taxes have a much
higher coefficient of 0.7; federal tax beliefs have about seven times the impact of
state tax beliefs. Furthermore, the state treatment more than doubles the degree
to which the state tax is included in round-2 estimates: the interaction effect is 0.1.
While the majority of the results point to state taxes being initially less salient,
there is one piece of evidence that does not fit with the predicted model of salience:
the impact of treatment on the effect of reported federal rates. Both treatment
interactions are statistically significant and negative (−0.1). However, these neg-
ative interactions only slightly offset the main effect of treatment on the reported
total rates which are 2.8 and 4.3 percentage points higher in the state and federal
treatment groups, respectively. Overall, the treatment increased reports on net,
which is consistent with the salience hypothesis, as is the fact that state reports
influence the total less than federal reports.
Column 3 of Table 1.7 presents the results of regression 1.11. I find that
the effect of actual tax rates are positive and significant. Respondents’ round-
2 answers reflect their true underlying tax rates to some degree, although less than
1. Interestingly, the coefficient is higher for state rates (0.8) than for federal rates
(0.6). There is also no indication that the treatment changes the degree to which
the actual tax rates are reflected in round-2 answers and none of the interactions
are significant. The only significant estimate is the effect of being in the federal
treatment which raises the average report by 6 percentage points. Note, the R2
also drops to 0.1 from 0.49 in the prior regression. These results are consistent
with the fact that individuals’ state and federal rates contain a large amount of
error, and therefore their reported rates may be a better source for testing the
salience hypothesis.
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Overall, regressions 1.9 and 1.10 provide the strongest reduced-form evidence of
differential tax salience between federal and state taxes. The fact that reminding
individuals of particular taxes changes their answers indicates that they were not
initially considering all taxes. This evidence is further strengthened by the fact that
reported state rates impact the respondents’ overall report at roughly one-seventh
the rate of reported federal taxes and that the impact of state rates over doubles
when the respondent has been prompted to think about state rates specifically.
These are also the two regressions which provide the cleanest test of tax salience
as motivated by the theoretical model. Individuals’ reports of total taxes should
be most directly effected by their beliefs of the specific underlying tax rates. It
is, in fact, the salience of these underlying beliefs that the experiment attempts
to manipulate. Individuals’ actual tax rates are a step removed from salience in
the model and may be subject to biases due to individuals’ errors, systematic
or otherwise, in beliefs. Actual rates also suffer from an additional source of
measurement error: they are correct for the “example” household, but due to
misreported income or differences in tax-filing behavior may not be always correct
for the respondent.
1.5 Model estimation
Next, I estimate a model of tax salience. This approach has the advantage of
recovering direct salience-parameter estimates, whereas the reduced-form analysis
only provided evidence for the relative effect of salience between the two taxes. The
cost of this approach is that it requires much stronger, and potentially unrealistic,
assumptions about how individuals perceive and report their tax rates. While the
model matches the literature on tax salience and offers an appealing framework for
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thinking about salience in this domain, it likely oversimplifies the unknown and
heterogeneous nature of the true data-generating process by which individuals are
reporting their tax rates. Therefore, estimates of the salience parameters should be
taken only as further suggestive evidence of differences between the taxes, instead
of as direct policy parameters.
To estimate the model, I begin by simplifying the error structure relative to
the model in Section 1.3.1. Specifically, I assume that the individual error in
perception of tax rate (δL,i) is absorbed into the individual reporting error (L,i)
when I elicit the tax rates. With this simplification, I can then estimate the two
equations describing the individual’s perceived federal and state tax rates directly:
τˆFi = βF,0 + βF,1τ
∗
Fi
+ Fi (1.12)
τˆSi = βS,0 + βS,1τ
∗
Si
+ Si (1.13)
Column 1 of Tables 1.8 and 1.9 contain the results from a regression of reported rate
on actual rate for state and federal rates respectively. The state regression yields a
coefficient that is approximately 1 in the linear specifications, while it is 0.5 for the
federal rate (columns 2 and 3 present alternative quadratic and cubic specifications
which yield similar predicted values). Fitted values from this regression are then
used to directly estimate the salience parameters:
τTi = βT,0 + θ
H
F τFi + θ
H
S τSi + Ti (1.14)
Table 1.10 presents the corresponding salience parameter estimates. I find
qualitatively similar results in all three specifications (the primary linear specifica-
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Table 1.8: Reported state rate as a function of actual state rate
(1) (2) (3)
State rate State rate State rate
VARIABLES reported reported reported
State rate, actual 0.948*** 1.297*** 1.017**
(0.160) (0.264) (0.513)
State rate squared, actual -0.038* 0.010
(0.023) (0.079)
State rate cubed, actual -0.001
(0.002)
Constant 12.173*** 11.706*** 11.881***
(0.798) (0.846) (0.890)
Observations 2,400 2,400 2,400
R-squared 0.014 0.016 0.016
Notes: Dependent variable is reported state tax rate (at current income).
Each column presents the regression for a different specification, allowing
the reported rate to be a linear, quadratic, or cubic function of actual rate,
respectively. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 1.9: Reported federal rate as a function of actual federal
rate
(1) (2) (3)
Federal rate Federal rate Federal rate
VARIABLES reported reported reported
Federal rate, actual 0.512*** 0.464*** 0.540***
(0.040) (0.070) (0.086)
Federal rate squared, actual 0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Federal rate cubed, actual -0.000
(0.000)
Constant 15.271*** 15.443*** 14.492***
(0.815) (0.840) (1.045)
Observations 2,367 2,367 2,367
R-squared 0.064 0.064 0.065
Notes: Dependent variable is reported federal tax rate (at current income).
Each column presents the regression for a different specification, allowing
the reported rate to be a linear, quadratic, or cubic function of actual rate,
respectively. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
tion, as well as, the additional quadratic and cubic specifications). The state tax
salience is lower than the federal tax salience with state tax salience being around
0.8, while federal tax salience is around 1.1. This finding means that individuals
are overweighting federal taxes in their answers while underweighting state taxes.
A surprising finding, given the reduced form results, is there is no statistically sig-
nificant effect of treatment on any of the salience estimates; nothing is significant
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Table 1.10: Model results, primary sample
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES R2 R2 R2
θS 0.828*** 0.790*** 0.770***
(0.232) (0.203) (0.216)
State trt.* θS 0.386 0.436 0.385
(0.318) (0.304) (0.312)
Fed trt.* θS 0.062 0.065 0.064
(0.332) (0.307) (0.294)
θF 1.108*** 1.100*** 1.076***
(0.135) (0.150) (0.140)
State trt.* θF -0.012 -0.075 -0.026
(0.191) (0.206) (0.193)
Fed trt.* θF -0.346* -0.345* -0.318
(0.194) (0.202) (0.205)
State trt. -3.845 -3.061 -3.452
(5.777) (5.796) (5.558)
Fed trt. 10.480 10.417 9.765*
(6.752) (6.412) (5.490)
Constant -14.865*** -14.070*** -13.172***
(4.287) (4.165) (3.957)
Observations 2,326 2,326 2,326
R-squared 0.100 0.100 0.101
Specification for Linear Quadratic Cubic
reported rates
Notes: Each column presents the structural estimate from a differ-
ent model of salience. The left column presents the estimates when
reported state and federal rates are a linear function of actual rates.
The second column contains estimates when reported state and fed-
eral rates are a quadratic function of actual rates. Finally, column
3 allows reported rates to be a cubic function of actual rates. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
at the 5% level, and only two of the twelve total interactions are significant at the
10% level.
1.6 Subsample Analysis
As discussed previously, there is a large amount of error in individuals’ reports of
marginal tax rates, especially in the “tails.” Through exploring the effect of this
reporting error using simulation analyses, I found that the size of reporting error
29
() in the reported rates could potentially confound measurements of salience.8 My
simulations show that large reporting error becomes a problem if (i) reported rates
are correlated strongly with actual rates, and (ii) if reported rates increase as the
underlying truth increases. The mistakes in reporting create a weaker relationship
between the reported specific rates and the reported total rates which leads to
smaller estimated coefficients for the reported state and federal rates. This concern
motivates an additional set of analyses focused on samples with less error in their
reports.
The preferred subsample, explored in this section, consists of individuals who
made no bigger than a 20 percentage point error, in absolute terms, in reporting
their state, federal or round-2 total rate (the rates used as components in the
primary analyses). Additional subsamples explored, but not reported, are (i) those
with less than 30 percentage point errors in the same three reports and (ii) those
with correct answers to both training questions and (iii) error on their round-1
answers less than the median amount of combined error.9
Table 1.11 recreates and combines Tables 1.3 and 1.7 with the preferred sub-
sample. A potential concern is that the subsample might suffer from some degree
of selection bias since the treatment may influence the degree of error in round-2
and/or in the state and federal reports, and thus change who is removed from the
sample. This concern is somewhat substantiated in column 1 as the treatment
groups have lower round-1 answers than the control group. However this selection
is in the opposite direction from the hypothesized treatment effect (which should
then increase round-2 reports). After treatment the round-2 reports are signifi-
cantly higher and the difference between round 2 and round 1 is higher than in
8For details, see Appendix A.1.
9Results in these subsamples generally qualitatively mirror the original sample or the preferred
subsample.
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Table 1.11: Randomization and results table, low error subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES R1 R2-R1 R2 R2
State treatment -1.466* 2.682*** -0.374 0.198
(0.843) (0.678) (1.022) (1.233)
Federal treatment -1.664** 3.354*** 1.513 0.796
(0.831) (0.668) (1.023) (1.266)
State rate, reported 0.176***
(0.047)
State Trt. * State rate 0.137**
(0.065)
Fed. Trt. * State rate 0.079
(0.069)
Federal rate, reported 0.857***
(0.033)
State Trt. * Fed. rate 0.059
(0.047)
Fed. Trt. * Fed. rate -0.035
(0.045)
State rate, actual 0.675***
(0.131)
State Trt. * State rate 0.270
(0.191)
Fed Trt. * State rate 0.011
(0.186)
Federal rate, actual 0.635***
(0.045)
State Trt. * Federal rate 0.014
(0.062)
Fed Trt. * Federal rate 0.057
(0.064)
Constant 23.366*** -0.450 4.739*** 8.860***
(0.594) (0.477) (0.733) (0.901)
Observations 1,446 1,446 1,446 1,446
R-squared 0.003 0.019 0.633 0.416
Notes: Replicates and combines Tables 1.3 and 1.7 with the low-error subsample. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
the primary sample (and statistically significant). Despite these potential selec-
tion concerns, the potential bias from measurement error in the primary sample
justifies an examination of the salience estimates in this low error group.
With these caveats in mind, column 5 provides additional evidence of salience
effects. The reported state rate influences the round-2 report at a rate of 0.2, while
the effect of federal rates is over four times as large (0.9). State treatment further
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increases the salience of state rates, with the interaction term being 0.1, effectively
doubling the contribution of reported state rates to the overall rate. Compared
to the primary sample, there are also no interactions of the reported federal rate
with the treatment. This reduction potentially reflects the reduced percentage of
people that self-reported including only the state rate in round 2.
Table 1.12 estimates the structural model for this subsample. Again I find a
lower salience for state taxes than for federal taxes (across all 3 specifications).
In the subsample analysis the gap between the estimated θs increases and be-
comes more significantly different. The estimate for θS drops by about 0.1 and
the standard errors around the estimates for the θs are cut approximately in half.
Additionally, the model is able to much better explain the data as the R2s increase
from around 0.1 to 0.4. However, there remains no statistically significant effect
of the treatment on the estimated salience parameters (once again contrary to the
other descriptive evidence).
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Table 1.12: Model results, low error sample
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES R2 R2 R2
θS 0.680*** 0.643*** 0.633***
(0.116) (0.123) (0.110)
State trt.* θS 0.289 0.287 0.296
(0.190) (0.188) (0.190)
Fed trt.* θS 0.011 0.009 0.006
(0.180) (0.186) (0.165)
θF 1.047*** 1.063*** 1.073***
(0.069) (0.066) (0.069)
State trt.* θF 0.023 -0.003 -0.008
(0.105) (0.106) (0.103)
Fed trt.* θF 0.094 0.093 0.073
(0.106) (0.102) (0.093)
State trt. -0.807 -0.398 -0.351
(1.968) (2.073) (2.094)
Fed trt. -0.088 -0.051 0.382
(2.185) (2.096) (1.960)
Constant -2.603* -2.666** -2.806*
(1.440) (1.332) (1.496)
Observations 1,446 1,446 1,446
R-squared 0.416 0.416 0.418
Specification for Linear Quadratic Cubic
reported rates
Notes: Replicates Table 1.10 with low error sample. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1.7 Heterogeneity in salience and tax knowledge
1.7.1 Heterogeneity in salience
In order to figure out the potential welfare implications of differential salience
between taxes, it is important to understand the forces that might be driving
salience. This section investigates several different potential hypotheses for factors
that might drive salience. One hypothesis is that consumers are boundedly ratio-
nal, so they pay attention to high taxes while ignoring smaller taxes. To examine
this, I look to see to what extent high state or federal tax rates might affect tax
reports and estimates of salience. It is also possible that more complicated tax sys-
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tems lead to more consumer confusion and less salience as the consumer chooses to
ignore the tax due to uncertainty in its true value. To investigate this hypothesis, I
examine states with different degrees of complication in their tax schedules (rang-
ing from a flat income tax to a fully progressive tax structure). Finally, it may
only be more educated individuals or individuals with high incomes that bother to
understand their income taxes, so I also examine salience by education and income
level.
Table 1.13 explores some potential factors affecting salience. The first two rows
report the reduced-form results for the effect of reported state and federal rates on
the report in R2 (equivalent to the same rows for regression 1.10). The third and
fourth rows provide the structural estimates for θS and θF . Each column provides
these estimates for a different subsample of the experiment. The columns contain
the following samples: (1) individuals in states with the 50% highest tax rates; (2)
individuals with at least a four-year college degree; (3) individuals in households
with above median incomes; and (4) individuals that self-report having changed
state or federal income brackets in the last 3 years.
In general, the smaller sample sizes lead to larger standard errors. While the
individuals in higher-tax states seem to have generally higher impacts for state
taxes (a higher reduced-form impact of reported state tax rates and model estimate
for θS) large standard errors lead to a lack of statistically significant differences.
Individual explanations, such as income and education, yield estimates that are not
statistically significantly different than the full-sample estimates. Therefore, I am
not able to identify an individual or policy-level factors that are clear determinants
of tax salience.
As a robustness check, I also compare effects of tax salience across broad classes
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Table 1.13: Comparing salience
High State High Education High Income Changed brackets Full sample
Reduced form estimates:
State rate, reported 0.158*** 0.116*** 0.099*** 0.024 0.097***
(0.04) (0.040) (0.037) (0.052) (0.029)
Federal rate, reported 0.605*** 0.719*** 0.771*** 0.771*** 0.680***
(0.045) (0.047) (0.048) (0.068) (0.035)
Structural parameter estimates:
θS 1.696*** 1.057*** 0.862*** 0.538 0.828***
(0.605) (0.255) (0.254) (0.524) (0.232)
θF 1.157*** 1.233*** 1.227*** 1.762*** 1.108***
(0.228) (0.172) (0.387) (0.295) (0.135)
N 1,180 1,490 1,254 818 2,326
Notes: Top panel presents regression estimates for the effect of reported state and federal rates
on round-2 rate, while bottom panel presents structural salience parameter estimates. Each
column represents a different subsample that the estimation was performed on: (1) Individuals
in states with the top half of tax rates; (2) individuals with more than a high school education;
(3) Individuals with household income above median; (4) Individuals report having changed tax
brackets in the last three years. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
of state-tax schedules. The results in column 1 of Table 1.7 are indicative of
potential lower salience of state taxes, that are then included (and thus raise the
rate) when made more salient by the treatment. To examine this effect more
closely, Table 1.14 reruns the regression from equation 1.9, but splits the sample
by the state tax structure. Column 1 is for the states that have a progressive tax
schedule, where more income leads to higher taxes, and column 2 is for states where
there is no state income tax. Making state tax more salient should not change
answers, if respondents know the true rate is zero. As expected the treatment has
no statistically significant effect on round-2 answers with no state tax, while it
does have an effect in the progressive tax states.
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Table 1.14: Treatment effects on change
from R1 to R2, by state type
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Prog. state tax No state tax
State treatment 2.564** -1.718
(1.266) (2.060)
Federal treatment 3.880*** 0.997
(1.264) (2.151)
Constant 26.551*** 22.803***
(0.908) (1.500)
Observations 1,432 406
R-squared 0.007 0.004
Notes: Dependent variable: round-2 answer mi-
nus round-1 answer. Regresses change in rates
on treatment assignment. Column 1 is the re-
gression for individuals in progressive tax states
while column 2 is for those in no tax states. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1.7.2 Heterogeneity in tax knowledge and errors
For an individual to react to a tax, the tax not only has to be salient to their
decision-making, the individual also has to know the amount of the tax. The
evidence is consistent that individuals generally know the sales tax they face, so
salience seems to be a primary driving factor in the previously studied topic of
individuals’ responses to changes in sales versus excise taxes (Chetty et al., 2009;
Taubinksy and Rees-Jones, 2017). However, the domain of income taxes is gener-
ally more complicated, and it is not clear that individuals completely understand
the actual income taxes they face. This is shown in work by Chetty, Friedman
and Saez (2013), who find that knowledge of features in the income tax schedule
(and lack of knowledge) can drive earnings behavior. Some features of federal in-
come tax knowledge have been studied, but this paper contributes new evidence
on knowledge, its determinants, of state income taxes as well.
I begin by examining the overall nature of the error in tax knowledge. Figure
1.3 demonstrates that while both state and federal reported rates have high rates
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of error, the magnitude of state errors are especially high relative to the true state
rates. While many individuals have true federal rates in excess of 30%, the vast
majority of state income tax rates are below 10% and, indeed, the median state
tax rate is less than 5%. Therefore, despite having roughly equal levels of error,
the ratio of actual rate to error is much lower for state rates than federal rates.
Figure 1.3: Actual rates and errors
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Notes: Left panel presents comparison between actual state rates and errors in the reported
state rates, while right panel does the same for federal rates.
Table 1.15 breaks down state errors further to see if observable features of
the state tax code contribute to individuals’ understanding of their state taxes.
It might be the case that more complicated structures lead to more error and
simple structures reduce errors in knowledge. To test this hypothesis, I separate
individuals into one of three types of states: column 1 is states with progressive
tax schedules, column 2 is states with no income tax, and column 3 are states
with flat rates (a simpler tax schedule, where everyone pays the same income
tax rate10). Those in progressive states, which have the most complicated tax
schedules, have the highest rates of error by every metric. Their median error is
3 percentage points, while those in zero rate states have 0 median error and those
10This excludes the effects of some credits and deductions which may lead to slightly different
marginal rates for limited income ranges.
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in flat rate states only have 1 percentage point in error. Similarly, the mean error
is 13 percentage points in progressive states, compared with 12 and 10 in zero
tax and flat rate states, respectively. This evidence is consistent with increasing
complications leading to increased errors.
Table 1.15: Error in state current tax rate, by state type
Prog. states Zero rate states Flat rate states
Median 3.3 0 1.3
Mean 12.8 12.2 9.7
25p 0 0 -0.2
75p 16 11 12.8
N 1,427 409 564
Notes: Error = Reported rate minus true rate. Positive value represent overestimates of true
taxes, while negative values represent underestimates of true taxes.
Table 1.16 looks at explaining the level of error for each type of report through
observed individual characteristics (income, political affiliation, tax-preparation
method, education) and tax-policy characteristics (state tax structure and average
state rate). Each column has a different error as a dependent variable. Column
1 is the error in the round-1 report, column 2 is the round-2 error, column 3 is
the total rate error, column 4 is the federal rate error, and column 5 is the state
rate error. The regressions include a variety of individual and state characteristics
to explain each round’s error. Very few characteristics have any predictive power
for explaining the errors in reports. Higher income is associated with lower errors
across reports, except in the case of state reports where it actually increases the
error in reports. For Round 1 and state taxes, having an professional prepare
your tax is associated with a roughly 3-5 percentage point increase in error. For
state reports, but not others, being in a flat-rate state is associated with a 3.2
percentage-point decrease in error. Low education (less than a high-school degree)
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is associated with much higher error, but past high school the estimated effect of
education on decreasing error is relatively flat.
A related issue in tax knowledge is that some people may misperceive their
marginal tax rate as their average tax rate, misunderstanding the progressive na-
ture of the income-tax schedule. Alternatively, the individual may just have better
information on their average tax rates than their marginal tax rates and use it to
proxy for their marginal rate (since average tax rate information is more readily
apparent on pay stubs and tax filing documents). Table 1.17 provides some evi-
dence that individuals do have a better sense of their average taxes than marginal
taxes. This table shows the errors individuals make in reporting each kind of av-
erage rate. Generally, these errors are smaller than their marginal counterparts.
Particularly, their total and state average rates which have median errors that are
almost zero, and mean errors that are 2 to 3 percentage points. Additionally, for
each type of rate, the 25-75 interquartile range (IQR) is smaller than its associated
marginal IQR.
While the evidence suggests individuals are more accurate in identifying their
average income-tax rates, it does not seem that individuals are fully misperceiving
their marginal tax rate as their average tax rate. 58% of respondents report higher
total marginal tax rates than average total tax rates. Similarly, 61% of respondents
give answers consistent with progressive federal tax rates, and 55% of respondents
do so for state tax rates. It appears the majority of respondents correctly perceive
a difference between their average and marginal rates and directionally get this
difference correct.
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Table 1.16: Explaining error rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES R1 R2 Total Federal State
Income: 2nd quartile -2.219** -1.119 -2.103* -1.477 4.767***
(1.084) (1.159) (1.194) (1.124) (1.426)
3rd quartile 0.687 1.665 1.313 1.070 4.986***
(1.024) (1.095) (1.128) (1.062) (1.347)
4th quartile -0.044 1.005 0.095 -2.210** 3.635**
(1.086) (1.161) (1.197) (1.127) (1.429)
Political affil: Democrat -0.721 -1.495 -0.790 -1.502 -0.973
(0.926) (0.989) (1.020) (0.960) (1.217)
Independent -1.098 -1.138 -0.977 -1.303 -2.612**
(0.980) (1.048) (1.080) (1.017) (1.289)
Libertarian 2.357 -2.322 -1.565 -0.223 -3.970
(1.964) (2.100) (2.163) (2.038) (2.584)
Green -1.594 5.352 11.924** 4.487 -7.453
(4.301) (4.598) (4.738) (4.462) (5.658)
Tax prep: tax software 2.135 -0.174 0.774 -1.748 0.452
(1.538) (1.645) (1.695) (1.596) (2.024)
Another HH member 1.476 -0.053 2.361 -2.188 1.075
(1.962) (2.097) (2.161) (2.035) (2.581)
Professional 3.460** 2.750 2.848 1.870 5.223**
(1.658) (1.772) (1.826) (1.720) (2.181)
Education: High school degree -13.590 -15.032 -11.671 -11.839 -32.242***
(8.557) (9.148) (9.425) (8.877) (11.256)
Some college -14.024* -15.903* -9.660 -11.960 -34.373***
(8.460) (9.044) (9.318) (8.776) (11.128)
Bachelor’s degree -14.957* -15.629* -10.666 -12.758 -37.006***
(8.454) (9.038) (9.312) (8.771) (11.121)
Graduate or professional degree -15.383* -17.407* -12.338 -14.856* -40.233***
(8.479) (9.064) (9.340) (8.796) (11.153)
Female -0.183 -0.148 -0.452 0.603 1.607*
(0.718) (0.768) (0.791) (0.745) (0.945)
Flat rate tax states -0.400 -0.664 -0.973 -1.640* -3.115**
(0.947) (1.012) (1.043) (0.982) (1.245)
No tax states -0.879 -0.999 -1.287 -2.100 -0.485
(1.647) (1.760) (1.814) (1.708) (2.166)
Avg state tax: 2nd quartile -0.574 0.227 -0.679 0.434 0.709
(1.440) (1.539) (1.586) (1.494) (1.894)
3rd quartile -1.953 -0.274 -1.862 1.233 -0.245
(1.522) (1.626) (1.676) (1.578) (2.001)
4th quartile -2.691* -1.283 -3.332** 1.242 -0.019
(1.499) (1.602) (1.651) (1.555) (1.972)
Constant 10.295 14.207 10.834 21.114** 44.302***
(8.737) (9.340) (9.623) (9.064) (11.492)
Observations 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297
R-squared 0.014 0.020 0.018 0.030 0.039
Notes: Each column regresses the error in reporting for a specific tax type (at current income)
on individual characteristics and the characteristics of the state that they live in. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.17: Error in average current tax rate
Avg. Total Avg. Federal Avg. State
Median 0.3 6.2 0.4
Mean 2.3 8.3 3.2
25p -8.1 -0.3 -0.2
75p 8.7 13.7 3.8
N 2,290 2,291 2,291
Notes: Error = Reported average rate minus true average rate.
Positive value represent overestimates of true taxes, while negative
values represent underestimates of true taxes.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper’s experiment and analysis finds evidence that suggests people react
less to their state income taxes than federal income taxes. These findings are
supported both in the reduced-form and structural-model results. These results
are bolstered by the fact that the majority of individuals self-report only including
federal rates in their overall answers if they have not been prompted to think about
specific types of taxes, but this reverses to the majority including both federal and
state income taxes when prompted to think about state income taxes first. While
some of this effect could be driven by experimenter demand effects, the fact that
thinking about federal taxes only (reminding them that different taxes exist, but
not about state income specifically) creates about half of this reversal is evidence
that this is likely not the only force at work.
These results are subject to some limitations. While the online sample pro-
vides a unique opportunity to experiment with a group that directly controls their
marginal labor supply on a fine-tuned basis, the sample is not representative of
the United States as a whole (neither demographically, nor with their labor-supply
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decisions). While the reports in the experiment are incentivized, the experiment
is unable to directly mirror the real-world setting of how individuals make labor-
supply decisions. The large range of (and, in some cases, implausible or incon-
sistent) answers given in parts of the task indicate a potentially wide disparity
in respondent understanding or effort towards the task. As discussed, this error
could create some of the effects and patterns seen in the primary analysis. How-
ever, when a lower-error sample is used, the salience effects become even stronger
so error in completing the task does not appear to be the prime driver of this
paper’s results.
These results have significant potential implications for optimal tax design as
state income taxes seem to be potentially less distortionary than federal income
taxes to behavior. Therefore, low-salience state taxes can be a useful lever for
policymakers to manipulate. However, to fully understand the welfare effects of
changes to state versus changes to federal income taxes, further exploration of the
determinants of salience in this domain are needed. While this paper explored
several potential drivers of salience, no strong evidence was found. This leaves the
literature with two open questions: (1) which types of individuals find state taxes
to be more or less salient and (2) what are the mechanisms underlying salience in
this domain. The first question is important towards understanding the welfare
effects of tax salience. The types of individuals find state taxes to be more or less
salient changes the implication for optimal tax design. If the taxes are less salient
for richer individuals (as in sales taxes), then raising state taxes might be less
distortionary for high-income individuals; a potentially useful finding, given that
high-income individuals are often found to have the highest earnings elasticity
to tax changes. However, if the reverse is true, this would have the opposite
implication for tax design.
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The next question that needs to be explored is the mechanism underlying
salience in this domain. Determining whether it is the relatively small size of
state taxes, differences in media or political coverage, or some other factor that
drives salience will be an important next step in order to determine the utility of
differential salience as a policy lever. This paper finds some evidence that this ef-
fect comes, at least in part, from the complication in state tax schedules. However,
other individual and structural components of salience need additional study.
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CHAPTER 2
HOW DO PEOPLE SEE THEIR TAXES? EXPERIMENTAL
EVIDENCE ON FEDERAL AND STATE INCOME-TAX
PERCEPTIONS
2.1 Introduction
Individuals’ perceptions of their taxes may influence their behavior. While it is
often convenient to model perceptions as accurate, empirical evidence has increas-
ingly shown that perceptions are often not free of systematic mistakes or biases
(Feldman et al., 2016; Chetty et al., 2009). Individuals’ incomplete perception
of tax schedules has been shown to have substantial impact in actual consumer
decisions, especially in areas such as the take-up of the earned income tax credit
(EITC) where mistakes in perception may have large impacts on the household’s
total budget (Chetty et al., 2013). Determining individuals’ understanding of the
nature and general shape of the tax schedule is also important for analyzing their
labor-supply decisions and our ability to measure the elasticity of taxable income
using features of the tax schedule (Saez, 2010).
The literature has tried to characterize mistakes that individuals might make
when perceiving their tax schedules. One area of particular focus has been un-
derstanding whether or not respondents correctly understand that there are dif-
ferences between the marginal and average tax rates they face and, also, if they
understand when each rate is applicable (Liebman and Zeckhauser, 2004). The
evidence on this topic is mixed: see Taubinksy and Rees-Jones (2017) for an ex-
ample where participants appear to be “ironing” (using the average rate in place
of the marginal rate) and Gideon (2017) for an example of participants correctly
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perceiving the difference between average and marginal rates. A related, but less
studied, area of active research is trying to measure individuals’ perceptions of the
broader tax schedule, and not just the rate individuals themselves face (Taubinksy
and Rees-Jones, 2017). This research investigates whether individuals understand
the existence of kinks in the tax schedule and the broader, progressive nature of the
federal tax system in the United States. Up until now, the federal tax schedule has
been the primary focus of research in the literature on tax perceptions. However,
state income-tax schedules provide a rich diversity of income-tax regimes and rates.
The heterogeneous nature of state tax schedules and their effects on individuals’
perceptions has not been directly addressed in the literature.
The first aim of the paper is to determine whether individuals correctly dis-
tinguish between marginal and average tax rates and to compare the degree to
which this understanding differs between state and federal taxes. The second aim
is to analyze whether individuals understand the progressive nature of the federal
income tax schedule and then compare the magnitude of their perceptions of pro-
gressivity with the actual progressivity in the tax schedule; and, to do likewise for
states with progressive tax schedules. The final aim of the paper is to build and
empirically estimate a model of federal tax perception designed to asses how peo-
ple’s perceptions of their average and marginal rates depend on their true average
rates and marginal rates.
This paper analyzes data collected using Amazon’s MTurk platform from over
3,000 respondents drawn from the United States. These individuals were incen-
tivized to answer questions about their perceived marginal and average tax rates
at a variety of income levels and for three types of taxes: federal, state, and total
(inclusive of state, federal, and payroll). While the primary design of the experi-
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ment was to measure and manipulate tax salience (as analyzed in Chapter 1), in
this chapter we use its questions on tax knowledge to analyze perceptions of state
and federal tax schedules.
We begin by exploring whether people recognize two basic patterns of progres-
sive tax schedules: (1) in virtually all instances average tax rates are less than
marginal tax rates, and (2) in many instances, marginal tax rates are higher at
higher incomes. We find the bulk of the evidence to be consistent with most in-
dividuals having correct perceptions of the progressive nature of state and federal
income tax rates (where applicable). For both state and federal income taxes,
around 62% of individuals report higher marginal than average rates (consistent
with a progressive tax scheme). Additionally, looking within subjects at both
types of taxes, individuals tend to report higher taxes when asked about tax rates
at higher incomes and lower taxes at lower incomes: around 30-40%, depending on
the type of tax and distance away from current income, report changes consistent
with a progressive tax schedule. In fact, the evidence suggests that individuals
overestimate the progressive nature of both state and federal tax schedules, re-
porting that the tax rate changes much more quickly than the actual rates change,
relative to changes in income. Between three and seven times as many people re-
port a change in the rate, compared with those who actually experience a change
in tax rate. Across all of these metrics, state and federal perceptions seem broadly
similar.
The paper then develops a model of tax perceptions. In this model, an indi-
vidual has perceptions of their marginal and average tax rates. These perceptions
may depend on either their true marginal or average tax rates (or both). The
model will then be estimated using mixture techniques to determine the types of
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respondents in the data (e.g. do some respondents only use their true marginal
rate as the basis of both their marginal and average answers). This model allows
us to see if individuals seem to be confusing average and marginal tax rates or
correctly perceiving the difference between the two. Here the results indicate that
individuals appear to be neither “ironing” (always using their average rate) nor
“spotlighting” (always using their marginal rate) in ways that behavioral models
have predicted; nor are they correct as assumed by traditional models (fully sep-
arating their estimates of average and marginal rates). Instead, we find evidence
consistent with both average and marginal rates influencing both types of answers.
Finally, the paper focuses on two groups of individuals in the federal income-tax
brackets containing the most respondents in the data: those that pay 15% or 25% in
marginal federal income taxes. Focusing on these two groups, which contain about
half the total sample, allows us to eliminate noise due to individuals in brackets
where we do not observe many people or due to small notches in the federal income-
tax schedule (caused by the phase-in or phase-out of deductions and/or credits,
which could increase the effect of income measurement error on our estimates).
Within these two groups we can then examine how reporting behavior changes
with distance from three changes in the tax schedule (the start of the 15% bracket,
the transition from 15% to 25%, and the end of the 25% bracket). These reports
exhibit a phenomenon similar to ironing (but at the population level instead of
individual level): the marginal rate reported grows in a linear fashion (akin to how
the underlying average federal tax rate is increasing), instead of in discontinuous
jumps as the true marginal rate does. Reports go from over-reporting their true
tax rate among the 15% group, on average, to under-reporting in the 25% group,
on average. Estimating the earlier model of perception among this group leads
to broadly similar results: there appears to be no type of individual that purely
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“irons,” purely “spotlights,” or is fully correct.
The evidence presented in this paper suggests several implications for individual
behavior. First, given the broad similarities in reporting behavior between state
and federal tax rates, there do not seem to be dramatically different perceptions of
state and federal tax schedules. Respondents seem to view, and therefore poten-
tially react to, the taxes similarly. This equivalence is potentially useful for state
policymakers, who may wish to use elasticity estimates from federal income taxes
when considering policy. Additionally, the mix of evidence, with findings for both
progressivity and “ironing,” suggests that traditional models of tax perceptions
may be too restrictive. Current theoretical models of perception do not explain
the data well. The gap between individuals’ perceptions of taxes and the actual tax
changes may also be a potential explanation for the empirically observed lack of
bunching at kinks in the tax schedule, which runs contrary to previous theoretical
predictions.
2.2 Experiment
We designed an experiment to measure individuals’ perceived marginal tax rates
and to manipulate the salience between state and federal income taxes. Figure
2.1 illustrates the experiment’s overall design. This design and the experiment’s
sample was discussed in full detail in Chapter 1, Section 1.2. The experiment’s
core is divided into five primary sections, each one containing five questions. The
questions ask what the respondent thinks the marginal tax rate is at a given level
of income for a household designed to be similar to their own in tax filing behavior.
The primary question gave the respondent an initial income level and asked “How
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Figure 2.1: Experiment design
Pre-Demographics
Example HH
Introduction & Training
Round 1: Total Tax 
Knowledge
State Tax 
Knowledge
Round 2: Total Tax 
Knowledge
Total Tax 
Knowledge
Average Tax 
Knowledge
Post Demographics
State Tax 
Calculation
Total Tax 
Calculation
● Basic tax filing behavior questions 
to create example household
● Introduce example household and 
test comprehension
● Training for  incentivized questions 
● 5 questions about total marginal 
tax rate at 5 different incomes 
(current, +/-5%, +/-15%)
● “How much...left after paying all 
income taxes if it had earned an 
additional $100?”
● Attention check question
● Ask about current marginal [type] 
tax rate
● Five incomes current, +/-3%, +/-
10%)
● Calculate tax paid with respondent 
provided rate
● Identical to first five  combined 
questions
● Ask respondents to indicate taxes 
they were including
● Other two tax type sections that 
respondent was not originally 
randomized into
● Average federal, state, and total 
income taxes
● Respondent demographics
● Additional tax filing information
Federal Tax 
Knowledge
Federal Tax 
Calculation
Total Tax 
Knowledge
Round 2: Total Tax 
Knowledge
Round 2: Total Tax 
Knowledge
Federal Tax 
Knowledge
Federal Tax
 Knowledge
Total Tax 
Knowledge
Total Tax 
Knowledge
State Tax 
Knowledge
State Tax
 Knowledge
Total Tax 
Knowledge
State Tax 
Knowledge
Federal Tax 
Knowledge
Federal Tax
 Knowledge
State Tax 
Knowledge
p=1/3      p=1/3        p=1/3 
p=1/2          p=1/2             p=1/2            p=1/2            p=1/2   p=1/2 
R
1
R
2
S                       F                    C
S/F/C
Notes: This figure illustrates the experimental design. Here we provide All participants begin
with the same three sections, before being randomized to one of two treatment groups (State or
Federal) or the control group. By the end of the experiment, all participants receive each of the
three main sections R1, S, F, C, and R2. However, randomization controls the order that they
receive S, F, and C.
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much more would the [example household] have, after paying all income taxes
on the additional earnings, if it had made an additional $100?”, where the specific
type of tax changes by section. (Refer to Appendix B for the full survey text.)
This paper focuses on measurements made in three of those sections: labeled
F (Federal), State (S), and Combined (C) in the figure. These sections elicit
respondents’ beliefs about their marginal federal, state, and total income tax rates,
respectively. Each of these sections elicit beliefs about these rates at five different
income levels, centered at the respondents’ reported household income level. The
other four incomes where the respondents’ beliefs are measured are at current
income plus 3%, plus 10%, minus 3%, and minus 10%. The other questions of
interest to this paper are the average tax-rate measurements, which ask about
average state, federal, and total tax rates. This measurement occurs after all
the marginal rates are measured (labeled section A). Average tax rates are only
measured for the respondents’ current household income level, not at the other four
income levels. Summary statistics for each of the marginal and average reports are
presented in Table 2.1, using the analysis sample. This sample is chosen for their
relatively low error in reporting their current federal marginal tax rate, as will be
described in more detail in Section 2.4.2.
50
Table 2.1: Reported state and federal tax rates, by income level
Mean Median SD
Reported Marginal Federal Tax
1.10I 20.3 20.0 16.9
1.03I 19.1 19.0 16.1
1.00I 17.2 16.0 17.2
0.97I 17.9 16.0 16.3
0.90I 17.2 15.0 16.7
Reported Marginal State Tax
1.10I 12.7 6.0 21.1
1.03I 12.3 6.0 19.8
1.00I 11.7 6.0 19.8
0.97I 12.1 6.0 21.3
0.90I 11.7 5.0 19.7
Reported Marginal Total Tax
1.10I 25.1 25.0 19.4
1.03I 24.9 23.6 18.9
1.00I 23.0 23.0 18.0
0.97I 22.9 22.0 18.3
0.90I 21.5 20.0 18.4
Reported Average Federal Tax
1.00I 13.6 12.1 12.6
Reported Average State Tax
1.00I 5.3 3.1 9.9
Reported Average Total Tax
1.00I 17.5 16.0 16.7
Notes: N=2,326. Provides summary statistics for reported state, federal, and
total marginal tax rates at each of the five income levels ranging from 110% of
income (1.10I) to 90% of income (0.9I). Additionally, reported average rates
at current income level (1.00I).
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Relationship between ATR and MTR
A key feature of income taxes is that the marginal tax rate faced by an individual
is virtually always higher than the average tax rate faced by that individual.1
Even for individuals in the lowest income-tax bracket or those who live in states
with only one marginal tax rate, the effect of deductions and exemptions make an
individual’s average rate lower than that individual’s marginal rate. We first test
1The only notable exceptions to this pattern are individuals in states with no income taxes
and for individuals in small income notches with low marginal rates due to the phase-in of a
credit or deduction.
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whether individuals are aware of this feature of tax schedules.
Table 2.2 presents the general patterns found in individuals’ answers for their
marginal tax rate (MTR) and average tax rate (ATR) for their state, federal, and
total tax answers. Here we find broadly consistent patterns across the three tax
rates, with the majority of individuals correctly reporting marginal tax rates that
are higher than their reports for average tax rates. For both federal and total
income tax rates, around 55% of individuals report higher marginal tax rates than
average tax rates, and only around 20-25% of respondents report lower marginal
tax rates than average tax rates.
Table 2.2: Comparing average and marginal rate answers
State Federal Total No-tax Progressive
states states
MTR > ATR 49.1 53.6 54.1 25.4 58.2
MTR = ATR 34.0 27.0 21.0 67.4 23.1
MTR < ATR 16.9 19.4 24.9 7.1 18.7
N 2,326 2,326 2,326 393 1,235
Notes: Compares individuals’ marginal tax rate answer (MTR) and average tax rate answer
(ATR) for three categories of income taxes: state, federal, and total tax. All answers are at the
respondent’s current income level. Each cell tells the proportion of the sample whose answers
exhibited the pattern given by the column label. Zero-rate states are those with no income tax
for all individuals. Progressive-rate states are those that have increasing income taxes for higher
incomes.
When looking at the overall pattern in state reports, only 49% of respondents
report marginal rates in excess of their reported average rates. However, states can
have one of three categories of income tax schedules: progressive (higher incomes
lead to higher tax rates), flat (the same marginal rate across all incomes), or no
state income tax. If we examine only individuals in progressive income tax states,
then the pattern of reports more closely matches federal reports: around 60% of
respondents report higher MTR than ATR, and only 19% of respondents report an
MTR less than ATR. Comparing this with respondents in states with zero income
taxes, where 67% of respondents correctly report an MTR equal to ATR.2
2In states with flat income tax schedules, there was a similar pattern to the progressive
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2.3.2 Perceptions of progressivity
A second key feature of the federal tax system and of many states is that taxes are
progressive in the sense that higher incomes have a higher MTR. We next examine
whether individuals are (i) aware of this feature, and (ii) aware of its magnitude.
The experimental design also allowed us to measure individuals’ beliefs about the
tax schedule near their current household income. We elicited individuals’ beliefs
about the marginal state and federal tax rates at each of five different income
levels: their current income, current income plus 3%, current income plus 10%,
and the equivalent amounts below their current income. Using these measures we
could see respondents’ perceptions of the state and federal income tax schedules
near their income and compare it with the true tax schedules.
Table 2.3 compares the directional relationship between the MTR reported at
the household’s current income level with the MTR reported at the other four
income levels (two below current income and two above). In the top panel, each
column compares the MTR at the given income level with the MTR reported
at the household’s current income level. For instance, the top left cell reports
the proportion of respondents who gave a state MTR rate at the income minus
10% level that was lower than the rate they reported at their household’s current
income level, which was 27% of respondents. In the cell below, we find that 64%
of people reported the same state MTR at both their current income level and
the income minus 10% level. Moving in the other direction, we see that at income
plus 10% about 28% of people reported a state MTR that was higher than the one
they reported at their actual income rate, while 64% of respondents reported the
same state MTR at both income levels. The rightmost four columns repeat the
states 30% of respondents reporting equal marginal and average tax rates and 50% reporting
MTR > ATR for state rates.
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comparisons using the individuals’ federal MTR reports. Finally, the lower panel
reports the true relationships between the actual MTRs at each income level. For
instance, in the bottom left cell we see that for 12% of respondents, the state tax
rate was actually lower at current income minus 10% than it was at the household’s
current income level, while the fourth column shows that 10% of households would
have had higher marginals at their current income plus 10% than at their current
income.
Table 2.3: Perceptions of local tax schedule
State reports Federal reports
τD10 < τC τD3 < τC τU3 > τC τU10 > τC τD10 < τC τD3 < τC τU3 > τC τU10 > τC
27.1 17.8 18.4 27.7 35.0 22.1 25.8 39.5
τD10 = τC τD3 = τC τU3 = τC τU10 = τC τD10 = τC τD3 = τC τU3 = τC τU10 = τC
64.0 69.0 70.6 64.0 54.6 64.4 64.5 53.4
τD10 > τC τD3 > τC τU3 < τC τU10 < τC τD10 > τC τD3 > τC τU3 < τC τU10 < τC
8.9 13.2 11.1 8.3 10.3 13.5 9.7 7.2
Actual rate Actual rate
τ∗D10 < τ
∗
C τ
∗
D3 < τ
∗
C τ
∗
U3 > τ
∗
C τ
∗
U10 > τ
∗
C τ
∗
D10 < τ
∗
C τD3 < τ
∗
C τ
∗
U3 > τ
∗
C τ
∗
U10 > τ
∗
C
11.6 4.9 3.5 9.5 17.0 6.0 4.1 15.2
Notes: N = 2, 326. The top panel compares individuals’ marginal tax rate reports at 5 different
income levels: current income (τC), down 10% (τD10), down 3% (τD3), up 3% (τU3), and up 10%
(τU10). The bottom panel compares the actual tax rates (τ
∗) at the same 5 income levels.
Comparing the patterns across state and federal reports, we find broadly sim-
ilar results. Overall, respondents seem to have a sense of the progressive nature
of most income-tax schedules. In state reports, around 27% of people give a lower
state MTR at the lowest income they see, while 28% report a higher state MTR
at the highest income they see. Only about 10% of respondents report the op-
posite pattern of higher state-tax rates at lower incomes or lower-state tax rates
at higher incomes. In the federal reports, we observe a similar pattern with 35%
of respondents reporting lower federal MTRs at the lowest income level and 40%
reporting higher federal MTRs at the highest income. Likewise, only about 10%
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respondents give answers inconsistent with a progressive federal-tax scheme.
Another piece of evidence that individuals have a sense of the progressive na-
ture of federal (and many states’) tax schedules is that for intermediate values of
income (plus or minus 3% from current household income) an intermediate num-
ber of respondents report rates that are higher or lower, respectively, than the rate
reported at their current income level. When we limit the sample to individuals
in states with progressive taxes in Table 2.4, we find even more similar patterns,
where state behavior looks similar to federal behavior, although still with generally
slightly lower proportions.
Table 2.4: Perceptions of local tax schedule, progressive states
State reports Federal reports
τD10 < τC τD3 < τC τU3 > τC τU10 > τC τD10 < τC τD3 < τC τU3 > τC τU10 > τC
33.1 20.9 22.8 33.8 34.9 22.1 25.8 39.5
Actual rate Actual rate
τ∗D10 < τ
∗
C τ
∗
D3 < τ
∗
C τ
∗
U3 > τ
∗
C τ
∗
U10 > τ
∗
C τ
∗
D10 < τ
∗
C τD3 < τ
∗
C τ
∗
U3 > τ
∗
C τ
∗
U10 > τ
∗
C
20.9 8.8 6.0 15.8 17.0 6.0 4.1 15.2
Notes: N = 1, 235 for state reports and N = 2, 326 for federal reports. Recreates the state
portion of Table 2.3 but limits the sample to states with progressive tax schedules.
While individuals, in the aggregate, seem to understand the progressive nature
of the tax structure, they also seem to overestimate the nearness of the proximity
to the next kink. 27-35% of individuals report a lower MTR when their income
is lowered by 10%, depending on the rate type, but only 12-17% of respondents
would actually have the corresponding rate change. Similarly, respondents over-
estimate the quickness at which the tax rate changes when their income increases
by 10%: 28-40% of respondents report increases, with only 10-15% of respondents
actually experiencing tax-rate increases. Of the individuals who change their rates
as income moves up or down, around 35% (for state) and 40% (for federal) make
changes in both directions (i.e. report a lower rate at a lower income and a higher
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rate at a higher income), while the other 60-65% change their tax rate answer in
only one direction.
2.3.3 The proximity of kinks
Another interesting question is the relationship between the proximity of kinks
and tax perceptions. That is, does being near a kink change how individuals view
their tax rates? It is possible that individuals who are near a kink are either more
or less aware of the marginal tax rate they face. They might be more aware if the
effect of crossing a kink and facing a higher rate has made it especially salient to
them, or the rate might be more salient to individuals who are aware of a nearby
kink and are trying to stay in the lower marginal-tax bracket (which might give
them a heightened understanding of their current rate). On the other hand, it
might be lower if they have recently moved to a higher bracket and they have not
yet fully incorporated the higher rate into their perceptions.
To investigate potential effects of being near kinks on perceptions, we estimate
a straightforward regression of perceptions on actual rate separately for those who
are near or far from a kink. That is we regress:
τˆF = β0 + β1τF + 
separately for those who are either “near” or “far” from a kink. We try two
different measures of distance: a threshold of 10% of income away from a kink or
a threshold of 20% of income away from a kink.
Table 2.5 presents the results from these regressions. Broadly speaking, we find
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similar patterns of results for both those near or far from kinks, regardless of the
cutoff used. In each case we cannot reject that the coefficients estimated for each
sample are the same. Thus we conclude that proximity to kinks does not appear
to be directly related to perceptions in the full sample. However, as we will show
in Section 2.4.1, this may be a power limitation when trying to examine every kink
in the sample, instead of focusing on kinks with sufficient numbers of individuals
nearby.
Table 2.5: Perceptions relative to kinks
Near kink (10%) Far from kink (10%)
τ ∗F 0.253*** τ
∗
F 0.236***
(0.032) (0.025)
Constant 12.76*** Constant 12.95***
(0.708) (0.559)
N 875 N 1,520
Near kink (20%) Far from kink (20%)
τ ∗F 0.202*** τ
∗
F 0.209***
(0.022) (0.026)
Constant 13.80*** Constant 14.01***
(0.460) (0.520)
N 1,451 N 806
Notes: Results from four different regressions, each on a different subsample, of federal tax rate
answer on actual federal tax rate. Each regression is based on distance from closest kink in the
federal tax schedule with the top two based on a distance of 10% of income from the nearest kink
and the bottom two based on a distance of 20% of income from nearest kink.
2.4 Estimating a model of perception
The prior literature has suggested a number of ways that people might perceive
their taxes. One is that individuals might correctly perceive taxes (knowing the
difference between the average and marginal tax rates that they face). The second
is that they might “iron” and use the average tax rate in place of their marginal
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tax rate. The third is that they might “spotlight” and use their marginal tax rate
in place of their average tax rate. In this section we develop a model that nests
each of these three types.
2.4.1 Model description
We elicit two federal tax rates of interest for each respondent: their current
marginal federal tax rates and their current average federal tax rates. In standard
economic analyses, each of these reports would typically be assumed to be reports
of the respondent’s actual marginal and average rates, with potentially some noise.
However, as suggested by the literature, respondents might not always distinguish
between marginal and average tax rates. Instead, they may report both their av-
erage and marginal rates as a function of either one or the other. We use a flexible
model to estimate individuals’ reports. Their reports may be a function of both
their actual average and marginal tax rates:
ˆτM = β0,M + β1,Mτ
M + β2,Mτ
A + 1 (2.1)
τˆA = β0,A + β1,Aτ
M + β2,Aτ
A + 2 (2.2)
Here ˆτM and τˆA are the respondents’ reports for marginal and average tax
rates, τM is the individuals’ actual marginal tax rate, and τA is the individuals’
actual average tax rate .
The literature suggests different individuals may report rates in systematically
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different ways (Liebman and Zeckhauser, 2004; Rees-Jones and Taubinksy, 2016).
In particular, there are three common suggestions for types of individuals. Type 1
incorrectly base both their reports of average and marginal rate on their average
rate (such that β1,A and β1,M are equal to zero):
ˆτM = β0,M + β2,Mτ
A + 1
τˆA = β0,A + β2,Aτ
A + 2
Type 2 reports both as a function of their actual marginal tax rate (such that
β2,m and β2,A are equal to zero):
ˆτM = β0,M + β1,Mτ
M + 1
τˆA = β0,A + β1,Aτ
M + 2
And finally, type 3 reports using the correct rate as the source of each report
(β2,M = β1,A = 0):
ˆτM = β0,M + β1,Mτ
M + 1
τˆA = β0,A + β2,Aτ
A + 2
Note that all three of these cases are embedded in the initial model.
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2.4.2 Mixture results
We estimate the model of individuals’ marginal and average tax perception (as
described by equations 2.1 and 2.2) using Stata 15’s finite mixture models. As
discussed in Section 1.2 this sample has a high number of individuals reporting
clearly erroneous tax rates either due to confusion about the experiment or about
the tax code. In Chapter 1, we limited the sample using cutoffs in reporting
error. This chapter adopts a different approach and estimates a first-stage mixture
model based on individuals’ reports of federal rates.3 We estimate a simple mixture
model of federal reports as a function of actual marginal and average federal rates,
allowing for two types of respondents. One type clusters around individuals who
reported federal rates that were in the realm of actual federal rates, while the
other contained individuals with extremely high reports for federal rates. Figure
2.2 presents the calculated posterior probabilities of each individual’s membership
in each group (type A are individuals reporting “reasonable” rates while type B are
individuals reporting “high” rates). The 2,326 individuals that were most likely
type A (i.e. had probabilities of being type A in excess of 50%) and who completed
the average tax section were kept in the primary analysis sample.
The model from Section 2.3.3 is then estimated using a finite mixture model.
Inputs are the individuals’ reported marginal and average federal tax rates and
their corresponding actual rates (calculated using Taxsim 9 as discussed in Section
1.2). The estimation allows for three types of respondents, but did not constrain
the coefficients or their relationships (i.e. the hypothesized types were not imposed
as part of the model estimation). We allow for three types in the estimation in
order to attempt to discover the three types typically discussed in the literature (as
3Cuts using state or total rates instead of federal rates yield similar qualitative results. Ad-
ditionally, similar results are found when imposing cutoffs on errors in reporting.
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Figure 2.2: Type probabilities
Notes: Individual posterior probabilities of type for initial sort-
ing model. Those with low probabilities of being type A are those
reporting very high federal marginal rates (e.g. near 100%).
discussed in the previous section). Table 2.6 presents the three sets of coefficient
estimates for each of the three types estimated in the sample. Each panel contains
the results for one type of individual and the six coefficient estimates associated
with that type. The first set of coefficients in each panel shows the relationship
between an individual’s reported marginal federal tax rate and their underlying
actual marginal rate and actual average rate (i.e. β0,M , β1,M and β2,M), while the
second set shows the relationship between reported average federal tax rate and
the underlying actual rates (i.e. β0,A, β1,A and β2,A). Finally Table 2.7 presents
the overall marginal posterior probabilities for membership in each type.4
None of the three types directly correspond to the types hypothesized by the
literature. However, type 1 seems to be the closest. For the type-1 individual,
the coefficients on the actual marginal rates are insignificant (corresponding with
4We tried to estimate a similar model using the state reports, but we were unable to get the
model to successfully converge for three types.
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Table 2.6: Mixture model results
Type 1:
Dep var: ˆτMF Dep var: τˆ
A
F
τMF -0.01 τ
M
F -0.00
(0.032) (0.035)
τAF 0.134*** τ
A
F 0.175***
(0.031) (0.034)
Constant 6.78*** Constant 6.11***
(0.678) (0.693)
Type 2:
Dep var: ˆτMF Dep var: τˆ
A
F
τMF 0.168*** τ
M
F 0.074***
(0.024) (0.026)
τAF 0.149*** τ
A
F 0.169***
(0.023) (0.025)
Constant 18.66*** Constant 13.3***
(0.459) (0.482)
Type 3:
Dep var: ˆτMF Dep var: τˆ
A
F
τMF -0.067 τ
M
F 0.270
(0.115) (0.154)
τAF 0.249* τ
A
F 0.012
(0.134) (0.200)
Constant 16.2*** Constant 80.56***
(1.91) (2.36)
N = 2, 326
Notes: Reports the mixture model results for each of the three types estimated, separated by
the three horizontal panels. The left columns presents the effect of actual marginal (τMF ) and
actual average (τAF ) federal tax rates on the respondents’ reported marginal tax rate (
ˆτMF ), while
the right column does the same for the respondents’ reports of average federal tax rate (τˆAF ).
the predicted type of β1,M = β1,A = 0), while the coefficients on the average tax
rate are positive and significant. However in both cases, the estimated coefficients
are significantly less than the estimate of 1 which would be expected if individuals
were fully incorporating their average rates into their estimates. We also note the
relatively low estimates for β0 for both dependent variables, combined with the
relatively small effect of both actual tax rates on the report, indicates individuals
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Table 2.7: Latent class probabil-
ities
Class
1 0.337
(0.021)
2 0.650
(0.021)
3 0.013
(0.002)
Notes: Posterior probabilities of class
membership from mixture model esti-
mated in Table 2.6.
of this type have relatively low reported marginal and average tax rates (< 15%).
As seen in Table 2.7, the probability of being classified as this type in the sample
is about 34%.
Type 2 does not correspond with the potentially expected individual using their
marginal tax rate for all the answers, nor a fully rational individual using their
actual marginal rate to generate marginal reports and their actual average rate to
generate their average reports. Instead, for this type, individuals’ reports for both
rate types are a function of both actual rates. All four coefficient estimates are
positive and significant, albeit low, in the range of 0.07–0.17. The estimates for
the constant are significantly higher than for a type-1 individual (13.3 and 18.7,
respectively). Combined with the small but positive effects of actual rates, most
individuals in this group have federal tax reports in the moderate range (15-25%).
This group had the substantially highest probability of being classified, about 65%.
Finally, type 3 corresponds with the remaining individuals with very high re-
ports (this time on average federal tax reports, since the sample selection cut
removed high marginal rate reporters), as β0,A is 80.5. The other coefficients ex-
hibit the exact opposite pattern as expected from the “rational” or “correct” type
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hypothesized: the individual’s average rate effects their marginal report while their
marginal rate significantly, at the 10% level, affects their average report, but the
“correct” rate to use is insignificant in each case. There is a 1% probability of be-
ing classified as this type in the data. Looking at these results in total, it appears
that the data lends itself to being classified into types based on the general level
of tax rates reported, instead of based on the theoretical models presented earlier.
2.5 Subsample analysis
While there are a wide variety of actual federal rates observed in the sample (over
27 rates), most of these apply to a very small number of individuals. In particular,
many rates apply for small (measured by income range) notches in the federal tax
codes created by features such as clawbacks in deductions or phase-out of credits.
Other rates cover a limited number of respondents with either very high or very
low tax rates. This feature of the data creates two potential problems for analysis.
The first problem is measurement error in the income variable which may place
the household incorrectly in a small notch that is a tax rate that the household
does not truly face. The second problem is the limited number of observations in
regions (such as high or low income) who may perceive taxes in a very different
way than the broader sample, but for whom we have limited data. Therefore, we
focus an additional analysis on the sample in the two federal income-tax brackets
for which we have the most data, those who are in the 15% bracket and the 25%
bracket, containing 1,078 and 467 respondents, respectively. These tax brackets
are adjacent in the federal tax schedule (individuals move from the 15% bracket
to the 25% bracket). Focusing on these individuals allows us to have the power
to examine the effects of underlying rate changes in a way that most of the other
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rate changes we observe do not.
2.5.1 Reduced-form analysis
We begin by examining how individuals report their marginal tax rates across the
two income-tax levels. First, we examine how errors in reports correspond with the
individual being in each of four regions of the tax schedule: in the middle of the
15% federal tax rate, in the middle of the 25% federal tax rate, near the boundaries
of the 15% tax rate, or near the boundaries of the 25% tax rate. Here, as before,
we define the boundaries as being in a range where a change of 10% of household
income would put the individual in a new tax rate. The regression specification is:
(τMF − τ ∗MF ) = β0 + β1IB + β2IF25 + β3IBIF25
τ ∗MF is the actual federal marginal tax rate, IB is an indicator for the respondent
being within one of the tax schedule boundaries, and IF25 is an indicator for being
in the 25% federal tax bracket.
Looking at the results in column 1 of Table 2.8, we find only two statistically
significant results. The constant of 2.34 indicates that respondents in the middle
of the 15% bracket are, on average, overestimating their federal income tax by
roughly 2.3 percentage points. The coefficient estimate for being in the 25% bracket
of -6.62 indicates respondents in this tax range underestimate their marginal tax
rate by roughly 4.3 percentage points. Interestingly, this means that, on average,
the respondents across the two federal-tax rates, which differ by 10 percentage
points, only change the average rate reported by less than 2 percentage points:
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respondents in the 15% bracket report an average of a 17% tax rate, while those
in the 25% bracket report an 21.7% tax rate. The effect of being near a boundary
is statistically insignificant.
However, there might be some difference between being near the upper bound-
ary of a tax rate relative to the lower boundary. Therefore we next we split the
income region into six areas. We accomplish this by splitting each boundary region
into the lower (near the step to the lower marginal tax rate) and the upper (near
the step to the next higher marginal tax rate). This allows us to detect if there are
differences in perceptions arising from being just below a kink, compared to being
just above a kink. The estimates from this regression are presented in column
2 of Table 2.8. In this regression, we once again find that people in the middle
of the 15% bracket tend to overestimate their taxes and people in the middle of
the 25% bracket tend to underestimate their taxes. However, this specification
allows us to detect statistically significant differences in reporting behavior near
the kinks. Examining the indicator variable for each region, we find a distinct
pattern in reporting as we move from left to right across the tax schedule (in the
direction of increasing incomes and increasing tax rates). Individuals closest to
the lower bound of the 15% bracket (i.e. closest to the 10% federal tax bracket),
underreport their tax rate by 1.7 percentage points. As per above, those in the
middle of the 15% bracket overreport their tax rate by 2.3 percentage points. As
income increases, and respondents near the upper bound of the 15% bracket, they
overreport by 5.7 percentage points. While at the lower bound of the 25% bracket
respondents underreport by 5.3 percentage points. In the middle of the bracket
they underreport by 4.3 percentage points. Finally, at the upper edge they un-
der report by 2.2 percentage points. Combining these, we find a generally steady
increase in the average rate reported from 13.3 to 17.3 to 20.7 to 19.7 to 20.7 to
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22.8. Interestingly, the only place the respondents’ rate has actually increased is in
between the average report of 20.7 and 19.7, where it has jumped by 10 percentage
points. This pattern seems somewhat consistent with a notion of average-tax-rate
reporting, combined with some initial overreporting of estimates.
Table 2.8: Errors in federal report by location in income tax bracket
IF25 -6.62***
(0.656)
IB 0.028
(0.670)
IF25 ∗ IB -0.588
(1.148)
I15 4.07***
(0.914)
IUB15 7.41***
(1.14)
ILB25 -3.60***
(1.22)
I25 -2.61***
(1.00)
IUB25 -0.53
(0.794)
Constant 2.342*** -1.73**
(0.85)
R2 0.10 0.12
N 1,545 1,545
Notes: Regresses error in federal marginal rate report by location in the federal income tax
schedule. IF25 is an indicator for being in the 25% federal tax bracket, IB is an indicator for
being with 10% of current income of a kink in the tax schedule. and ILB25 and IUB25 are
indicators for being within 10% of current income from the lower boundary and upper boundary
of the 25% tax rate, while I25 is an indicator for being in the middle of the 25% rate (i.e. not
within 10% of the boundary). Similarly for I15 and IUB15 in the 15% rate.
2.5.2 Model of perception
We next estimate the mixture model of perception in this sample. In order to
accommodate the fact that there are now only two actual federal marginal tax
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rates, we no longer include marginal tax rate as a continuous variable and instead
include an indicator for being in the 25% federal income tax bracket. The results
of this model are presented in Table 2.9.
Table 2.9: Mixture model results, subsample
Type 1:
Dep var: ˆτMF Dep var: τˆ
A
F
IM25F 11.15*** I
M
25F 7.11**
(1.33) (1.18)
τAF 0.47*** τ
A
F 0.36***
(0.13) (0.14)
Constant 8.35*** Constant 6.72***
(1.03) (1.07)
Type 2:
Dep var: ˆτMF Dep var: τˆ
A
F
IM25F -16.28*** I
M
25F -8.39***
(1.47) (1.45)
τAF 0.28** τ
A
F 0.25
(0.14) (0.16)
Constant 22.15*** Constant 14.7***
(1.20) (1.24)
Type 3:
Dep var: ˆτMF Dep var: τˆ
A
F
IM25F -26.14*** I
M
25F 11.18
(6.46) (7.71)
τAF 1.85*** τ
A
F -0.31
(0.68) (0.80)
Constant 5.58 Constant 85.98***
(5.30) (6.22)
N = 1, 545
Notes: Recreates Table 2.6 with the two rate subsample.
The estimates for type 1 are broadly consistent with the general findings from
the full-sample model. Coefficients for both average and the current rate indicator
are positive and statistically significant, indicating that both are influencing both
types of individual reports in this type. In this type we see the effect of changing
tax brackets in the individual reporting of marginal rates is 11 percentage points
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(compared with the true effect of a 10 point increase in the underlying federal
rate). These individuals appear to be approximately calibrated to the increase
in marginal federal reports. Similarly, the effect of changing brackets on average
reports is 7 percentage points, which is in line with the fact that average rates
increase slower than marginal rates. The estimates for type 2 are more puzzling,
as now average rates have similar effects on reporting (although not statistically
significantly affecting the average reports), but now the indicator has a large and
significant negative effect on reporting for both marginal and average rates (-16.3
and -8.4 percentage points, respectively). This change is coupled with an increase
of the constant terms in both regressions, up to 22.2 and 14.7 percentage points,
respectively. Consequently, this type contains those who are overreporting if they
are in the 15% tax bracket and underreporting if they are in the 25% tax bracket.
Using the median tax rate in each group, the average marginal reports would
be 24.1% and 9.8% for those in the 15% and 25% marginal brackets. As in the
previous estimation, the third type contains those with very high average reports.
As reported in Table 2.10, the majority of people are in type 1, with about 58%
probability of assignment, type 2 has a 41% probability and type 3 remains at just
over 1%.
Table 2.10: Latent class proba-
bilities, subsample
Class
1 0.579
(0.031)
2 0.408
(0.031)
3 0.013
(0.003)
Notes: Posterior probabilities of class
membership from mixture model esti-
mated in Table 2.9.
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper has provided experimental evidence on income-tax perceptions. The
findings are mixed, much like the existing literature. We find some evidence of
individuals understanding progressivity (although with much too much curvature
in the reported schedule relative to the true schedule) and some evidence that
reports behave more like averages than marginals (in the patterns seen in report-
ing errors). This paper provides the first evidence that demonstrates individuals
seem to have similar perceptions of state and federal income tax schedules, having
broadly consistent patterns across all metrics examined, particularly in states with
progressive income tax structures.
This paper was unable to estimate a direct model of state perceptions and it
appears that much more data for a single state (or similar states) would be required
to do so. This would be an interesting next step for the literature, although the
initial evidence leads us to believe the findings would likely be similar to those in
federal tax reports.
Another question raised by this paper is what effect does individuals’ “over”-
perceiving progressivity have on labor-supply choices. It is possible that individuals
are less incentivized to earn higher wages or work more hours due to the mistaken
sense that taxes will go up quickly and reduce their net increase in earnings. This
finding could be further exacerbated by the fact that individuals also perceive the
tax rate to decrease more quickly than it does below them, meaning the perceived
decrease in post-tax income from working less would be smaller than the actual
decrease. The combined effect of these perceptions is that individuals perceive an
overly smooth marginal tax schedule with more frequent changes than actually
exist. This mismatch between perception and reality could explain the empirical
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finding of a lack of bunching around actual kinks in the tax schedule (Saez, 2010).
The mismatch in perceptions and reality would also bias estimates of the elasticity
of taxable income using such bunching estimators as there is a disconnect between
the rate changes individuals perceive and those that actually exist.
Additionally, while taxes are known to distort (and reduce) labor-supply de-
cisions, misperceptions of the tax schedule are, as of yet, generally unstudied in
their labor-supply effect. The effect of “over-progressivity” on potentially reduc-
ing labor supply is particularly notable when combined with this paper’s findings
when looking at the 15% and 25% federal-rate subsamples. There we found that
individuals in the lower tax rate not only believed their tax rate was going up
faster than it did, they also believed their rate was already higher than it actually
was (as compared to those in the higher tax rate who actually underestimated
their tax rate). This creates two forces that would tend to bias this group’s labor
supply downward. This paper does not have a sufficient sample in the lowest tax
rate (10%) to estimate it, but if these twin trends continue then the group of ex-
tremely low earners may have particularly large (and incorrect) incentives not to
work due to errors in perception. This may be an area of particular interest for
future research and policymakers due to the increasing trend of tying state and
federal aid to labor market participation.
71
CHAPTER 3
DIFFICULTY TO REACH RESPONDENTS AND NONRESPONSE
BIAS: EVIDENCE FROM LARGE GOVERNMENT SURVEYS
(WITH ORI HEFFETZ)
3.1 Introduction
To what extent do survey-based estimates depend on the difficulty of reaching
respondents? The answer can hint at how cautious one should be when making
population-wide inferences from surveys with low response rates. If within a sur-
vey sample, after controlling for other observables, outcomes are systematically
different across easy-to-reach and hard-to-reach respondents, then one may ques-
tion the routinely made assumption that nonrespondents—those out of sample who
are, effectively, the hardest to reach—are similar to the average within-sample re-
spondent. In other words, within-sample comparisons across difficulty-of-reaching
groups can help assess the assumption of (conditional) random selection into the
survey sample. This paper reports findings from such within-sample comparisons.
Its goal is to help in assessing how sensitive population-wide estimates of important
outcomes are to survey response rates and to assumptions regarding nonrespon-
dents.
Our (purely empirical) investigation proceeded in three steps. First, we iden-
tified three large and widely used government surveys that report the number of
phone or in-person visit attempts made in the course of reaching respondents: the
Census/BLS’s Current Population Survey (CPS), CDC’s Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System (BRFSS), and BLS’s Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).
The three show a wide range of response rates, which have all been generally de-
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clining over the years, averaging in our data from just under 45% in the BRFSS to
around 70% in the CEX and to just over 90% in the CPS. We note that these are
the only three datasets that we investigated, and we chose in advance to report
our findings from all three.
Second, within each dataset, we sought to identify one or two key outcomes
to analyze. We were guided by our goal to focus on the outcomes of most inter-
est to researchers, policymakers, and the public. Our search resulted in choosing
four key outcomes: the labor force participation rate and the unemployment rate
from the CPS, obesity prevalence from the BRFSS, and total household expen-
ditures from the CEX. All four are national statistics that are closely watched,
analyzed, and discussed in the academic literature, business world (or, in the case
of obesity, health-policy world), and popular media. Importantly, unlike opinion-
poll and social-survey outcomes such as voter intentions or consumer and investor
confidence—outcomes that some researchers fundamentally mistrust—our four key
outcomes are regarded by many as (more or less) objective indicators, based on
survey questions designed to elicit factual reports rather than perceptions, feelings,
or convictions.1
Third, based on the number of contact attempts made to each respondent,
we divided each dataset into three or four difficulty-of-reaching groups, as sim-
ilar in size as we could. We then compared, within each dataset, easy-to-reach
respondent groups versus hard-to-reach groups with regard to outcome averages
(both unadjusted and adjusted for observables) and to cross-demographic-group
differences.
1While not a key outcome of our paper, we also analyzed a life satisfaction question asked in
the BRFSS, and used it to probe the robustness of past research on subjective well-being data
(see Section 3.3.1).
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We find strong and robust differences between easy-to-reach and hard-to-reach
respondents in all four primary outcome variables. Briefly, the labor force partici-
pation rate (65.1% overall in our 2012–2013 CPS sample) is 4.9 percentage points
lower among the easiest-to-reach respondents (reached in a single visit attempt)
than among the hardest-to-reach respondents (reached in 3 or more attempts),
after controlling for demographic differences across difficulty-of-reaching groups.
Similarly, the unemployment rate (7.6% in our sample) monotonically decreases
1.5 percentage points from easiest- to hardest-to-reach; the obesity rate (28.4%
in our 2012 BRFSS sample) monotonically decreases 3.1 points from easiest (1
call attempt) to hardest (7+ attempts); and average log quarterly household ex-
penditures ($9,459 in our 2008–2013 CEX sample, exponentiated back to dollars)
increase by $465 from easiest- (1 contact attempt) to hardest-to-reach (5+ at-
tempts). In addition, for labor force participation and for obesity—but not for
the other two outcomes—the male-female gap and other cross-demographic-group
gaps consistently shrink or increase with difficulty of reaching.
Overall, our analysis reveals a consistent picture: in our data, difficulty-of-
reaching is strongly correlated with important outcomes of interest, even after
controlling for the main observables that typical weighting schemes are based on.
How important is this finding?
In principle, the finding of systematic differences between easy- and hard-to-
reach respondents is not, by itself, necessarily worrisome. As long as survey non-
respondents are randomly selected (unconditionally, or on observables) from the
population-representative sample targeted by the survey, sample averages (uncon-
ditional, or conditional on observables) could be made generalizable to the popu-
lation. But a difficult-to-reach respondent in one survey could be a nonrespondent
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in another survey that had a higher nonresponse rate due to time, budget, or other
constraints. By the same token, nonrespondents in a given survey can be viewed
simply as respondents so difficult that they remained out of reach. Indeed, the rela-
tively high response rates in surveys such as the CPS suggest that additional effort
and resources can bring many difficult (non)respondents into the sample. From
this perspective, a finding of within-sample differences across difficulty-of-reaching
groups challenges the random-selection assumption: if difficulty of reaching is cor-
related with outcomes, the likelihood of nonresponding may also be correlated with
outcomes. Moreover, if in-sample trends in differences across difficulty-of-reaching
groups extend to (out-of-sample) nonrespondents then not only are nonrespon-
dents different from the average respondent; their average outcomes are not even
within the range of average outcomes observed within sample.2
If we could somehow observe nonrespondents’ outcomes—e.g., by matching
respondents and nonrespondents with administrative measures of the survey out-
comes we investigate—we could directly examine whether the difficulty-outcome
trends we find extend to nonrespondents, and hence whether these trends are in-
deed evidence of nonresponse bias. (We could then also directly investigate another
important question that our paper cannot examine: that of survey measurement
error.) In practice, such direct tests are impractical for the same reason that the
government surveys we study are so widely used in the first place: nationally rep-
resentative administrative datasets containing “true” measures of the outcomes we
study are not readily available.3
2Heffetz and Rabin (2013, p. 3007) provide a step-by-step numerical example that illustrates
this point.
3In fact, it is not even clear that administrative data could exist for outcomes such as labor
force participation and unemployment rates as defined and measured in the CPS, since they
require reports of job search activity. On the other hand, in certain other special cases researchers
are able to match administrative and survey data. We are aware of two papers—Lin and Schaeffer
(1995) regarding child-support awards and payments, and Kreuter et al. (2010) regarding welfare
receipts and other outcomes—that investigate difficulty trends where true outcomes are known
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While we cannot use our data to directly assess whether the within-sample
trends we find extend to nonresponders, the wide range of response rates in the
three datasets we study provides indirect, circumstantial evidence. In the CPS,
with a nonresponse rate just under 10%, we do observe many who would be non-
respondents in another survey. The consistent in-sample trends we find in the
CPS may hence tentatively provide some rationale for out-of-sample extrapolation
of in-sample trends in higher-nonresponse-rate surveys—while acknowledging, of
course, that such cautious rationale may apply to certain types of nonresponders
more than to others. More generally, our finding of consistent trends in three sur-
veys with, respectively, around 55%, 30%, and 10% nonresponse rate suggests that
nonrespondents may on average look more like very difficult-to-reach respondents
than like the average in-sample respondent. (Indeed, as hinted above, the very
coexistence of such a wide range of nonresponse rates may in itself suggest it.)
Beyond these cautious arguments, the assumption that nonrespondents look
like the in-sample average is simply hard to defend when said average is a mov-
ing target, changing systematically as increasingly difficult respondents are added
to the sample. Moreover, when tracking outcomes over time, that assumption
may differentially impact estimates of both long-run trends—as response rates
slowly decline—and shorter-run fluctuations—as the outcome-difficulty gradient
could itself vary with the outcome (we discuss such evidence in our concluding
section). In the typical case—such as ours—where researchers do not know much
about nonresponders, one may therefore view a finding of large within-sample
difficulty-of-reaching differences as a reason for concern, the more so the higher is
the nonresponse rate.
for respondents and nonrespondents. As we discuss in detail in Section 3.5, the former finds that
the difficulty trends among respondents mostly do not extend to nonrespondents, but its survey
context and difficulty measure are rather different from ours, while the latter, whose setup and
difficulty measure are arguably more comparable to ours, finds that they do.
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The rest of our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2 we study the CPS.
We find large cross-difficulty-of-reaching differences in the raw (i.e., unadjusted)
subsample means of our two key outcomes. The labor force participation rate
climbs from 63.0% [SE 0.1] in the easiest-to-reach group to 72.3% [0.2] in the
hardest-to-reach group—an increase of over 9 percentage points—while the unem-
ployment rate declines from 8.1% [0.1] to 6.7% [0.2]. Of course, if these differences
in outcomes were explained entirely by demographic differences between the easy-
and hard-to-reach respondents then—assuming the demographic composition of
the population is known from outside sources—applying the correct weights would
yield unbiased population estimates. To show that this is not the case, at least
not in a simple way, we compare adjusted means (controlling for observables in-
cluding age, sex, race, education, and others) and still find that the adjusted labor
force participation rate increases from 64.1% [0.1] to 69.0% [0.3], and the adjusted
unemployment rate decreases from 8.0% [0.1] to 6.5% [0.2].
We also find that differences in labor force participation across age, sex, and
other demographic groups change systematically with difficulty of reaching, albeit
less dramatically. Finally, in robustness analysis we find that our CPS findings are
even stronger when limiting the sample to self reports, for whom our difficulty-
of-reaching measure is likely cleaner than for proxy reports; and are weaker when
limiting the sample to telephone-completed interviews, for whom the measure is
likely noisier.
In Section 3.3 we study obesity prevalence in the BRFSS. Here the uncontrolled
means decrease from 29.4% [SE 0.1] to 27.1% [0.1] from the easiest- to the hardest-
to-reach groups, and the adjusted means decrease from 29.7% [0.1] to 26.6% [0.2].
We also find some evidence of cross-demographic-group differences in obesity that
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change with difficulty of reaching. For example, among BRFSS’s easiest-to-reach
respondents, males’ adjusted obesity rate is indistinguishable from females’ rate
(male−female diff: 0.4% [SE 0.3]), however in the hardest-to-reach group males
are a further 1.8 [0.4] percentage points more likely to be obese than females
(diff: 2.2%). We illustrate the potential practical implications of these findings
using a simple extrapolation. We also explore the relationship between difficulty
of reaching and the self-reported height and weight variables that underlie the
BRFSS obesity measure. Finally, we show that using the survey weights that the
BRFSS recommends for making population-wide inferences does not change our
conclusions.
In Section 3.4 we analyze log quarterly expenditures of CEX households, again
finding a notable trend across difficulty-to-reach groups. Transformed back into
dollars, unadjusted means rise from $8,225 [SE $74] to $9,990 [64], and adjusted
means rise from $9,120 [59] to $9,585 [43]—a 5% increase—from easiest to hardest.
We again demonstrate the robustness of our estimates in several ways. We also
analyze separately total food and total health expenditures and find that they
increase and decrease, respectively, with difficulty of reaching.
In Section 3.5 we draw connections with previous work that investigates the
relationship between difficulty of reaching and outcomes. To our knowledge, such
work is almost non-existent in economics. We review work—mostly in statistics
and survey methodology—that has been exploring the potential use of difficulty-
of-reaching measures and other paradata (data about how the data were collected)
for making inferences regarding nonrespondents. Importantly, we review evidence
that suggests that higher response rates do not always reduce overall bias: while
potentially reducing unit nonresponse bias, they may increase item nonresponse
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bias or measurement error if, for example, the harder to reach are less likely to
accurately answer certain survey questions. We also review evidence on the quality
of number-of-contact-attempts paradata as difficulty-of-reaching measures.
Our paper’s closest predecessor is Heffetz and Rabin (2013), whose closest pre-
decessor is Curtin et al. (2000). These earlier papers study outcomes from the
University of Michigan’s Surveys of Consumers: self-reported happiness, and the
Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS), respectively. Both papers find that conclu-
sions regarding outcome variables depend on the difficulty of reaching respondents.
Indeed, the outcome measures they study—designed to elicit mostly unverifiable
emotions, attitudes, and beliefs—may be directly affected by the momentary con-
text in which they are asked and hence may be more prone to difficulty-of-reaching
differences. (For example, busy people may only be reached late in the day, when
they are more pessimistic; or over the weekend, when they are more optmistic.)
In contrast, our main outcomes of interest—labor force participation, unemploy-
ment, obesity, and expenditures—are measures that are designed to reflect veri-
fiable states that do not change moment to moment, and as such are supposedly
unaffected by the momentary situation related to the availability (or busyness) of
respondents. A main contribution of our paper is to document that conclusions
regarding such outcomes also depend on the difficulty of reaching respondents, in
a way that simple reweighting schemes cannot correct.
We conclude in Section 3.6, where we discuss the practical implications of our
findings—both for users of the specific outcomes we study and more broadly for
designers and users of other surveys. As a concrete application, we plot unem-
ployment data over two decades (1994–2013) and demonstrate that cyclical unem-
ployment fluctuations have been more extreme among easy than among difficult
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respondents.
3.2 CPS: Labor Force Participation and Unemployment
3.2.1 Data
The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a monthly survey conducted by the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the U.S. Census Bureau. Among its many uses,
it provides closely watched labor force statistics for the U.S., such as the labor force
participation and unemployment rates. The survey consists of a rotating panel of
households. A participating household provides data for four consecutive months,
is not contacted for eight months, and then provides data for four more consecutive
months. The eight interviews are referred to as month-in-sample (MIS) 1 through
8. The CPS samples addresses, so each household’s first interview (MIS 1) must
begin with a personal visit by a field interviewer, but it can be completed by phone
if requested by the respondent. The majority (around 85%) of the remainder of
the interviews are conducted via telephone, with the exception of MIS 5, the one
following the eight-month break, which is also usually completed in person.
Within each household, the interviewer attempts to interview the “most knowl-
edgeable” member, often the owner or renter of the unit (CPS, 2015). During each
interview the respondent is asked to help create a roster of eligible household
members and answer questions to determine, for each member, whether she is:
employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force. Specifically, for each civilian
member of the household who is 15 or older, a series of questions is asked to de-
termine whether or not she was employed in the interview month’s reference week
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(almost always the week containing the 12th of the month). If she was, the CPS
codes her as employed. Otherwise, the interview determines, among other things,
whether or not she was actively looking for work in the past four weeks and was
available for work during the reference week. If she was, the CPS codes her as
unemployed. Otherwise—i.e., she neither had a job (employed) nor was actively
looking for one (unemployed)—she is coded as out of the labor force.
We analyze CPS data from January 2012 to December 2013. The CPS response
rate in each of these 24 months is between 89% and 91%, and is 90.1% overall for
the period.4 Our analysis sample consists of all 307,603 MIS 1 observations that
the BLS would include when calculating the labor force participation and unem-
ployment rates—i.e., civilians aged 16 and up with complete labor force records.5
The labor force participation rate is defined as the share of these who are in the
labor force (i.e., they are either employed or unemployed); the unemployment rate
is defined as the share of those in the labor force who are unemployed.
Finally, our difficulty-of-reaching measure is a variable recording the “number
of actual and attempted personal contacts.” It is a noisy measure. Importantly, it
counts only personal visit attempts, so it likely understates the difficulty of reach-
4These are calculated from the CPS monthly files: the number of households with a partial or
complete interview is divided by the number of eligible households in the month. This calculation
corresponds to the American Association of Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) Response Rate
#2, #4, and #6 (AAPOR, 2016). (The three response rate definitions differ in how households
of unknown eligibility are treated, but the CPS contains no such households because interviewers
classify the eligibility of each address.) Krueger et al. (2017, Figure 4) show that nonresponse
rate in the CPS has been generally increasing, from slightly above 4% in 1990 to roughly 8% in
2010, and then steeply climbing to nearly 11% by 2014.
5 We restrict our analysis to MIS 1 data for two reasons. First, the number-of-contact-attempts
variable only counts in-person contact attempts, so it is mostly non-zero only for MIS 1 (where
91.9% of the observations in our analysis sample are non-zero) and, to a lesser extent, for MIS 5
(76.1% non-zero). Second, the CPS is subject to rotation group bias, i.e., some of its outcomes
vary systematically by MIS (for recent evidence see and Dixon (2013) and Krueger et al. (2017));
focusing on a single MIS avoids this confounding bias. (While the sources of this bias are still
being investigated, Krueger et al. (2017) find suggestive evidence that the unemployment rate
calculated from early interviews—MIS 1, 2, 3, and 5—is a stronger predictor of other measures
of economic slack than that calculated from later interviews.)
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ing respondents who were also contacted by the telephone.6 In addition, since it is
reported by the interviewer (and not by an automatic system, as in some telephone
surveys), it may be affected by intentional or unintentional misreporting.7 Indeed,
24,807 observations (8.1% of our analysis sample) have nil contact attempts re-
ported, and we do not know how difficult to reach they were; in the tables below
we classify their number of contact attempts as “None Reported,” or “NR.” The
remainder of the observations have 1–9 (top coded) contact attempts recorded. We
classify them into three categories: 1 attempt (64.3%), 2 attempts (17.0%), and 3
or more attempts (10.7%).
3.2.2 Analysis by Difficulty of Reaching
Sample composition
Table 3.1 reports basic demographics for our sample. Each of its first four columns
is based on a single number-of-contact-attempts category (1, 2, 3+, and NR);
the fifth column is based on the entire sample (All). The first three columns
show that on some demographics the sample’s composition changes systematically
with number of attempts. Notably, the young are harder to reach than the old:
those aged 20–39 comprise 30.7% of the 1-attempt sample compared with 37.0%
of the 3+-attempts sample, while those aged 65 and up comprise 20.2% and 12.5%
respectively. (In both cases, the 2-attempt percentages lie in between.) On the
other hand, women and men are of overall similar difficulty of reaching: the share
652,624 of the observations in our sample (17.1%) are known to have been conducted at least
in part via telephone, and we also analyze them separately below. Another 6,398 observations
(2.1%) have a missing value for interview mode.
7While not explicitly stated in the data dictionary, it was confirmed to us by researchers at
the BLS that this variable, as well as the mode variable, are manually entered by the interviewer.
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of women, 52.2% overall, does not vary much with number-of-attempts category.
We also note that demographic-group shares in the NR column are in some cases
inside, and in other cases outside (below or above), the range of shares in the three
leftmost columns. This makes it difficult to hypothesize about the difficulty-of-
reaching of NR respondents, and we have little to say about them in the rest of
this section; we include them in the tables only for completeness.
Looking at our variables of interest at the bottom of the table, the labor-force-
status composition of the sample changes dramatically with contact attempts:
a sharp increase in the share employed, from 57.9% (1 attempt) to 67.5% (3+
attempts), is mirrored almost entirely by a sharp decrease in the share not in the
labor force, from 37.0% to 27.7%, while the share unemployed is pretty stable
and hovers around 5%. In other words, as contact attempts increase, household
members are more likely to be recorded as employed and less likely to be recorded as
not employed who are not looking for employment. As a result, and as discussed in
the introduction, our two key outcomes—the labor force participation rate and the
unemployment rate—increase, and decrease, respectively, with contact attempts.
In the rest of this subsection we show that this increase and decrease are not
eliminated by controlling for the (first order) changes in demographic composition
noted above.
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Table 3.1: CPS Demographics
Attempts 1 2 3+ NR All
Age: 16–19 (%) 6.4 7.0 7.1 6.1 6.5
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.0)
20–39 30.7 33.4 37.0 28.4 31.6
(0.1) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.1)
40–49 16.5 18.1 18.8 17.3 17.1
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
50–64 26.2 25.7 24.7 28.9 26.2
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1)
65 and up 20.2 15.8 12.5 19.3 18.6
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1)
Children in household 25.5 28.4 28.5 23.4 26.2
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1)
Female 52.2 52.0 52.0 52.8 52.2
(0.1) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.1)
Educ: Less than high school 14.9 14.7 14.1 11.1 14.5
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
High school 30.2 29.1 28.0 27.1 29.6
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1)
Some college or tech. school 27.3 28.0 28.3 27.0 27.5
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1)
College graduate 27.6 28.2 29.6 34.8 28.5
(0.1) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.1)
Race: White 82.9 81.1 78.8 84.8 82.3
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
Black 9.7 10.1 11.5 8.6 9.8
(0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
Asian 4.4 5.6 6.4 4.4 4.8
(0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0)
Other 3.1 3.2 3.3 2.3 3.1
(0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0)
L.F.P.: Employed 57.9 62.5 67.5 63.5 60.2
(0.1) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.1)
Unemployed 5.1 5.2 4.8 4.0 5.0
(0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0)
Not in the labor force 37.0 32.3 27.7 32.5 34.9
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1)
Labor force participation 63.0 67.7 72.3 67.5 65.1
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1)
Unemployment rate 8.1 7.6 6.7 5.9 7.6
(0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
Median number of attempts (known) 1 2 3 n/a 1
Observations 197,751 52,275 32,770 24,807 307,603
Notes: Source: Current Population Survey, Jan. 2012–Dec. 2013. Sample: all MIS 1 observations who are
qualified to be in the civilian labor force and gave enough employment information to be classified. All figures
(and standard errors) reflect proportions within each column’s difficulty-of-reaching category, except for those for
unemployment rate (which are calculated as described in text) and number of attempts (which report medians).
NR: No reported contact attempts.
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Labor force participation
Table 3.2 reports our main labor force participation results. Since the table’s
structure is shared by all other main-results tables in the rest of this paper (with
unemployment, obesity, and expenditures as dependent variables), as well as with
many appendix tables, we describe it below in some detail. We also note here that
our main findings are not affected more than trivially by including a larger set of
age indicators and interactions or, for our binary dependent variables (labor force
participation, unemployment, and obesity), by replacing the OLS specification in
our main-results tables with probit or logit.8
Table 3.2’s four columns report results from a single OLS regression. The de-
pendent variable is a 0/1 labor force participation indicator. The regressors are
sets of demographic indicators (those reported in Table 3.1, plus unreported indi-
cators for marital status (6 categories), household size (5), state (51), urban/rural
(3), interview month (12), interview year (2), and a constant); a set of difficulty-to-
reach-category indicators; and a full set of interactions of the difficulty indicators
× all demographic indicators (including those unreported). Panel A reports the
estimated coefficients: the first column reports coefficients on the demographic
indicators for the base (omitted) difficulty-to-reach category (1 contact attempt),
and the other columns report the coefficients on the demographic indicators inter-
acted with each of the three other difficulty categories (2, 3+, and NR). Notice
the reported 4 × 13 coefficients are mechanically identical to those one would get
from estimating a separate regression of the dependent variable on the set of demo-
8Specifically, all the OLS-adjusted means discussed below remain within their reported stan-
dard errors (and are often within our tables’ rounding error) when including a set of ten rather
than five age categories, as well as all age-gender, age-education, and gender-education inter-
actions; and all the probit/logit-adjusted means are within 0.13 percentage points of the OLS-
adjusted means discussed below (indeed, most are exact matches, given rounding error), with
the interaction coefficients showing the same patterns and statistical significance.
85
Table 3.2: Labor force participation
Attempts 1 2 3+ NR
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 16–19 -0.263*** -0.025** -0.035** -0.047***
(0.006) (0.012) (0.015) (0.018)
20–39 -0.011*** -0.009 -0.003 -0.024***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
50–64 -0.113*** 0.018*** 0.049*** 0.028***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
65 and up -0.574*** 0.016* 0.069*** 0.032***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Children in household 0.039*** 0.017*** 0.035*** 0.026***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Female -0.103*** -0.002 0.010** 0.007
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Educ: Less than high school -0.136*** 0.008 0.001 -0.020*
(0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012)
Some college or tech. school 0.029*** -0.004 -0.010 -0.004
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
College graduate 0.098*** -0.014*** -0.025*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Race: Black -0.026*** -0.004 0.001 -0.016
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Asian -0.055*** -0.000 0.013 0.011
(0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015)
Other -0.037*** -0.006 0.015 0.047**
(0.006) (0.013) (0.016) (0.020)
Constant 0.782*** 0.016 0.105*** 0.107***
(0.011) (0.024) (0.027) (0.038)
B: Adjusted means
Labor force participation 0.641*** 0.662*** 0.690*** 0.665***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Notes: Source: Current Population Survey, Jan. 2012–Dec. 2013. N = 307, 603 (1 attempt:
197,751; 2: 52,275; 3+: 32,770; None Reported: 24,807). R2 = 0.29. The table reports estimates
from a single OLS regression. Dependent variable: 0/1 labor force participation indicator. See
page 85 for a full explanation of table structure. Panel A: estimated coefficients from a fully
interacted regression: each regressor is interacted with each difficulty-to-reach category (omitted
category: 1 attempt). Regression also includes non-reported indicators (and their interactions)
for marital status (6 categories), household size (5), state (51), urban/rural (3), interview month
(12), and interview year (2); see appendix note B.1. Standard errors, clustered at the household
level, in parentheses. Panel B: adjusted means, calculated from panel A regression. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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graphics (and no interactions) within each of the four difficulty categories (that is,
four separate regressions), and then subtracting the coefficients in the 1-attempt
regression from those in each of the other three regressions.
Panel B reports adjusted means for the four difficulty-to-reach categories (cal-
culated from the regression coefficients estimated in Panel A). Intuitively, the
adjusted means are calculated as follows.9 For each observation, one calculates
the dependent variable’s predicted value four times, using that observation’s true
values for all the independent variables except for the set of difficulty-to-reach indi-
cators, which are changed to indicate 1 attempt for the 1-attempt adjusted mean,
are changed to indicate 2 attempts for the 2-attempts adjusted mean, and so on.
The adjusted means row then reports these predicted values averaged across all the
sample’s observations. The four adjusted means are hence the average predicted
value of the dependent variable in four hypothetical samples. Each of the four
samples is identical to our actual (full) sample except that the number-of-contact-
attempts category is hypothetically set to 1, 2, 3+, or NR, respectively, for all of
that sample’s observations.
We start with the bottom line: the adjusted means in Panel B are 64.1% (1),
66.2% (2), and 69.0% (3+)—a total increase of 4.9 percentage points, with each
of the three point estimates statistically different from the others. In other words,
the differences in composition across the difficulty-to-reach categories explain less
than half of the 9.3-point raw increase from Table 3.1.
Looking at panel A, the fully interacted regression shows that not only are
respondents in different difficulty categories predicted to have different labor force
participation rates even when they are otherwise identical (on observables) to the
9In practice, we use the STATA 14.1 command “margins,” which also computes standard
errors using the delta method. Our intuitive exposition here draws in part on Williams (2011).
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entire sample, but furthermore these predicted differences interact with demo-
graphics. For example, teenagers (aged 16–19) are 26.3 percentage points less
likely to participate than those aged 40–49 among 1-attempt respondents but are
26.3 + 3.5 = 29.8 points less likely to participate among 3+-attempts respondents.
In contrast, those 65 and up are 57.4 points less likely to participate with 1 at-
tempt, but are 50.5 points less likely to participate with 3+ attempts, a (highly
significant) 6.9 point reduction in the difference. As to other age-group coefficients,
that on ages 20–39 seems relatively stable, while that on ages 50–64 shrinks from
11.3% (1 attempt) to 6.4% (3+). Other changes with difficulty of reaching include
a 3.5, 2.5, and 1.0 point change of the difference between, respectively, those with
and without children in the household, those with and without a college degree
(baseline: only high school), and men versus women.
These differences in panels A and B between the difficult and the easy to
reach—and hence potentially between nonrespondents and respondents—cannot
be eliminated by standard reweighing schemes. The generalizability of in-sample
estimates to population-wide estimates regarding labor force participation there-
fore depends crucially on maintaining low nonresponse rate in the CPS (while
managing high response quality, including accurate responses to individual ques-
tions).
Unemployment rate
In Table 3.3, which is otherwise identical to Table 3.2, we switch to analyzing the
unemployment rate by replacing the dependent variable with a 0/1 unemployment
indicator and limiting the sample to labor force participants. Beginning again with
the adjusted means in panel B, we see a distinctive trend as the unemployment
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rate drops from 8.0% (1 attempt) to 7.5% (2 attempts) to 6.5% (3+ attempts).
This overall drop of 1.5 percentage points is similar to the drops in the annual
unemployment rate from its Great Recession peak (9.6% in 2010) to its level in
2012 (8.1%) and from its 2001-recession peak (6.0% in 2003) to the next trough
(4.6% in 2006–2007). It is again clear that unless nonrespondents are selected
at random—a suspect assumption, given that even among respondents, difficulty
of reaching is a strong predictor of the outcome—high response rates (with high-
quality responses) are crucial for producing accurate population-wide estimates.
Looking at interactions in panel A, there appears to be less movement in
Table 3.3 than in Table 3.2. (The only consistent trends with some statistical
significance—up to the 5% level—are within some of the age rows.)
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Table 3.3: Unemployment rate
Attempts 1 2 3+ NR
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 16–19 0.079*** 0.012 0.022 -0.011
(0.007) (0.014) (0.017) (0.020)
20–39 0.014*** 0.001 -0.011** -0.004
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
50–64 0.003 -0.005 -0.010** 0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
65 and up 0.002 -0.001 -0.008 0.014
(0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Children in household -0.002 -0.009* -0.006 -0.007
(0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Female -0.004*** -0.005 -0.001 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Educ: Less than high school 0.043*** -0.001 -0.011 -0.002
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013)
Some college or tech. school -0.020*** 0.003 0.000 0.003
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
College graduate -0.043*** 0.003 0.008* 0.007
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Race: Black 0.064*** -0.018** -0.010 -0.009
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Asian -0.007* 0.006 0.010 -0.023***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Other 0.047*** -0.012 0.003 -0.000
(0.006) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017)
Constant 0.061*** -0.032* -0.025 -0.037
(0.010) (0.019) (0.018) (0.027)
B: Adjusted means
Unemployment rate 0.080*** 0.075*** 0.065*** 0.066***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Notes: Source: Current Population Survey, Jan. 2012–Dec. 2013. Sample: labor force par-
ticipants, N = 200, 358 (1 attempt: 124,530; 2: 35,376; 3+: 23,705; None Reported: 16,747).
R2 = 0.05. Table reports estimates from a single OLS regression (see page 85 for full explanation
of table structure). Dependent variable: 0/1 unemployed indcator. Panel A: estimated coeffi-
cients from a fully interacted regression: each regressor is interacted with each difficulty-to-reach
category (omitted category: 1 attempt). Regression also includes non-reported indicators (and
their interactions) for marital status (6 categories), household size (5), state (51), urban/rural
(3), interview month (12), and interview year (2); see appendix note A.1. Standard errors, clus-
tered at the household level, in parentheses. Panel B: adjusted means, calculated from panel A
regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3.2.3 Robustness and Additional Results
Self reports versus proxies
Unlike the CEX—where a respondent provides expenditure information at
the household level—and BRFSS—where a respondent provides individual
information—in the CPS a respondent provides information about herself and
about every other adult in the household. This means that in the CPS, number
of contact attempts may be a noisier measure of the true, underlying difficulty of
reaching household members who are not personally interviewed. Are the difficulty-
of-reaching trends we report above indeed stronger among self reporters?10
To explore this hypothesis, appendix Tables B.2 and B.3 (participation) and
B.4 and B.5 (unemployment) reproduce Tables 3.2 and 3.3 separately for self
and proxy reports. As hypothesized, the difficulty-outcome trends are stronger—
indeed, much stronger—among self reporters. Adjusted means for labor force par-
ticipation show a monotonic 7.5-point increase (from 62.4 to 69.9 points) among self
reporters, compared with an only 2.3-point increase (from 65.8 to 68.1) among the
proxy reported. There are also generally more pronounced difficulty-of-reaching
trends within the demographic-group estimates of self reporters. Similarly, when
moving from 1 to 2 to 3+ attempts, adjusted means for unemployment display a
monotonic 2.5-point decrease (8.4% to 7.2% to 5.9%) among self reporters, again
roughly three times the 0.7-point decrease among the proxy reported (7.7% to
7.8% to 7.0%, no longer strictly monotonic).
10Notice that one should not expect the difficulty-of-reaching trends to entirely disappear
among proxy reports, for reasons that could be both mechanical—e.g., all else equal, the house-
hold of a harder-to-reach individual is, on average, harder to reach—and circumstantial—e.g., de-
mographic predictors of difficulty-of-reaching (such as age) are correlated across members within
a household.
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While the dramatically steeper trends among self reporters in the adjusted
means of both dependent variables support the idea that there is a link between
the difficulty of contacting a respondent and her outcomes, and that the link cannot
be accounted for with other observable demographic controls, the comparison of
self versus proxy reports should be interpreted with caution, as it has its own set of
limitations. Importantly, self reporters are likely to be different from those whose
labor force status is reported by proxy. Indeed in our data self reporters are on
average older, more highly educated, and more likely to be female (not reported);
of course, they may also be different on unobservable characteristics. We therefore
refrain from drawing strong conclusions based on self reporters alone. (Our main
analysis above pools together proxy- and self-reports, more closely matching the
sample used by the BLS when it estimates its statistics.)
Telephone-completed interviews only
As mentioned above, the CPS’s number-of-contact-attempts variable only counts
in-person attempts. In addition, the interview-mode variable only records the
mode of the last interview (in person, telephone, or missing).11 One may therefore
wonder whether a respondent whose last interview was by telephone may on aver-
age be harder to reach than a respondent whose last interview was in person, given
the same number of reported in-person contact attempts, as the former required at
least one (and possibly more than one) additional, unrecorded, telephone contact
attempt.12 Specifically, consider the hypothesis that at a given number of reported
11We learned in conversations with BLS staff that the mode variable gets set every time the
interviewer enters the case. As a result, for households whose data were collected over the course
of multiple interviews, only the last interview’s mode is recorded.
12Of course, as we do not observe the total number of telephone contact attempts, we can
neither quantify the hypothesized difficulty difference nor can we even be certain that it exists,
as unrecorded telephone attempts could have taken place also for individuals who completed the
interview in person.
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in-person attempts, telephone completes are more likely to have had, on average,
an additional unobserved positive number of telephone attempts. This hypothesis
yields two predictions: relative to in-person completes, the 17.1% telephone com-
pletes in our main sample should on average (a) have outcomes consistent with
being more difficult than their difficulty measure suggests, and (b) show weaker
outcome-difficulty trends (due to the difficulty variable being a noisier measure for
them).
Appendix Tables B.6 (participation) and B.7 (unemployment) repeat our main
analysis restricting the sample to the 52,624 telephone completes in our data.
(We do not report estimates restricted to in-person completes because, accounting
for 80.8% of our data, they are rather close to the full-sample estimates above.)
The adjusted means for labor force participation follow the same upward trend
as in Table 3.2, rising from 68.5% to 70.3% to 71.3% across the difficulty-to-
reach categories, but are generally higher than the full-sample adjusted means
(64.1%, 66.2% and 69.0%), consistent with (a) above, and their trend is less steep,
consistent with (b) above. Likewise, the adjusted means for unemployment follow
the same pattern as in Table 3.3, declining from 6.4% to 6.0% to 5.1%, are lower
than their full sample counterpart (8.0%, 7.5% and 6.5%, respectively), and show
a slightly less steep trend although not statistically significantly so. The coefficient
patterns in panel A of both appendix tables generally resemble those in the primary
analysis, but at different levels (similar to the findings in the adjusted means).
Overall, then, the evidence is consistent with the above hypothesis.
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3.3 BRFSS: Obesity
3.3.1 Data
The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) is a large annual cross-
sectional telephone survey designed to monitor health-related risk behaviors,
chronic health conditions, and the use of preventative health services among the
adult U.S. population. Most modules of the survey are designed and supported by
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). However, data collection is
decentralized and is individually administered by each of the 50 states, the District
of Columbia, Guam and Puerto Rico (henceforth, the 53 locations). The survey
is intended to be nationally representative of adults living in households in the
United States and these territories. It uses random digit dialing for both landline
and cellular telephone numbers; for landlines, one respondent is randomly chosen
per household. The survey is conducted throughout the year, with differences in
the exact timing between the 53 locations.13 The 2012 BRFSS dataset—the latest
publicly available at the time of conducting our analysis—includes 475,687 respon-
dents. Across the 53 locations, its median survey response rate is 45.2%, ranging
from 27.7% in California to 60.4% in South Dakota; weighted by location sample
size, its average response rate is 44.6%.14
The BRFSS contains a variable with respondents’ Body Mass Index (BMI,
13Appendix Figures B.1 through B.3, each containing 54 mini-graphs representing the entire
sample and the 53 locations, report the corresponding 54 distributions of contact attempts and
of interview timing information (the month, day of the month, and day of the week in which the
interview was conducted).
14The BRFSS calculates response rates using AAPOR Response Rate #4, separately for its
landline and cellular phone samples within each location; it then reports location response rates
as weighted averages, weighted by local landline/cellular full-sample sizes. See BRFSS (2013) for
a detailed discussion of response rate calculation and variation across locations.
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defined as mass in kg
(height in meters)2
). It is calculated from respondents’ reports of their height
and weight (in either feet and pounds or meters and kilograms), and is missing
for respondents who did not provide their height or weight (n = 22, 710, 4.8% of
the original sample); who reported being pregnant at the time of the interview
(n = 2, 680, 0.6%); or whose calculated BMI was considered erroneous by the
CDC (n = 85). Our analysis is based on the remaining 450,212 respondents. Our
main dependent variable is a 0/1 indicator of obesity, defined by the World Health
Organization as BMI ≥ 30 (WHO, 1995, 2000).
Our difficulty-of-reaching measure is a variable that records the number of
calls made to each respondent. We use it to divide the data into four approximate
difficulty quartiles: 1 call (25.5% of the data), 2–3 calls (30.5%), 4–6 calls (21.9%)
and 7 or more calls (22.1%).15
For completeness and transparency, we note that chronologically, BRFSS data
were the first we analyzed, and prior to analyzing obesity we analyzed an outcome
that, while not a key outcome of our paper, was of great interest to us nonetheless:
a life satisfaction question. We first attempted to replicate the main findings in
Heffetz and Rabin (2013) and then, as BRFSS data have been used by economists
to study the relationships between life satisfaction and properties of states (Os-
wald and Wu, 2010) and cities (Glaeser et al., 2016), we also explored the state
relationships by difficulty of reaching and by cross-location differences in survey
methodology. Our early analysis of the life satisfaction question used older (2005–
2008) BRFSS data, matching the dataset in Oswald and Wu (2010); in general we
replicated the published results that we explored.16
15In the public-use data we analyze, the number-of-calls variable is globally top-coded at 35,
and in some states it appears to be locally top-coded at 15 (top-coding does not affect our
difficulty categories). Appendix Figure B.4 reports the distribution of this variable in our sample
and in each of the 53 locations.
16 Specifically, Heffetz and Rabin (2013) found that cross-group differences in reported hap-
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3.3.2 Analysis by Difficulty of Reaching
Sample composition
Table 3.4 reports the demographic composition of our BRFSS sample. As with
the CPS, we find compositional differences in the makeup of the difficulty-to-reach
subsamples. Notably, in both datasets the difficult to reach tend to be younger
than the easy to reach. But in contrast with the CPS, in the BRFSS females are on
average easier to reach: their share decreases monotonically from 61.2% (1-attempt
respondents) to 56.3% (7+ attempts). The BRFSS sample also becomes less non-
hispanic white (79.5% to 73.8%), more educated, and of higher reported income
with difficulty of reaching. While the relevant variable definitions are not directly
comparable across the CPS and BRFSS, these trends seem consistent across the
two datasets. In particular, higher income is consistent with higher participation
and lower unemployment (see also appendix Table B.1, which replicates table 1
and adds CPS income data). Finally, there is a strong, monotonic and significant
(both economically and statistically) difficulty-of-reaching trend in the fraction of
the sample that is obese, which declines from 29.4% (1 attempt) to 27.1% (7+
attempts). Interestingly, this trend does not reflect a trend in the average weight
of the difficulty-to-reach categories (as weight remains relatively constant), though
it may in part reflect a 1 cm overall increase in average height from the 1- to
piness depend on the difficulty of reaching respondents; our appendix Tables B.23 and B.24,
modeled after tables 1–4 from Heffetz and Rabin (2013), report that the original results replicate
qualitatively (the data show the same directional patterns), but the estimated magnitudes are
smaller. While this may be seen as a successful replication in a new dataset, we caution that the
original outcome variable (happiness yesterday) is not directly comparable to the BRFSS variable
(general satisfaction with one’s life). Oswald and Wu (2010) found that average life satisfaction in
a U.S. state is related to non-subjective quality-of-life measures for the state; we replicated their
analysis and found that controlling for cross-state differences in survey methodology—including
the faction of a state’s population that was easy-to-reach, the faction interviewed in each third
of the month, and the state’s overall response rate—did not affect the original findings.
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7+-attempt categories.
Table 3.4: BRFSS Demographics
Attempts: 1 2–3 4–6 7+ All
Age: 18–39 (%) 18.5 20.6 23.6 20.9 20.8
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
40–49 12.1 13.6 15.5 17.6 14.5
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
50–59 18.3 19.8 21.1 23.7 20.6
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
60–69 22.1 21.4 20.0 20.5 21.1
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
70 and up 28.5 24.1 19.2 16.6 22.5
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Missing 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Children in household 22.4 25.5 29.3 31.8 26.9
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Female 61.2 58.2 56.5 56.3 58.2
(0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
Educ: Less than high school 9.0 8.7 8.5 8.6 8.7
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0)
High school 30.7 29.6 28.7 28.2 29.4
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Some college or tech. school 27.8 27.5 27.1 25.6 27.1
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
College graduate 32.5 33.9 35.5 37.4 34.7
(0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
Missing 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Race: White, non-hispanic 79.5 78.0 75.2 73.8 76.8
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Black, non-hispanic 7.5 7.8 8.5 10.1 8.4
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0)
Other, non-hispanic 6.0 6.4 6.7 6.4 6.4
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0)
Hispanic 5.9 6.7 8.3 8.4 7.3
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0)
Missing 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.2
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Inc: Below $25,000 30.2 27.3 25.6 22.8 26.7
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
$25,000–49,999 23.9 23.4 22.7 21.3 22.9
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
$50,000–74,999 12.9 13.7 14.0 14.2 13.7
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
$75,000 and up 20.0 22.7 25.2 29.2 24.0
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Missing 13.0 12.8 12.5 12.5 12.7
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0)
Obese (BMI ≥ 30) 29.4 28.5 28.1 27.1 28.4
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Avg. height (cm) 168.7 169.3 169.6 169.7 169.3
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Avg. weight (kg) 79.6 79.8 79.9 79.7 79.8
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0)
Median number of attempts 1 2 5 10 3
Observations 114,694 137,418 98,813 99,287 450,212
Notes: Source: Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 2012. Sample: Non-pregnant individuals who
provided height and weight (and were not excluded due to erroneously high/low BMI). All figures (and standard
errors) reflect proportions within each column’s difficulty-of-reaching category, except for those for height and
weight (which report averages) and number of attempts (which report medians).
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Obesity
Table 3.5 follows the same structure as the CPS outcome tables (see table 3.2’s
exposition on p. 85). It reports the results from a regression of a 0/1 obesity
indicator on a set of demographic indicators (those in Table 3.4 and additional un-
reported indicators for marital status (7 categories), location (53), urban/rural (6),
and interview month (12)) and a constant, a set of difficulty-of-reaching indicators,
and a full set of demographic-difficulty interactions. As panel B reports, adjusted
obesity prevalence declines monotonically from 29.7% (1 attempt) to 26.6% (7+ at-
tempts), an overall decrease of 3.1 percentage points that is in fact larger than the
unadjusted mean decrease of 2.3 points. Not only do differences in demographic
composition across the difficulty-to-reach groups not drive the differences in obe-
sity prevalence; the demographic-composition differences in fact mask some of the
adjusted differences in obesity across difficulty categories. Since our entire sample
could be viewed as the 44.6% easiest to reach among eligible households, the sam-
ple average of 28.4% obesity may be an overestimate of the population average.
For example, a simple out-of-sample extrapolation of the within-sample trend in
Table 3.5 suggests an overestimate of around 2 additional percentage points for the
population obesity prevalence.17 Of course, such a simple extrapolation leaves out
many important details (including, for example, the possibility of measurement
error that is correlated with difficulty), and is hence only given as an illustration.
Our point is that our data strongly question the practice of assuming that nonre-
sponders are on average as obese as responders (unconditionally or conditionally
on observables), and accordingly regarding the sample average (raw or reweighted)
17This back-of-the-envelope estimate makes the simplifying assumptions that our four observed
difficulty-to-reach categories are equal-sized and represent the easiest-to-reach half of the total
attempted population. The remaining, unobserved, half of the population is then split into 4
equal-sized difficulty-to-reach groups; a linear trend that approximates the trend observed in
panel B’s adjusted means is projected onto these groups; and then the overall average is taken.
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as the best population-wide estimate.
In panel A we note two cross-demographic-group obesity differences that change
with difficulty of reaching and that we find of particular interest. First, women
change from being essentially as obese as men (difference = −0.4 percentage points,
insignificant) among 1-attempt respondents to being 2.2 points less obese than
men among 7+-attempts respondents, a large and significant overall change of 1.8
points. Second, those with children in the household change from being a sig-
nificant 2.3 points more obese among 1-attempt respondents to being essentially
as obese as those in children-less households (difference = 0.5 points, insignifi-
cant), another large and significant overall change of 1.8 points. While neither of
these changes is strictly monotonic (see table), in both cases conclusions regard-
ing cross-demographic-group differences in obesity rates—comparing women versus
men, and those with children versus without—qualitatively change. In both cases,
whether one estimates a large and statistically significant difference or no differ-
ence depends on which difficulty category one looks at, and—given the BRFSS’s
relatively low response rate—population-wide inferences strongly depend on what
one assumes about nonresponders.18
18Appendix Table B.8 reproduces Table 3.5 with additional controls for reported employment
status. The table shows some interesting patterns: relative to those employed for wages—other
things equal—homemakers, the self-employed, and especially students, are less obese; while those
out of work for more than a year, and especially those unable to work, are more obese. Also,
as expected, some of the education and income coefficients change. At the same time, both the
adjusted means in panel B and the patterns noted above in panel A change little, and always
remain within their original standard errors.
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Table 3.5: Obesity
Attempts 1 2–3 4–6 7+
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 18–39 -0.093*** 0.007 0.009 0.031***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
40–49 -0.019*** 0.013* 0.001 0.011
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
60–69 -0.007* 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
70 and up -0.122*** 0.012** 0.007 0.028***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Children in household 0.023*** -0.007 -0.004 -0.018***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Female -0.004 -0.006* -0.021*** -0.018***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Educ: Less than high school 0.025*** -0.000 0.001 0.006
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Some college or tech. school -0.007** 0.005 -0.002 0.005
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
College graduate -0.064*** 0.002 -0.006 -0.007
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Inc: Below $25,000 0.035*** -0.003 -0.009 -0.016**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
$25,000-49,999 0.009* -0.005 -0.006 -0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
$75,000 and up -0.045*** 0.003 0.001 0.008
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Race: Black, non-hispanic 0.123*** 0.000 -0.010 0.013*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Other, non-hispanic -0.005 0.010 0.021** -0.001
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Hispanic 0.033*** 0.001 0.003 0.003
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Constant 0.370*** 0.013 0.038** -0.009
(0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
B: Adjusted means
Obesity 0.297*** 0.287*** 0.282*** 0.266***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Notes: Source: Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 2012. N = 450, 212 (1 attempt: 114,694; 2–3:
137,418; 4–6: 98,813; 7+: 99,287). R2 = 0.04. Table reports estimates from a single OLS regression. Dependent
variable: 0/1 obesity indicator. See page 85 for full explanation of table structure. Panel A: estimated coefficients
from a fully interacted regression: each regressor is interacted with each difficulty-to-reach category (omitted
category: 1 attempt). Regression also includes non-reported indicators (and their interactions) for missing data,
marital status (7 categories), location (53), urban/rural (6), and interview month (12); see appendix note A.1.
Standard errors in parentheses. Panel B: adjusted means, calculated from panel A regression. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3.3.3 Robustness and Additional Results
Height and weight
The variables that underlie the obesity variable—self-reported weight (kg) and
height (m)—may themselves be interesting to researchers as main outcomes. We
repeat our analysis with each of the two as a dependent variable (appendix Tables
B.9 and B.10). We find a strong decreasing trend in adjusted mean weight, which
drops from 80.4 [SE 0.06] to 79.1 [0.06] kg from the easiest to hardest category—a
1.3 kg (≈ 2.9 lbs) difference. We also find evidence of cross-group differences—
including across males and females and across some age and income groups—with
overall changes in the range 0.8–1.6 [0.2–0.3] kg from easiest to hardest.
In contrast, adjusted mean height remains remarkably stable, at 169.3 [0.02–
0.03] cm, across the four difficulty-to-reach categories, with small (< 1 [0.1] cm)
changes from easy to difficult in cross-sex and cross-race differences (Table B.10).
Weighted regressions
Whereas the CPS and CEX are both multiple-interview panels from which we only
analyze a single interview per household—MIS 1 in the CPS and second interview
in the CEX (see next section)—the BRFSS is a cross section of individuals. As a
result, unlike with the other two datasets, with the BRFSS we can use the provided
(full sample) survey weights to probe the robustness of our unweighted analysis.
The BRFSS includes analysis weights designed to adjust for nonresponse and
non-coverage in the survey and to make the number of cases sum to the population
for each geographic region (usually state) (CDC, 2012). The weighting process
101
takes into account the probability that someone was likely to be sampled. The
weight is also raked on up to 12 demographic margins.19 Appendix Tables B.11,
B.12, and B.13 recreate Tables 3.5 (obesity), B.9 (weight), and B.10 (height),
respectively, using the provided individual weights. In the adjusted means for
obesity, the weighted prevalence trends from 29.4% to 28.4% to 27.2% to 26.1%
[all SEs 0.3] across increasing difficulty-to-reach categories (compared with 29.7%
to 28.7% to 28.2% to 26.6% in the unweighted Table 3.5). We also find similar
patterns in the adjusted means for weight and height across the weighted and
unweighted tables, and for all three outcomes we additionally find the same general
patterns, or lack thereof, in panel A’s coefficients.
In summary, using the BRFSS weights does not change our in-sample conclu-
sions.20 This finding questions the assumption that BRFSS nonrespondents are
similar to the (properly weighted) average respondent.
19These are: age group by gender, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, home ownership
status, gender by race and ethnicity, age group by race and ethnicity, phone ownership, region,
region by age group, region by gender, region by race and ethnicity. See CDC (2012) for additional
details.
20As an additional robustness check, appendix Table B.14 recreates Table 3.5 based on the
303,034 respondents (67.3% of our sample) who were interviewed by one of the 1,651 interviewers
who conducted at least 10 interviews in each difficulty category; and appendix Table B.15 does
the same and adds a full set of interviewer controls and interviewer-difficulty interactions. As
the tables show, our findings do not change, suggesting that using weights that accounted for
such information would not change our conclusions. (We conduct this test only for BRFSS data
because we do not observe interviewer ID in the CPS and CEX.)
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3.4 CEX: Quarterly Household Expenditures
3.4.1 Data
The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), administered by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, measures the purchasing habits of U.S. consumers. The CEX’s random
sample of households is designed to be representative of the non-institutionalized,
civilian population of the U.S.21
The CEX consists of two separate components—a diary survey and an interview
survey—with two independent samples. We focus on the interview survey, which
collects data on up to 95% of household expenditures. Its goal is to collect detailed
data on large purchases that respondents can be expected to remember for three
or more months (accounting for 60–70% of household purchases), and estimates
for other major categories of expenses (accounting for 20–25% of purchases). The
survey is a rotating panel: each quarter, approximately 20% of the sample is new;
each household participates for five consecutive quarters.
The first interview collects demographic and other household details. Each of
the second through fifth interviews collects expenditure data for the three preceding
months; these data are used by the BLS to revise the weights in the Consumer
Price Index, as well as to create national expenditure estimates. The survey has a
quarterly target of approximately 7,000 participating households. Response rates
among eligible households for 2008 to 2013 were, respectively, 73.8%, 74.5%, 73.4%,
70.4%, 69.5% and 66.7%—a fast decline of roughly 7 percentage points in five
21This section is based on the documentation available at http://www.bls.gov/cex/ (accessed
on May 26, 2016). This includes the percentages of household expenditures that the CEX is
estimated to cover (reported in the next paragraph).
103
years.22
Beginning in 2008, the BLS releases detailed paradata for the CEX interview
component. The paradata contain information about each contact attempt, includ-
ing when it occurred, its mode (in person or telephone), and its result. We create
a number-of-contact-attempts variable by counting the contact-attempt entries in
the paradata file. For consistency with our analyses in the previous sections, in
our main analysis we use this variable for the first interview. However, since no
relevant expenditure data are collected in the first interview, we use the second
interview’s expenditure data. (When we also use the second interview’s number of
contacts, our results below become stronger; see footnote 23.)
Our primary estimation sample is 2008:Q2–2013:Q4; we omit 2008:Q1 because
we do not have paradata for its first interview, which occurred in 2007. We start
with 39,277 observations, from which we drop 2,553 (6.5%) that could not be
matched with first-interview paradata. We further exclude 2 observations from the
main analysis of log total expenditures and 156 observations from the robustness
analysis of log health expenditures due to negative expenditure values. We divide
the resulting sample into four difficulty-of-reaching groups, as equal-sized as the
contact-attempts distribution allows: 1 attempt (18.0% of the sample), 2 (19.7%),
3–4 (27.2%), and 5 or more (35.2%).
Our key outcome variable is log total quarterly expenditures (specifically, ln[1+
expenditures]). When reporting and discussing results, we often transform the
estimates back to dollar values (by exponentiating and subtracting 1); we use the
delta method to transform SEs.
22As with the CPS, these figures correspond with AAPOR’s Response Rate #2, #4, and #6.
(There are no households of unknown eligibility, as CEX interviewers classify the eligibility of
each address.)
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3.4.2 Analysis by Difficulty of Reaching
Sample composition
Table 3.6 reports substantial demographic differences across difficulty-to-reach
groups in the CEX—a finding similar to those from the other two datasets. As in
the CPS and BRFSS, the CEX’s hard-to-reach are younger: the youngest two age
categories, together covering ages 16–39, increase their share from 27.0% of the
1-attempt subsample to 33.5% of the 5+ subsample, while the 65+ age category
falls from 30.9% to 15.6%. Also consistent with the other two datasets, the 5+
subsample is more educated and earns more than the 1-attempt subsample, with
the proportions of college degree holders and of household income above $70,000
respectively increasing by 5.4 and 10.4 percentage points.
There is also a qualitatively large and statistically significant trend in our key
outcome, log total expenditures: exponentiated, they increase from $8,225 (1 at-
tempt) to $9,200 (2), to $9,865 (3–4), to $9,990 (5+). Finally, the table also
reports averages for two arguably important expenditure categories that have re-
ceived much attention from economists and that we chose ahead of time (prior
to looking at the data for specific categories): food and health. Average log food
expenditures mirror the total expenditures pattern of monotonic (and highly statis-
tically significant) increase, while health expenditures appear to generally (though
nonmonotonically) decrease.
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Table 3.6: CEX Demographics
Attempts 1 2 3–4 5+ All
Age: 16–29 (%) 13.2 10.0 11.0 13.5 12.1
(0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2)
30–39 13.8 15.2 17.1 20.0 17.2
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.2)
40–49 14.3 18.7 19.8 22.1 19.4
(0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (0.2)
50–64 27.8 28.9 30.2 28.8 29.0
(0.6) (0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.2)
65 and up 30.9 27.2 22.0 15.6 22.4
(0.6) (0.5) (0.4) (0.3) (0.2)
Children in household 28.4 32.0 33.4 36.3 33.3
(0.6) (0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.2)
Female 53.6 53.3 52.8 53.2 53.2
(0.6) (0.6) (0.5) (0.4) (0.3)
Educ: Less than high school 15.9 14.7 13.2 12.2 13.7
(0.5) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2)
High school or GED 26.5 25.8 24.6 24.2 25.1
(0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (0.2)
Some college or tech. school 30.4 28.8 29.9 30.9 30.1
(0.6) (0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.2)
College graduate 27.2 30.7 32.3 32.6 31.2
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.2)
Race: White 84.3 83.0 82.3 77.8 81.2
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.2)
Black 10.2 10.3 11.2 14.2 11.9
(0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2)
Asian 3.9 4.7 4.7 5.5 4.8
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
Other 1.7 2.0 1.9 2.5 2.1
(0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Inc: Below $20,000 26.4 21.4 19.1 18.3 20.6
(0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.3) (0.2)
$20,000-39,999 24.8 23.0 21.3 21.1 22.2
(0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (0.2)
$40,000-69,999 22.4 24.0 24.1 23.7 23.6
(0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (0.2)
$70,000 and up 26.4 31.7 35.5 36.8 33.6
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.2)
Exp: Total (log) 9.02 9.13 9.20 9.21 9.15
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Total ($) 8,225 9,200 9,865 9,990 9,459
(74) (79) (72) (64) (36)
Health (log) 5.12 5.20 5.12 4.83 5.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Food (log) 7.15 7.24 7.31 7.33 7.27
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Median number of attempts 1 2 3 7 3
Observations 6,603 7,230 9,973 12,918 36,724
Notes: Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2008–2013. Sample: all second interview households that could
be matched with a first-interview difficulty measure, excluding 2 and 156 observations with negative entries,
respectively, in the total expenditure rows and in the health expenditure row. All figures (and standard errors)
reflect proportions within each column’s difficulty-of-reaching category, except for those for expenditures (which
report average log expenditures and average log expenditures exponentiated into dollars), and number of attempts
(which report medians).
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Total expenditures
Table 3.7 has the same format as previous main-results tables. Panel A presents
regression results for households’ log quarterly total expenditures. Panel B’s ad-
justed means are calculated from the panel A regression, and are reported both
directly (in logs) and transformed back into dollars. The latter increase from $9,120
(amongst the 1-attempt subsample) to $9,331 (2), to $9,581 (3–4), and then stay
flat at $9,585 (5+). Thus, accounting for the changing demographic composition of
the subsamples, the difference between the easiest- and hardest-to-reach respon-
dents shrinks from $1,765 in the unadjusted means (Table 3.6) to $465—a still
very significant 5% increase—in the adjusted means (Table 3.7).23 We find no
significant trends in the coefficient estimates in Panel A.
23 We view these estimates as somewhat conservative. Recall that we pair a household’s
difficulty-to-reach measure (from the first interview) with its outcome variable (expenditures
from the second interview) across two different quarters. Therefore, if a household’s difficulty of
reaching in a specific interview is more strongly related to its outcome measures in that same
interview, our estimates might be attenuated. To explore this possibility, appendix Table B.16
replicates Table 3.7, keeping the sample constant but using the difficulty-to-reach measure from
each household’s second interview. We indeed find similar patterns overall, with a larger expen-
diture gap between easiest- and hardest-to-reach respondents: the difference increases from $465
(Table 3.7) to $769 (Table B.16), reflecting both a drop from $9,120 to $8,942 among the easiest
and a slightly smaller increase, from $9,585 to $9,711, among the hardest to reach. Furthermore,
including additional controls for interview hour and duration—which are not available in our CPS
and BRFSS data, and hence are not included in our main specification, but could in principle be
incorporated into the survey weights—only decreases the (now nonmonotonic) expenditure gap
in table 3.7 to $379 (Table B.17)—still a very significant 4% increase—and the expenditure gap
in Table B.16 to $427 (Table B.18).
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Table 3.7: Total expenditures
Attempts 1 2 3–4 5+
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 16–29 -0.091*** -0.010 -0.004 0.012
(0.025) (0.035) (0.032) (0.030)
30–39 -0.025 0.002 0.000 -0.022
(0.023) (0.030) (0.028) (0.027)
50–64 0.000 -0.030 -0.002 -0.021
(0.021) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024)
65 and up -0.026 -0.029 -0.020 -0.046
(0.023) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028)
Children in household 0.063*** -0.048 -0.041 -0.022
(0.023) (0.031) (0.029) (0.027)
Female -0.022* 0.019 0.006 0.025*
(0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
Educ: Less than high school -0.152*** 0.032 0.031 0.011
(0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025)
Some college or tech. school 0.104*** -0.018 -0.017 -0.031
(0.016) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020)
College graduate 0.256*** -0.004 -0.013 -0.021
(0.017) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021)
Race: Black -0.076*** -0.019 -0.042 -0.016
(0.020) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024)
Asian -0.076** -0.008 -0.030 0.024
(0.032) (0.042) (0.039) (0.037)
Other 0.058 -0.125** -0.115* -0.037
(0.047) (0.063) (0.059) (0.055)
Inc: Below $20,000 -0.614*** -0.020 0.008 0.034
(0.019) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024)
$20,000-39,999 -0.257*** -0.011 0.014 0.025
(0.018) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022)
$70,000 and up 0.396*** 0.017 0.023 0.035
(0.018) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022)
Constant 9.172*** 0.074 0.114** 0.022
(0.037) (0.051) (0.048) (0.046)
B: Adjusted means
Total expenditures (log) 9.118*** 9.141*** 9.168*** 9.168***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Total expenditures ($) 9,120*** 9,331*** 9,581*** 9,585***
(59) (54) (47) (43)
Notes: Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2008–2013. Sample: All households from Table 3.6, excluding
2 households with negative net total quarterly expenditures. N = 36, 722 (1 attempt: 6,603; 2: 7,229; 3–4:
9,972; 5+: 12,918). R2 = 0.56. Table reports estimates from a single OLS regression. Dependent variable:
ln(total quarterly household expenditures +1). See page 85 for full explanation of table structure. Panel A:
estimated coefficients from a fully interacted regression: each regressor is interacted with each difficulty-to-reach
category (omitted category: 1 attempt). Regression also includes non-reported indicators (and their interactions)
for marital status (5 categories), size of consumer unit (3), urban/rural (2), interview month (12), and interview
year (6); see appendix note A.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Panel B: adjusted means, calculated from panel
A regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
108
3.4.3 Robustness and Additional Results
Health and food expenditures
Appendix Tables B.19 and B.20 replicate Table 3.7, with log health and log food
expenditures as dependent variables. As with the unadjusted means, the trend in
food expenditures is in line with the trend in total expenditures. It shows a 6%
increase from easiest- to hardest-to-reach respondents—close to the 5% increase in
total expenditures. In contrast, health expenditures show a highly significant (both
statistically and economically) 13% decrease from easiest to hardest—opposite in
sign and over double the percent increase in total (and in food) expenditures. As
in Table 3.7, there are no clear trends (and few significant interaction estimates)
in panel A in either Table B.19 or B.20.
This finding of significant and opposite trends in the adjusted means for food
and health—the only two consumption categories we looked at—suggests that
while some expenditure categories may be underestimated in the entire population,
others may be overestimated. It highlights that without empirical evidence, it is
difficult to know a priori the direction of potential bias.24
Telephone and in-person interviews
As with the CPS, CEX interviews can occur either in person or over the telephone.
In contrast with the CPS, in which only in-person attempts are recorded, in the
24 A posteriori, this and the finding of no clear trends in cross-demographic-group differences
in either food or health may be consistent with some speculative interpretations of our results.
For example, these findings are consistent with the untested idea that within the demographic
groups we linearly control for (age, income, having children, etc.), households with healthier lives
and lifestyles (spending more on food and less on health) are on average more difficult to reach.
However, see footnote 26 for an alternative interpretation.
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CEX all contact attempt are supposed to be recorded, and we have no a priori
reason to expect the number-of-contact-attempts variable to be a better or worse
measure of difficulty across one mode or the other. Appendix Tables B.21 and
B.22 replicate Table 3.7 separately for telephone and in-person interviews.25 We
observe the same general pattern in the in-person sample (24,305 interviews) and
telephone sample (11,719 interviews) as we observe in the combined sample, but
the in-person exponentiated adjusted means seem a few hundred dollars lower on
average: $8,923 [SE $66] to $9,387 [54] (in person, a 5% increase) versus $9,344
[124] to $9,920 [71] (telephone, a 6% increase) from easiest to hardest.
3.5 Previous Related Work
3.5.1 Research Utilizing Difficulty-of-reaching Measures
Our paper contributes to an empirical literature that seeks to shed light on nonre-
sponse bias by investigating the links between difficulty measures and survey-based
outcomes. Within economics, we are aware of only two such investigations, both
recent: Heffetz and Rabin (2013), discussed above; and Behaghel et al. (2014),
discussed below. Outside of economics the literature is longer-established, larger,
and growing. Heffetz and Rabin (2013) review it in some detail. This section fo-
cuses on new work that postdates their review, but we present it in the context of
the earlier literature, organized by three strands: theoretically focused, empirically
focused, and experimental.
25We use a variable indicating interview mode as reported by the interviewer. Interviews re-
ported as occurring through mixed modes (telephone and in-person) and interviews with missing
mode data are excluded.
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First, on the theory-focused front, models have been developed where the prob-
ability of survey participation is related to the outcome of interest; see Potthoff
et al. (1993), who also analyze published number-of-calls data to fit parameters in
their model. Our findings in the present paper appear consistent with such models.
A more recent literature builds on such earlier work and aims at further utiliz-
ing paradata, including number of contact attempts, to directly improve analysis.
One idea is to incorporate paradata in reweighting methods. Biemer et al. (2013)
present one such technique, a call-back model, in which the response propensity is
modeled using information on the number of contact attempts. Krueger and West
(2014) examine a similar but richer model that adds additional sources of auxiliary
data, such as interviewer observations and characteristics of the interview location.
Of particular interest to our analysis, the corrected weights sometimes move dif-
ferent subgroups’ estimated outcome prevalence in opposite directions, suggesting
that nonresponse bias may be differentially affecting different groups—consistent
with our findings that the difficulty-outcome gradient may differ across demo-
graphic groups. Coming from economics rather than from statistics and survey
methodology, Behaghel et al. (2014) (mentioned above) propose using difficulty-
of-reaching paradata for dealing with survey attrition, and apply their proposed
corrective to a job-search experiment.
Second, on the empirically focused front, we noted above two studies that link
administrative data to survey data (see footnote 3). Such studies can shed light on
both nonresponse bias—by comparing administrative-data outcomes across survey
nonrespondents and respondents (of different difficulty)—and measurement error—
by comparing respondent outcomes (by difficulty) across administrative and survey
data. Lin and Schaeffer (1995) match child-support awards and payments with a
telephone survey and examine nonresponse bias. They provide some evidence that
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hard-to-reach respondents may not actually be more like nonrespondents than the
easy-to-reach. However, their survey is conducted in a very different context than
the large government surveys we study, as most of their nonrespondents were never
located from the initial court records; and their resulting difficulty measure is also
rather different, as they exclude contact attempts made prior to locating the re-
spondent. Kreuter et al. (2010) link administrative and survey data for a subsample
of German unemployment-benefits recipients who were interviewed by telephone,
and provide insight on both nonresponse and measurement: in their data, adding
hard-to-reach respondents reduces nonresponse bias (the true averages of survey
participants become closer to the true target-population averages), but increases
measurement error (survey reports of the hard to reach are farther from their true
values). For three of the four outcomes they study—employment status, age, and
foreign citizenship—the net effect is to decrease the overall bias in survey outcomes
(the reduction in nonresponse bias outweighs the increase in measurement error).
But for the receipt of unemployment benefits the addition of hard-to-reach re-
spondents actually increases the overall bias in the survey measure. These findings
highlight the concern that unwilling—and thus hard-to-reach—respondents may
be more prone to misreport and, in particular, misreport sensitive behaviors.
Related to the potential unwillingness of the hard to reach, two recent papers
propose respondents’ motivation as a potential explanation of the link between
difficulty and outcomes. In the first, a working paper, Chadi (2014) documents a
connection between a respondent’s motivation to participate in the survey, number
of contact attempts, and subjective happiness. In the second, Meyer et al. (2015)
examine the declining accuracy of survey data by combining survey and adminis-
trative measures of government transfers. They find that measurement error con-
tributes as much to the observed bias in survey estimates as item nonresponse and
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unit nonresponse combined; they speculate that an increase in “over-surveyed” and
unmotivated participants could increase measurement error. While the idea that
the hard-to-reach are less motivated and more prone to measurement error cannot
be directly assessed in our data, it could not alone easily explain our findings.
For example, to explain the cross-demographic-group trends we find for some out-
comes, such difficulty-motivation links would have to differ across demographics.
For another example, they would have to increase food expenditures and decrease
health expenditures from easy to difficult respondents.26 At the same time, the
idea that for some variables, item nonresponse increases with difficulty of reaching
finds support in our data. For example, based on reported imputation flags in
the CPS, we calculate imputation rates for twelve-month family income to be 19.2
percent (1 attempt), 20.8 (2), 23.9 (3+), and 27.8 percent (NR). (There is no clear
way to directly link imputation flags to any of our main-outcome variables.)
Third, on the experimental front, in an influential study Keeter et al. (2000)
conduct two telephone surveys—one over five days with a response rate of 36%,
the other over eight weeks with a response rate of 61%—and find mostly small dif-
ferences in outcomes, with demographics a notable exception. While our evidence
in the present paper is consistent with the finding of significant demographic-
composition changes as response rates increase, we also find significant changes
in all four (non-demographic) key outcome variables we examine. The latter sug-
gests that the earlier findings should not be misinterpreted as providing a blanket
26 Of course, the less motivated may be more reluctant, differentially across demographics
and expenditures, to accurately report certain kinds of information. We cannot rule out, for
example, that due to social-image considerations, the harder to reach over-report behaviors per-
ceived as “positive”—labor force participation, total expenditures, and food expenditures—while
under-reporting behaviors perceived as “negative”—unemployment, health expenditures, and
(especially among women, all else equal) obesity. However, our finding (in Table 3.2) that the
increase in labor force participation with difficulty of reaching is less pronounced (all else equal)
among men, the childless, and college graduates does not easily fit within such a social-image
explanation.
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justification for drawing population-wide conclusions regarding non-demographic
variables from surveys with low response rates.
While we are not aware of recent work investigating the generalizability of
the above experimental findings by running more experiments, the experimental
finding of demographic differences across easy- and hard-to-reach respondents has
been highlighted in recent empirical work. That work acknowledges the possibility
of a link between difficulty and outcome variables, but leaves open the possibility
that demographic controls may alleviate the problem—something that we show in
this paper is not generally possible. Legleye et al. (2013), for example, examine the
effect of increasing the number of contact attempts in a French telephone survey
designed to measure sexual and reproductive health (SRH) issues. The inclusion
of harder-to-reach respondents, who are found to differ on SRH behaviors from
the rest of the sample, is shown to make the sample closer to the demographic
composition of the target population. Similarly, a working paper by Pudney and
Watson (2013) simulates the impact of reducing the number of call attempts in two
health and employment longitudinal surveys—the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) and the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA)—
and find that it would change the samples’ demographic composition and outcomes
of interest such as disability, ill health and employment. Other recent papers also
find significant differences in demographics and outcome variables between the
easy and difficult to reach, including Cohen et al. (2013), and Hetschko and Chadi
(2017).
Recall that we find a consistent demographic and socioeconomic gradient across
our three datasets: hard-to-reach respondents are younger and more educated, and
they have higher household income, than easy-to-reach respondents. In addition,
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our outcome variables, which are associated with socioeconomic status, exhibit
similar patterns: the difficult-to-reach are more likely to be employed (in the CPS)
and are generally healthier (having lower obesity rates in BRFSS and lower medi-
cal expenditures in CEX). These findings are broadly consistent with those in the
works reviewed above, although differences in methodology prevent direct compar-
isons.27 This broad consistency highlights the fact that researchers interested in
outcomes related to socioeconomic status may need to pay particular attention to
the potential for nonresponse bias in their analyses.
3.5.2 Evidence on the Quality of Difficulty-of-reaching
Measures
A limitation of paradata is that they are rarely collected for direct use by analysts.
Often a mere by-product of the data collection process, their quality may be lower
than that of other survey data. Bates et al. (2010) examine the quality of para-
data across three federal surveys: the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS),
the CEX, and the CPS. The three collect the data through a common Contact
History Instrument (CHI).28 The authors find that while most CHI entries in the
CPS and NHIS were recorded immediately after the contact attempt, in the CEX
almost 20% of the attempts were recorded with some delay. In all three datasets,
attempts that did not result in a contact were more likely to be recorded later,
27For example, Legleye et al. (2013) and Pudney and Watson (2013) both find that the em-
ployed are harder to reach, while Curtin et al. (2000) find that those with higher income are
harder to reach. Similarly, the existing evidence is consistent with the notion that the healthy
are generally harder to reach than the unhealthy across a variety of measures such as annual
medical expenditures, self-reported health, and disability status (Cohen et al., 2013; Pudney and
Watson, 2013).
28The CHI information is publicly available—and is the source of our contact attempts data—
for the CEX but not for the CPS.
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and hence presumably had a higher chance of being forgotten, than those resulting
in a contact. The authors also discuss an internal report according to which CEX
interviewers estimated that they ever complete a record for only around 85% of
their attempts. Similarly, Biemer et al. (2011) conduct an informal survey of field
interviewers and supervisors for the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NS-
DUH), and find greater incentives to underreport than to overreport the number
of visit attempts.29 To the extent that the uneven underreporting found in these
studies adds measurement error to our difficulty-of-reaching independent variables,
our estimates may be attenuated. Our estimated difficulty trends may hence be
viewed as lower bounds.
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Investigating three of the most commonly used government surveys, we find sig-
nificant, systematic differences in key outcomes across number-of-contacts groups.
These differences persist within demographic cells—indeed, some of them system-
atically differ across demographic groups—and cannot be eliminated by standard
reweighting. They qualitatively replicate within subsamples of the data, and they
generally grow when the number-of-contacts measure seems cleaner.
That selection and nonresponse may bias survey outcomes is well-known the-
oretically but—judging by common practices—under-appreciated empirically. By
demonstrating that even after adjusting for demographics, key outcome variables
are strongly related, empirically, to respondents’ difficulty of being reached—and
29According to the authors, overreporting could be caught through timesheet reviews while
underreporting might help keep a case considered alive, thus helping the interviewer avoid being
perceived as using time inefficiently.
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hence, potentially, to their likelihood of survey participation—we hope to have
convinced readers that a routine assumption of random nonresponse is hard to
justify in these data.
In practice, how concerned should users of these and similar data be?
The answer depends on application and, importantly, on survey response rates:
the lower these are, the more population-wide inferences from sample estimates
rely on the assumption of random nonresponse (or random on observables). As we
discussed when analyzing the BRFSS, our findings are consistent with the possi-
bility that the population-wide prevalence of obesity could be 1 or 2 percentage
points below the BRFSS sample mean, and, furthermore, cross-group comparisons
of obesity (women versus men, for example) could change from an estimate of no
difference to an estimate of a significant difference, depending on assumptions re-
garding nonresponders. Like the BRFSS, many telephone surveys nowadays have
response rates below 50%—sometimes, well below that figure. In-person surveys
still enjoy generally higher response rates, but they too show worrying trends: for
example, as mentioned earlier, response rate in the CEX lost 7 percentage points
from 2008 to 2013; this recent drop accelerated a previous, slower decline of 4
points from 2001 to 2008 (NRC, 2013). Brick and Williams (2012), who examine
the causes of increasing nonresponse, note decreases in the response rate of sev-
eral large, telephone and in-person, U.S. cross-sectional surveys from 1997–2007,
including in the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), National Household
Education Survey (NHES), General Social Survey (GSS), and National Immuniza-
tion Survey (NIS). Even among the most prominent in-person surveys, such as
the CPS, response rates have been declining, dropping most recently from around
92% in 2010 to just above 89% in 2014 (Krueger et al., 2017). While the CPS’s
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presently high response rates mean that from a practical point of view, our CPS
findings are mostly academic, and (measurement error aside) the official CPS-
based population-wide estimates are likely rather accurate, our findings underline
the importance of keeping response rates high—something that may or may not
be achievable in the future.
We conclude with a concrete demonstration of the value of high (and accurate)
response rates, in the context of one important application. Figure 3.1 tracks the
unemployment rate by difficulty of reaching over time. The solid shapes depict
the panel-B adjusted-mean estimates from twenty replications of Table 3.3, for
the twenty years starting in 1994—the earliest year for which we have number-of-
attempts data—with one exception: the “Children in household” control, which
is not available for all years, is excluded from the regressions. The hollow shapes
depict differences between these adjusted means. The figure generalizes our main
finding from Table 3.3: in each of the twenty years, the unemployment rate is
significantly higher among the easy than among the difficult to reach. How-
ever, the easy-minus-difficult difference (hollow squares) is both highly variable
and, importantly, highly correlated with the unemployment rate (solid shapes).30
In other words, unemployment fluctuations are more extreme among easy than
among difficult respondents. Qualitatively, the figure therefore suggests that the
common practice of treating nonrespondents as average respondents yields larger
cyclical fluctuations in unemployment estimates relative to treating them as diffi-
cult respondents. Quantitatively, this striking finding is of negligible significance at
present (given current CPS response rates)—but it demonstrates the importance
30The correlation between the 1-attempt unemployment rate (solid squares) and the 1-attempt-
minus-3+-attempts difference (hollow squares) is 0.83 (N = 20). This high correlation is accom-
panied by substantial variation in the 1-attempt-minus-3+-attempts difference: for example, in
2000, when the U.S. annual unemployment rate was the lowest since the late 1960s, the difference
was 0.7%; in 2010, when unemployment was the highest since the early 1980s, the difference was
1.9%.
118
Figure 3.1: Unemployment rate, by number of contact attempts and year
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of keeping response rates and accuracy high.
While we know little about the increasingly many nonrespondents in the
datasets we examine, we interpret our findings as, at the very least, suggesting that
the burden of proof should lie with researchers whenever they make the random-
nonresponse assumption in surveys with low response rates. Moreover, in specific
applications this burden may extend across time and space. In particular, to the
extent that the outcomes we examined are used for tracking the economy over
time (as in the above example) or for making cross-country comparisons, our find-
ings suggest that users should be concerned about, and try to control for, possible
differences across periods and locations in the relation between outcomes and dif-
ficulty of reaching. Finally, this burden of proof may extend beyond outcomes’
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means—the sole focus of the present paper. What is the relation, for example, be-
tween outcomes’ variance and difficulty of reaching? If nonresponders’ outcomes
vary more than responders’ outcomes, statistics that measure inequality may be
affected too. We leave this question to future research.
Once the burden of proof lies with researchers, we trust that the ensuing de-
mand for higher quality paradata, including difficulty-of-reaching measures, will
hasten the process of these measures getting better, cleaner, and more widely
available.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 1: ARE ALL INCOME TAXES REALLY
THE SAME? AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION INTO
STATE AND FEDERAL INCOME-TAX SALIENCE
A.1 Simulation
As discussed, reporting error is a potential concern when measuring salience. This
concern is potentially magnified when the rate that is reported with more (relative)
error is also the rate that is hypothesized to be the less salient rate. This is a
concern because reporting error could potentially be driving the finding of lower
salience. To explore the validity of this concern, I conducted a series of simulation
analyses. To see the extent to which reporting error alone could drive my findings,
I simulated the following model:
τFi = τ
∗
Fi
+ Fi (A.1)
τSi = τ
∗
Si
+ Si (A.2)
τTi = τSi + τFi + Ti (A.3)
This simulation used the true tax rates from the underlying sample, but then
generated reported data using various combinations of model parameters. The
simulation focused on matching the error and covariance structure of the data. The
errors were drawn from distributions chosen to match the relevant distributions for
each reporting rate. In particular, total and federal errors were drawn from a Beta
distribution with parameters estimated from the sample population and the state
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errors were drawn from a Weibull distribution with similarly estimated parameters.
The correlation structure between the three types of error was estimated from
the sample data as well. Errors were then generated with the same correlational
structure (and alternatively with no correlation and with only federal and state
error correlation).
This process was able to create data whose regressions fit the same basic pat-
terns as the actual sample. Looking at Table A.1, I see that the simulation process
was able to create data with generally similar relationships between coefficients
as in the actual data. Further experimentation with the simulation showed that
a potential explanation for this strange pattern of the coefficients for actual and
reported state rates is the error of state rates. As can be seen in column 4 of Tables
A.2 and A.3, the coefficient for reported state rate decreases and increases when
the state error is doubled and halved, respectively; while the other coefficients
remain relatively stable.
Table A.1: Simulation regressions, full correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Reported state Reported fed P2 P2
State rate, actual 1.065*** 0.925***
(0.112) (0.130)
Federal rate, actual 0.967*** 0.947***
(0.027) (0.031)
State rate, reported 0.117***
(0.016)
Federal rate, reported 0.767***
(0.014)
Constant 0.152*** 0.099*** 0.080*** 0.053***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Observations 3,182 3,182 3,182 3,182
R-squared 0.028 0.290 0.297 0.581
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Table A.2: Simulation regressions, doubled state error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Reported state Reported fed P2 P2
State rate, actual 1.131*** 0.925***
(0.224) (0.130)
Federal rate, actual 0.967*** 0.947***
(0.027) (0.031)
State rate, reported 0.049***
(0.008)
Federal rate, reported 0.775***
(0.014)
Constant 0.305*** 0.099*** 0.080*** 0.056***
(0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004)
Observations 3,182 3,182 3,182 3,182
R-squared 0.008 0.290 0.297 0.579
Table A.3: Simulation regressions, halved state error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Reported state Reported fed R2 R2
State rate, actual 1.033*** 0.925***
(0.056) (0.130)
Federal rate, actual 0.967*** 0.947***
(0.027) (0.031)
State rate, reported 0.293***
(0.032)
Federal rate, reported 0.751***
(0.014)
Constant 0.076*** 0.099*** 0.080*** 0.046***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Observations 3,182 3,182 3,182 3,182
R-squared 0.097 0.290 0.297 0.586
A.2 Survey text
S1: You are being asked to take part in a research study to help us better under-
stand people’s knowledge of the income tax system in the United States. If you
agree to participate in this study, we will first ask you a few questions about your
household’s tax filing behavior to determine if you are eligible. Then we will use
this information to generate a fictional household that is similar to yours in many
respects. We will ask you some questions about the amount of taxes this fictional
household would pay in different situations. You are welcome to use a calculator to
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help you answer. Finally, we will ask some more questions about your household,
to help us better understand your answers.
We do not anticipate any risks to you for participating in this study other than
those encountered in day-to-day life and you may withdraw from the study at any
time.
If you are eligible for our survey and complete it, then you will receive a $1
participation fee, and you can also earn up to $0.50 in bonus payments based on
how close your answer is to our estimate of the correct answer. At some point in
the survey there will be one or more questions to see if you are paying attention
and if you do not correctly answer them, you will not be eligible for the bonus
payment. There are no other benefits to you for participation in this survey.
Participation in this study is completely voluntary. Your answers will be con-
fidential and all records will be kept private. In any sort of report we make
public, we will not include any information that will make it possible to iden-
tify you. If you have questions about this survey, the researcher conducting it is
Daniel Reeves (dbr88@cornell.edu), a graduate student at Cornell University. If
you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a subject in this study,
you may reach Cornell University’s Institutional Review Board at 607-255-5138 or
http://www.irb.cornell.edu.
S2: Before we begin, please enter your mturk id, which will be used for your
payment.
S3: The tax system has a variety of different tax brackets. The tax rates that
households pay depend on which tax bracket they are in. This tax bracket depends
on a variety of factors such as the household’s income, the deductions they take,
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and the number of dependents in the household. To make our questions relevant to
your household and its tax bracket, we would first like to ask you some questions
about your household’s income and taxes.
S4: What state did you live in during 2016? (If you lived in multiple states,
pick the one where you spent the majority of the year)
S5: In 2016, what was your total household income rounded to the nearest
thousand dollars? Answers: 0 to 250,000+ (251 levels, in $1,000 increments.)
S6: How confident are you that your answer for household income is correct?
Answers: Not at all confident...Very confident (7 levels)
S7: For 2016, how will your household file its income taxes? Answers: Indi-
vidual, Head of household or qualifying widow(er), As a married individual (filing
jointly), Married individual (filing separately), Don’t know.
S8: For 2016, how many dependents aged 18 or under will your household
claim when filing its taxes? (Please enter 99 if you are not sure)
S9: For 2016, how many dependents aged 19 or over will your household claim
when filing its taxes? (Please enter 99 if you are not sure)
S10: In 2016, will anyone claim you as a dependent? Answers: Yes, No, Not
sure
S11: [If married] In 2016, will anyone claim your spouse as a dependent?
Answers: Yes, No, Not sure
[If answered every question with no unsure/don’t know then proceed. Other-
wise exit survey]
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S12: Thanks. You are eligible to participate in our survey!
S13: For most of this survey, we will ask you about the income taxes paid by
the Lawson household. Please carefully read the Lawson household’s description
as we will test you on this information before you may continue. The Lawson
household was chosen to share some features with your household.
The Lawson household:
• Lives in [state]
• Files taxes [filing status]
• Claims X personal exemptions, X for dependents aged 18 or under, and X
for dependents over the age of 18. It also has no blind or members aged 65
or over.
• Claims only the standard deductions and exemptions and uses only credits
available to it based on its income and dependents.
• Does not live in a city or county with a local income tax
• Receives all its income as salary from one household member’s job and has
no self-employed members
• Does not do things such as itemizing deductions or investing in tax deductible
retirement accounts which might change their taxes
• The Lawson household’s income may change from question to question and
will be given to you each time.
The Lawson household’s income may change from question to question and will
be given to you each time.
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S14: What state does the Lawson household live in?Answers: 50 states + DC
+ Don’t know
S15: Which best describes how the Lawson household earns money? Answers:
The household’s income comes from stock investments; The household’s income
comes from a self-employed member’s job; The household’s income comes from a
government program like Social Security or Disability Insurance; The household’s
income comes from a single member’s job and that member is not self employed;
The household’s income comes from multiple member’s jobs and those members
are not self employed; The household’s income comes from multiple member’s jobs
and those members are self employed
[If answered incorrectly, display message and repeat Lawson section up to one
more time; if they fail again then exit survey.]
S16: Unfortunately, you did not correctly answer our questions on the Lawson
household. Please read the description and try again.
[If answered correctly, proceed]
S17: Congratulations, you correctly answered our questions about the Lawson
household.
This survey contains questions about tax rates and each of these questions has a
chance to determine the final amount of your bonus payment. One of these twenty-
nine questions will be randomly selected and your bonus payment will depend on
how close your answer is to our estimate of the correct answer. Many questions
may seem similar, and others are repeated multiple times, so please carefully read
each question to make sure you are answering it as accurately as possible. Doing
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so will increase the odds that you will receive a higher bonus payment.
Additionally, there will be one, or more, questions to check whether you are
paying attention when answering questions. These do not require any tax knowl-
edge, but must be answered correctly in order for you to be eligible for a bonus
payment.
S18: We will begin with two training questions to help you learn how to answer
the types of questions you will encounter in this survey. The two training questions
will ask you to use a randomly chosen tax rate for a fictional household. After the
training is complete, you will use your best guess about the actual taxes paid by a
household that looks like yours (the Lawson household) to answer the rest of the
questions. The training will also explain how your bonus payment is calculated
[Repeat section twice, once with a random rate between 0-50 and another
between 50 and 100; random order]
S19: This is a training question, for this training question we have randomly
chosen a number between 0 and 100 to be the fictional Felton household’s tax
rate. The randomly chosen tax rate for the Felton household is [random rate]%.
Therefore, the Felton household needs to pay [random high rate]% of its additional
earnings in total income taxes.
Imagine that the Felton household’s income in 2016 was initially [HH income].
How much more would the Felton household have, after paying all income taxes
on the additional earnings, if it had made an additional $100?
S20: Given the randomly chosen tax rate was [random rate]%, the correct
answer is [correct answer]. If the Felton household earned $100 more before taxes,
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it would need to pay [correct answer]% of that in income taxes, which is [correct
answer]. So $100 more before taxes minus [random high rat] in total income taxes
is equal to [correct answer] after taxes.
If this had been a question chosen for payment and you gave the correct answer
([correct answer], then you would receive the full bonus payment of $0.50. However,
if you answered another number, the further away this number was from [correct
answer], the smaller your bonus payment would be if the question were chosen.
For instance, if you had answered [wrong answer], then your bonus payment would
only be $0.05. If you get too far away from the correct answer, your bonus payment
will become $0.00.
Click here to see the formula that will determine your bonus payment. [Appears
when clicked] Your bonus payment is the higher of $0 or (1-10*(Correct rate-Income
tax rate implied by your answer)2)*$0.50. So your payment is highest ($0.50) at
the correct answer and gets smaller as you go above or below the correct answer,
until the payment shrinks to zero.
S21: You are now done with the training questions. From here on, you will
be answering questions about the Lawson household and will no longer be given a
hypothetical income tax rate. Instead, we want you to answer the questions using
your best guess about the Lawson household’s taxes. There will be six sections of
questions, and each section will begin with brief instructions for that section. Any
one of the questions about tax rates may be randomly chosen to determine your
bonus payment, so please read and answer carefully.
As a reminder, remember that the Lawson household:
• Lives in [state]
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• Files taxes [filing status]
• Claims X personal exemptions, X for dependents aged 18 or under, and X
for dependents over the age of 18. It also has no blind or members aged 65
or over.
• Claims only the standard deductions and exemptions and uses only credits
available to it based on its income and dependents.
• Does not live in a city or county with a local income tax
• Receives all its income as salary from one household member’s job and has
no self-employed members
• Does not do things such as itemizing deductions or investing in tax deductible
retirement accounts which might change their taxes
• The Lawson household’s income may change from question to question and
will be given to you each time.
S22: For each question in this section we will give you a different starting
income for the Lawson household. We then want you to think about all the income
taxes the Lawson household would need to pay if it earned an additional $100 and
how much of the $100 would be left after it pays all these taxes.
[P1b through Pu15 (5 questions) were presented in random order]
S23: The Lawson household’s income in 2016 was initially [HH Income]. How
much more would the Lawson household have, after paying all income taxes on
the additional earnings, if it had made an additional $100?
[From here on out the respondent always had the option to click a button to
remind themselves of the basic characteristics of the Lawson household]
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S24: The Lawson household’s income in 2016 was initially [HH Income*1.05].
How much more would the Lawson household have, after paying all income taxes
on the additional earnings, if it had made an additional $100?
S25: The Lawson household’s income in 2016 was initially [HH Income*1.15].
How much more would the Lawson household have, after paying all income taxes
on the additional earnings, if it had made an additional $100?
S26: The Lawson household’s income in 2016 was initially [HH Income*0.95].
How much more would the Lawson household have, after paying all income taxes
on the additional earnings, if it had made an additional $100?
S27: The Lawson household’s income in 2016 was initially [HH Income*0.85].
How much more would the Lawson household have, after paying all income taxes
on the additional earnings, if it had made an additional $100?
S28:The Lawson household’s income in 2016 is not given. Please ignore the
rest of the question and enter Lawson as the answer to show that you are paying
attention.
[Randomized to one of three conditions: control, state, federal; with the ap-
propriate words changed depending on randomization]
S29: For each question in this section, we will give you a different starting
point of income for the Lawson household. These questions are similar to ones
you have been asked before, and we want you to think about all/state/federal
income taxes the Lawson household would need to pay on its additional income
if it earned an additional $100 and how much of the $100 would be left after it
pays its all income taxes. However, these questions may be at different income
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levels than before.
[P1b through Pu15 (5 questions) were presented in random order]
S30: The Lawson household’s income in 2016 was initially [HH Income]. How
much more would the Lawson household have, after paying all/state/federal
income taxes on the additional earnings, if it had made an additional $100?
[From here on out the respondent always had the option to click a button to
remind themselves of the basic characteristics of the Lawson household]
S31: The Lawson household’s income in 2016 was initially [HH Income*1.03].
How much more would the Lawson household have, after paying all/state/federal
income taxes on the additional earnings, if it had made an additional $100?
S32: The Lawson household’s income in 2016 was initially [HH Income*1.1].
How much more would the Lawson household have, after paying all/state/federal
income taxes on the additional earnings, if it had made an additional $100?
S33: The Lawson household’s income in 2016 was initially [HH Income*0.97].
How much more would the Lawson household have, after paying all/state/federal
income taxes on the additional earnings, if it had made an additional $100?
S34: The Lawson household’s income in 2016 was initially [HH Income*0.9].
How much more would the Lawson household have, after paying all/state/federal
income taxes on the additional earnings, if it had made an additional $100?
S35: Think back to your answers about how much the Lawson household would
pay in all/state/federal income taxes at various incomes. Overall, how confi-
dent are you that your answers were correct? Answers: Not at all confident....Very
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confident (7 levels)
S36: Based on your answer, when the Lawson household’s income is [HH
Income], the Lawson household would pay [answer]% of each additional dollar
earned in state income tax. Using the rate you gave, if the Lawson household
had earned an additional $600 in salary, how much of that $600 would they have
left after paying their all/state/federal income tax?
[p1b through pu15 repeated, in random order for all respondents]
S37: When answering the last five questions about all income taxes, what
taxes were you considering in your answers? (Check all that apply) Answers [Ran-
dom order]: Federal income taxes; State income taxes; City income taxes; Other
local income taxes (like county or school district); Payroll taxes (Medicare/Social
Security); Other (please specify)
[Other two sections the respondent was not randomized to were repeated, minus
the calculation question]
S38: As our final three questions about the Lawson household, we would like
to ask you about the total amounts of each type of income tax that the Lawson
household would pay on their income.
[Three average questions presented in random order]
S39: If the Lawson household’s income in 2016 was [HH income], what is the
total amount they paid in state income taxes?
S40: If the Lawson household’s income in 2016 was [HH income], what is the
total amount they paid in federal income taxes?
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S41: If the Lawson household’s income in 2016 was [HH income], what is the
total amount they paid in total income taxes?
S42: Finally, we would like to ask you a little bit more about yourself, to help
better understand your answers. What year were you born?
S43: What is your gender?
S44: What is the highest level of education you have completed? Answers:
Some high school; High school degree or equivalent; Some college or technical
school; Bachelor’s degree; Graduate or professional degree; Prefer not to answer
S45: How will you prepare your federal and state income tax returns for
2016?Answers: Prepared by you by hand; Prepared by you using tax software; Pre-
pared by another member of your household (either by hand or using tax software);
Prepared by a tax professional such as an accountant; Do not know; Prefer not to
answer
S46: Have you ever prepared your own income tax returns, either by hand or
using tax software?
S47: In 2016, how many elderly and/or blind exemptions will your household
claim? (Please enter 99 if you are not sure)
S48: Does your household claim any tax credits or deductions that are subject
to income limits such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)? Answers: Yes,
EITC only; Yes, some other tax credit or deduction; Yes, EITC and other tax
credits; No; Do not know; Prefer not to answer
S49: For your household’s federal income tax returns for 2016, will your house-
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hold itemize or take the standard deduction?
S50: What was the approximate total of the itemized deductions that your
household took from your federal returns?
S51: Will your household pay the federal alternative minimum tax (AMT) in
2016?
S52: About how many hours do you work per week?
S53: How many members of your household (including you) would you consider
to be part-time employees?
S54: Are you or any other members of your household self-employed?
S55 How many members of your household (including yourself) are self-
employed?
S56: What is your household’s primary source of income? Answers: Salaries,
wages or tips; Self-employment income; Government programs such as Social Se-
curity or Disability Insurance; Investment income (e.g. stocks, bonds, property);
Other (please specify); Prefer not to answer
S57: Which would you say best describes your household’s living arrange-
ments? Answers: We own the place that we live in, but are still paying off its
mortgage; We own the place that we live in and and have paid off its mortgage:
We rent the place we live in; We live rent free at a place we do not own; Other
(please describe); Prefer not to answer
S58: Which term best describes your political affiliation? Answers: Republi-
can; Democrat; Independent; Libertarian; Green; Other (please describe); Prefer
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not to answer
S59: In a typical week, how much time would you estimate that you spend
reading about, listening to, or watching news coverage?
S60: How many years have you lived in [state]?
S61: Where did you live in before living in [state]?
S62: In the past three years, do you think your household has changed which
state and/or federal income tax bracket it is in? Answers: Yes, changed only federal
income tax brackets; Yes, changed only state income tax brackets; Yes, changed both
state and federal income tax brackets; No, not changed either bracket; Not sure;
Prefer not to answer
S63: When you last moved locations or changed jobs did you use any tools
or resources to see how your income taxes might change as a result of this job
or location change? Answers: Yes, I looked at online tax information or used an
online calculator; Yes, I consulted an accountant or financial professional; Yes, I
talked to a knowledgeable friend or family member; Yes, other (please specify); No,
I thought my taxes would change but did not try to determine how much; No, I did
not think my taxes would change and therefore did not consult any other resources;
No, I did not think about taxes when changing jobs or locations; Not applicable
S64: What zipcode does your household live in?
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 3: DIFFICULTY TO REACH
RESPONDENTS AND NONRESPONSE BIAS: EVIDENCE FROM
LARGE GOVERNMENT SURVEYS
Note B.1: Regressor Category Definitions
CPS
Marital status: 6 categories: Married with spouse present, Married with spouse
absent, Widowed, Divorced, Separated, Never married.
Number of persons living in the household: 5 categories: 1 person, 2, 3, 4,
5 or more.
State: 51 categories: 50 states and District of Columbia.
Urban status: 2 categories (+ a “Missing” indicator for missing data):
Metropolitan, Nonmetropolitan.
Interview month: 12 categories: January, February, . . . , December.
Interview year: 2 categories: 2012, 2013.
BRFSS
Household income: 4 categories: “Is your annual household income from all
sources” Less than $25,000, $25,000–49,999, $50,000–$74,999, $75,000 or
more.
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Marital status: 6 categories (+ Missing): Married, Divorced, Widowed, Sepa-
rated, Never married, A member of an unmarried couple.
Urban status: 5 categories (+ Missing): In the center city of an Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA), Outside the center city of an MSA but inside the
county containing the center city, Inside a suburban county of the MSA, In
an MSA that has no center city, Not in an MSA.
Location: 53 categories: 50 states, District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico.
Interview month: 12 categories: January, February, . . . , December.
CEX
Income: 4 categories (“CEX created variable for the income class of the consumer
unit based on income before taxes (created from responses to the detailed
income section of the survey)”): Less than $20,000, $20,000–39,999, $40,000–
69,999, $70,000 or more.
Marital status: 5 categories (“Marital status of reference person”): Married,
Widowed, Divorced, Separated, Never married.
Size of consumer unit: 3 categories: 1 member, 2 members, 3 or more members.
Urban status: 2 categories (+ Missing): Inside metropolitan statistical area
(MSA), Outside MSA.
Interview month: 12 categories: January, February, . . . , December.
Interview year: 6 categories: 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013.
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Table B.1: CPS Demographics, with income
Attempts 1 2 3+ NR All
Age: 16–19 (%) 6.4 7.0 7.1 6.1 6.5
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.0)
20–39 30.7 33.4 37.0 28.4 31.6
(0.1) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.1)
40–49 16.5 18.1 18.8 17.3 17.1
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
50–64 26.2 25.7 24.7 28.9 26.2
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1)
65 and up 20.2 15.8 12.5 19.3 18.6
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1)
Children in household 25.5 28.4 28.5 23.4 26.2
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1)
Female 52.2 52.0 52.0 52.8 52.2
(0.1) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.1)
Educ: Less than high school 14.9 14.7 14.1 11.1 14.5
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
High school 30.2 29.1 28.0 27.1 29.6
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1)
Some college or tech. school 27.3 28.0 28.3 27.0 27.5
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1)
College graduate 27.6 28.2 29.6 34.8 28.5
(0.1) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.1)
Inc: Less than $20,000 16.8 15.4 15.2 12.5 16.1
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
$20,000-39,999 22.6 22.0 21.4 20.0 22.2
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1)
$40,000-74,999 27.8 28.0 28.6 28.1 27.9
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1)
$75,000 and up 32.8 34.7 34.8 39.4 33.9
(0.1) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.1)
Race: White 82.9 81.1 78.8 84.8 82.3
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
Black 9.7 10.1 11.5 8.6 9.8
(0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
Asian 4.4 5.6 6.4 4.4 4.8
(0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0)
Other 3.1 3.2 3.3 2.3 3.1
(0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0)
L.F.P.: Employed 57.9 62.5 67.5 63.5 60.2
(0.1) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.1)
Unemployed 5.1 5.2 4.8 4.0 5.0
(0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0)
Not in the labor force 37.0 32.3 27.7 32.5 34.9
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1)
Labor force participation 63.0 67.7 72.3 67.5 65.1
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1)
Unemployment rate 8.1 7.6 6.7 5.9 7.6
(0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
Median number of attempts (known) 1 2 3 n/a 1
Observations 197,751 52,275 32,770 24,807 307,603
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.1, but includes household income categories.
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Table B.2: Labor force participation, self-reported only
Attempts 1 2 3+ NR
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 16–19 -0.176*** -0.030 -0.067* 0.090
(0.015) (0.032) (0.036) (0.062)
20–39 -0.001 -0.013* -0.003 -0.020**
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
50–64 -0.129*** 0.019** 0.051*** 0.023**
(0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
65 and up -0.568*** 0.014 0.062*** 0.022
(0.005) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Children in household 0.016*** 0.008 0.014 0.004
(0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012)
Female -0.104*** -0.001 0.021*** 0.019***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Educ: Less than high school -0.113*** 0.009 -0.007 -0.030*
(0.005) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016)
Some college or tech. school 0.044*** -0.010 -0.017** -0.016
(0.003) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
College graduate 0.114*** -0.018** -0.039*** -0.017*
(0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Race: Black -0.015*** -0.009 0.008 -0.022
(0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014)
Asian -0.038*** 0.016 -0.001 0.015
(0.007) (0.014) (0.016) (0.019)
Other -0.031*** -0.013 0.025 0.012
(0.008) (0.018) (0.020) (0.027)
Constant 0.725*** -0.002 0.140*** 0.097*
(0.014) (0.032) (0.034) (0.051)
B: Adjusted means
Labor force participation 0.624*** 0.659*** 0.699*** 0.677***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.2, but restricts the sample to self reports. N = 155, 442 (1
attempt: 99,604; 2: 25,813; 3+: 16,675; None Reported: 13,350). R2 = 0.32. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.3: Labor force participation, proxy-reported only
Attempts 1 2 3+ NR
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 16–19 -0.255*** -0.013 -0.025 -0.037*
(0.007) (0.015) (0.018) (0.022)
20–39 -0.015*** -0.001 -0.004 -0.022*
(0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
50–64 -0.096*** 0.016* 0.043*** 0.038***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013)
65 and up -0.580*** 0.020 0.077*** 0.049***
(0.005) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017)
Children in household 0.046*** 0.015* 0.031*** 0.023*
(0.004) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014)
Female -0.103*** -0.005 -0.004 -0.009
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Educ: Less than high school -0.155*** 0.007 0.007 -0.013
(0.005) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016)
Some college or tech. school 0.018*** -0.002 -0.009 0.002
(0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
College graduate 0.086*** -0.012 -0.014 0.009
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Race: Black -0.042*** 0.005 -0.006 -0.016
(0.005) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017)
Asian -0.072*** -0.008 0.027* 0.009
(0.007) (0.014) (0.016) (0.022)
Other -0.042*** 0.004 0.004 0.080***
(0.008) (0.018) (0.023) (0.027)
Constant 0.756*** -0.011 0.132* 0.102
(0.032) (0.067) (0.072) (0.076)
B: Adjusted means
Labor force participation 0.658*** 0.665*** 0.681*** 0.656***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.2, but restricts the sample to proxy reports. N = 149, 685
(1 attempt: 96,891; 2: 25,982; 3+: 15,674; None Reported: 11,138). R2 = 0.27. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.4: Unemployment rate, self-reported only
Attempts 1 2 3+ NR
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 16–19 0.116*** 0.003 0.051 -0.016
(0.017) (0.037) (0.043) (0.065)
20–39 0.018*** -0.003 -0.011* -0.015**
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
50–64 0.009*** -0.003 -0.008 -0.003
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
65 and up 0.012** 0.001 -0.015 0.013
(0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Children in household -0.012*** 0.003 0.005 0.009
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Female -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Educ: Less than high school 0.047*** 0.007 -0.020 -0.009
(0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018)
Some college or tech. school -0.015*** 0.009 -0.002 0.008
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
College graduate -0.047*** 0.008 0.008 0.015**
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Race: Black 0.058*** -0.015 -0.014 -0.005
(0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013)
Asian -0.010* 0.011 0.013 -0.016
(0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Other 0.044*** -0.005 0.016 0.000
(0.008) (0.016) (0.019) (0.024)
Constant 0.063*** -0.028 -0.007 -0.020
(0.014) (0.026) (0.026) (0.040)
B: Adjusted means
Unemployment rate 0.084*** 0.072*** 0.059*** 0.060***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.3, but restricts the sample to self reports. N = 99, 752 (1
attempt: 60,524; 2: 17,585; 3+: 12,499; None Reported: 9,144). R2 = 0.04. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.5: Unemployment rate, proxy-reported only
Attempts 1 2 3+ NR
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 16–19 0.076*** 0.021 0.010 -0.025
(0.007) (0.016) (0.019) (0.023)
20–39 0.011*** 0.008 -0.012* 0.003
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
50–64 -0.006** -0.004 -0.013* 0.004
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
65 and up -0.011*** 0.001 0.004 0.010
(0.004) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
Children in household -0.008** -0.009 -0.004 0.002
(0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Female -0.009*** -0.007 -0.002 0.012**
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Educ: Less than high school 0.041*** -0.010 -0.006 0.008
(0.005) (0.011) (0.012) (0.018)
Some college or tech. school -0.029*** -0.002 0.004 0.000
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
College graduate -0.041*** -0.001 0.008 -0.000
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Race: Black 0.068*** -0.020* -0.004 -0.012
(0.005) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016)
Asian -0.004 0.003 0.005 -0.030**
(0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013)
Other 0.051*** -0.020 -0.008 0.003
(0.008) (0.017) (0.021) (0.026)
Constant 0.070* -0.015 -0.109** -0.153***
(0.039) (0.077) (0.045) (0.056)
B: Adjusted means
Unemployment rate 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.070*** 0.073***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.3, but restricts the sample to proxy reports. N = 98, 887
(1 attempt: 63,144; 2: 17,454; 3+: 10,909; None Reported: 7,380). R2 = 0.06. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.6: Labor force participation, telephone interviews only
Attempts 1 2 3+ NR
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 16–19 -0.243*** 0.013 -0.046 -0.068**
(0.020) (0.040) (0.046) (0.027)
20–39 -0.018** -0.011 0.002 -0.016
(0.008) (0.016) (0.018) (0.011)
50–64 -0.084*** 0.002 0.036* -0.004
(0.009) (0.017) (0.020) (0.012)
65 and up -0.554*** 0.047* 0.099*** 0.006
(0.013) (0.025) (0.031) (0.016)
Children in household 0.070*** 0.001 -0.010 -0.007
(0.010) (0.019) (0.021) (0.013)
Female -0.090*** -0.013 -0.002 -0.006
(0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.008)
Educ: Less than high school -0.148*** -0.018 -0.002 -0.011
(0.013) (0.027) (0.031) (0.017)
Some college or tech. school 0.014 0.012 0.023 0.010
(0.009) (0.016) (0.019) (0.011)
College graduate 0.080*** 0.002 0.021 0.016
(0.008) (0.016) (0.018) (0.011)
Race: Black -0.038*** 0.007 0.017 -0.005
(0.013) (0.026) (0.026) (0.017)
Asian -0.024 -0.041 0.011 -0.023
(0.016) (0.029) (0.032) (0.021)
Other -0.046** 0.045 0.021 0.065**
(0.020) (0.041) (0.048) (0.028)
Constant 0.756*** 0.206*** 0.097 0.142***
(0.038) (0.070) (0.079) (0.053)
B: Adjusted means
Labor force participation 0.685*** 0.703*** 0.713*** 0.684***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003)
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.2, but restricts the sample to telephone interviews N =
52, 624 (1 attempt: 17,917; 2: 6,277; 3+: 4,315; None Reported: 24,115). R2 = 0.28. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.7: Unemployment rate, telephone interviews only
Attempts 1 2 3+ NR
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 16–19 0.049** 0.044 0.063 0.018
(0.019) (0.040) (0.048) (0.027)
20–39 0.023*** -0.010 -0.031** -0.014*
(0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008)
50–64 0.010* -0.010 -0.010 -0.006
(0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.008)
65 and up 0.004 -0.014 -0.013 0.014
(0.009) (0.018) (0.020) (0.012)
Children in household -0.005 -0.012 -0.003 -0.005
(0.007) (0.014) (0.015) (0.010)
Female -0.004 -0.002 0.006 0.004
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006)
Educ: Less than high school 0.057*** -0.013 -0.001 -0.010
(0.014) (0.026) (0.029) (0.019)
Some college or tech. school -0.022*** 0.011 0.021 0.004
(0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008)
College graduate -0.042*** 0.016 0.023** 0.006
(0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007)
Race: Black 0.059*** -0.029 -0.048** -0.001
(0.012) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016)
Asian -0.024*** 0.000 0.036 -0.008
(0.009) (0.018) (0.025) (0.012)
Other 0.059*** -0.042 -0.044 -0.009
(0.019) (0.034) (0.034) (0.025)
Constant 0.046* -0.039 -0.016 -0.026
(0.027) (0.041) (0.047) (0.037)
B: Adjusted means
Unemployment rate 0.064*** 0.060*** 0.051*** 0.060***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002)
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.3, but restricts the sample to telephone interviews. N =
36, 281 (1 attempt: 12,300; 2: 4,523; 3+: 3,185; None Reported: 16,273). R2 = 0.05. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.8: Obesity, with controls for labor force participation
Attempts 1 2–3 4–6 7+
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 18–39 -0.073*** 0.002 0.001 0.023***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
40–49 -0.014*** 0.012* -0.002 0.009
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
60–69 -0.001 0.002 0.007 -0.000
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
70 and up -0.104*** 0.008 0.007 0.017**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Children in household 0.026*** -0.007 -0.004 -0.019***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Female -0.002 -0.008** -0.023*** -0.021***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Educ: Less than high school 0.014*** 0.002 0.003 0.009
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Some college or tech. school -0.004 0.005 -0.003 0.004
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
College graduate -0.062*** 0.003 -0.006 -0.008
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Inc: Below $25,000 0.019*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.012*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
$25,000-49,999 0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
$75,000 and up -0.042*** 0.002 -0.001 0.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Race: Black, non-hispanic 0.117*** 0.001 -0.009 0.013*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Other, non-hispanic -0.008 0.011 0.023*** 0.000
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Hispanic 0.034*** 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Empl: Self-employed -0.048*** -0.005 -0.014* -0.007
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Out of work, >1 year 0.026*** -0.017 -0.009 0.001
(0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Out of work, <1 year 0.001 0.002 -0.024* -0.017
(0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Homemaker -0.035*** 0.001 -0.009 0.005
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Student -0.094*** 0.016 0.003 0.007
(0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Retired -0.002 0.001 -0.015** 0.001
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Unable to work 0.106*** 0.001 -0.023*** -0.012
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Constant 0.357*** 0.015 0.048*** 0.002
(0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
B: Adjusted means
Obesity 0.296*** 0.286*** 0.282*** 0.268***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.5, but includes additional controls for the employment-status question
“Are you currently:” (see response options under “Empl” in table; omitted category: “Employed for wages”).
N = 450, 212 (1 attempt: 114,694; 2–3: 137,418; 4–6: 98,813; 7+: 99,287). R2 = 0.04. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table B.9: Self-reported weight
Attempts 1 2–3 4–6 7+
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 18–39 -4.068*** 0.240 0.589** 1.550***
(0.205) (0.272) (0.288) (0.285)
40–49 -0.293 0.300 -0.144 0.606**
(0.205) (0.272) (0.287) (0.280)
60–69 -1.097*** -0.058 0.345 0.374
(0.170) (0.228) (0.248) (0.243)
70 and up -7.152*** 0.357 0.597** 1.582***
(0.177) (0.241) (0.267) (0.268)
Children in household 1.060*** -0.147 -0.069 -0.617***
(0.160) (0.212) (0.224) (0.223)
Female -15.797*** -0.340** -0.721*** -0.916***
(0.112) (0.151) (0.163) (0.162)
Educ: Less than high school -0.102 -0.397 -0.307 -0.317
(0.203) (0.278) (0.305) (0.306)
Some college or tech. school 0.616*** 0.019 -0.109 0.016
(0.140) (0.190) (0.208) (0.210)
College graduate -1.453*** -0.103 -0.229 -0.352*
(0.144) (0.195) (0.212) (0.211)
Inc: Below $25,000 0.760*** -0.143 -0.411 -0.750***
(0.191) (0.258) (0.280) (0.282)
$25,000-49,999 -0.071 -0.024 -0.084 -0.112
(0.185) (0.248) (0.269) (0.270)
$75,000 and up -1.506*** 0.097 0.205 0.315
(0.191) (0.253) (0.271) (0.267)
Race: Black, non-hispanic 5.749*** -0.011 -0.239 0.379
(0.217) (0.292) (0.311) (0.300)
Other, non-hispanic -2.593*** 0.459 0.658* -0.345
(0.244) (0.326) (0.348) (0.347)
Hispanic -1.640*** -0.609* -0.592 -0.676*
(0.281) (0.364) (0.374) (0.370)
Constant 94.401*** -0.156 0.202 -0.373
(0.465) (0.629) (0.691) (0.732)
B: Adjusted means
Self-reported weight (kg) 80.385*** 79.932*** 79.644*** 79.067***
(0.055) (0.048) (0.057) (0.064)
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.5, but replaces the dependent variable with weight. N =
450, 212 (1 attempt: 114,694; 2–3: 137,418; 4–6: 98,813; 7+: 99,287). R2 = 0.2. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.10: Self-reported height
Attempts 1 2–3 4–6 7+
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 18–39 0.010*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
40–49 0.005*** -0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
60–69 -0.008*** -0.001 0.001 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
70 and up -0.019*** 0.000 0.001 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Children in household -0.000 0.001 0.002* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female -0.149*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Educ: Less than high school -0.008*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Some college or tech. school 0.007*** -0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
College graduate 0.011*** -0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Inc: Below $25,000 -0.008*** -0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
$25,000-49,999 -0.004*** -0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
$75,000 and up 0.004*** -0.000 0.002** 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Race: Black, non-hispanic 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other, non-hispanic -0.023*** -0.002 -0.004** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Hispanic -0.037*** -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 1.794*** -0.005** -0.010*** -0.007**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
B: Adjusted means
Height (m) 1.693*** 1.693*** 1.693*** 1.693***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.5, but replaces the dependent variable with height. N =
450, 212 (1 attempt: 114,694; 2–3: 137,418; 4–6: 98,813; 7+: 99,287). R2 = 0.54. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.11: Obesity, weighted
Attempts 1 2–3 4–6 7+
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 18–39 -0.106*** 0.021 0.012 0.031**
(0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
40–49 -0.016 0.024* -0.004 -0.013
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
60–69 -0.007 0.000 0.011 -0.003
(0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
70 and up -0.120*** 0.014 0.011 0.012
(0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Children in household 0.022*** -0.003 -0.001 -0.009
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Female -0.005 -0.007 -0.014* -0.014*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Educ: Less than high school 0.009 0.012 0.007 0.010
(0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Some college or tech. school -0.002 -0.004 -0.009 0.007
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
College graduate -0.060*** -0.005 -0.004 -0.001
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Inc: Below $25,000 0.030*** -0.002 -0.011 -0.020
(0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
$25,000-49,999 -0.005 -0.001 0.003 0.000
(0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
$75,000 and up -0.053*** 0.011 0.021 0.007
(0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Race: Black, non-hispanic 0.125*** -0.017 -0.034** -0.010
(0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Other, non-hispanic -0.055*** 0.006 0.017 -0.018
(0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Hispanic 0.048*** -0.022 0.003 -0.016
(0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Constant 0.408*** -0.020 -0.005 -0.010
(0.021) (0.028) (0.030) (0.032)
B: Adjusted means
Obesity 0.294*** 0.284*** 0.272*** 0.261***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.5, but uses the BRFSS analysis weights. N = 450, 212 (1
attempt: 114,694; 2–3: 137,418; 4–6: 98,813; 7+: 99,287). R2 = 0.04. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
149
Table B.12: Self-reported weight, weighted
Attempts 1 2–3 4–6 7+
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 18–39 -4.686*** 0.899 0.793 1.757***
(0.425) (0.558) (0.590) (0.583)
40–49 0.333 -0.020 -1.089* -0.976*
(0.422) (0.567) (0.587) (0.579)
60–69 -1.022*** 0.040 0.069 0.195
(0.347) (0.468) (0.502) (0.490)
70 and up -6.666*** -0.040 0.076 0.879
(0.366) (0.488) (0.563) (0.538)
Children in household 0.886*** 0.037 0.278 -0.068
(0.333) (0.444) (0.468) (0.465)
Female -15.455*** -0.426 -0.432 -0.515
(0.244) (0.326) (0.342) (0.343)
Educ: Less than high school -0.720 0.509 -0.377 -0.446
(0.446) (0.644) (0.674) (0.644)
Some college or tech. school 1.153*** -0.708* -0.232 -0.149
(0.304) (0.413) (0.430) (0.444)
College graduate -1.191*** -0.572 -0.143 -0.340
(0.289) (0.389) (0.426) (0.413)
Inc: Below $25,000 0.504 -0.243 -0.562 -1.131*
(0.403) (0.554) (0.587) (0.592)
$25,000-49,999 -0.131 -0.457 -0.245 -0.170
(0.374) (0.503) (0.534) (0.562)
$75,000 and up -1.230*** -0.178 -0.086 -0.273
(0.410) (0.527) (0.546) (0.551)
Race: Black, non-hispanic 5.703*** -0.673 -1.203 -0.402
(0.565) (0.719) (0.741) (0.736)
Other, non-hispanic -5.324*** -1.078 0.214 -2.753***
(0.475) (0.661) (0.677) (0.662)
Hispanic -1.701*** -1.610** -0.197 -0.908
(0.566) (0.742) (0.741) (0.708)
Constant 94.169*** -0.294 0.375 1.312
(0.919) (1.209) (1.258) (1.449)
B: Adjusted means
Self-reported weight (kg) 81.127*** 80.604*** 80.096*** 79.623***
(0.135) (0.115) (0.116) (0.114)
Notes: This table replicates Table B.9, but uses the BRFSS analysis weights. N = 450, 212 (1
attempt: 114,694; 2–3: 137,418; 4–6: 98,813; 7+: 99,287). R2 = 0.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table B.13: Self-reported height, weighted
Attempts 1 2–3 4–6 7+
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 18–39 0.011*** -0.001 -0.003 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
40–49 0.006*** -0.003 -0.004* -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
60–69 -0.008*** 0.002 0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
70 and up -0.017*** -0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Children in household -0.003** 0.002 0.005*** 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female -0.148*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Educ: Less than high school -0.007*** -0.006** -0.007** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Some college or tech. school 0.008*** -0.002 0.003* 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
College graduate 0.011*** -0.002 0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Inc: Below $25,000 -0.009*** -0.000 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
$25,000-49,999 -0.003** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
$75,000 and up 0.006*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Race: Black, non-hispanic 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Other, non-hispanic -0.031*** -0.010*** -0.006* -0.016***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Hispanic -0.036*** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 1.787*** -0.001 -0.001 0.005
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
B: Adjusted means
Height (m) 1.704*** 1.703*** 1.703*** 1.702***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Notes: This table replicates Table B.10, but uses the BRFSS analysis weights. N = 450, 212 (1
attempt: 114,694; 2–3: 137,418; 4–6: 98,813; 7+: 99,287). R2 = 0.52. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table B.14: Obesity, interviewer-ID-controls sample
Attempts 1 2–3 4–6 7+
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 18–39 -0.090*** 0.005 0.014 0.033***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
40–49 -0.016** 0.014* 0.002 0.010
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
60–69 -0.006 0.007 0.007 0.008
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
70 and up -0.120*** 0.012 0.005 0.028***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Children in household 0.021*** -0.005 0.000 -0.016**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Female -0.003 -0.004 -0.025*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Educ: Less than high school 0.025*** 0.001 -0.003 0.006
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Some college or tech. school -0.007* 0.010* -0.005 0.003
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
College graduate -0.066*** 0.006 -0.004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Inc: Below $25,000 0.034*** -0.006 -0.006 -0.016*
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
$25,000-49,999 0.008 -0.008 0.000 -0.007
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
$75,000 and up -0.046*** -0.001 0.003 0.004
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Race: Black, non-hispanic 0.127*** 0.003 -0.007 0.004
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Other, non-hispanic -0.005 0.016 0.030*** -0.002
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Hispanic 0.037*** -0.007 -0.008 -0.003
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Constant 0.371*** -0.001 0.029 -0.004
(0.013) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
B: Adjusted means
Obesity 0.298*** 0.289*** 0.285*** 0.266***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.5, but limits the sample to only include respondents interviewed by inter-
viewers with at least 10 interviews in each of the four difficulty categories (1,651 interviewers). N = 303, 034 (1
attempt: 78,998; 2–3: 91,931; 4–6: 66,194; 7+: 65,911). R2 = 0.04. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.15: Obesity, interviewer-ID-controls sample with interviewer-ID controls
Attempts 1 2–3 4–6 7+
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 18–39 -0.091*** 0.006 0.014 0.035***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
40–49 -0.016*** 0.016* 0.003 0.012
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
60–69 -0.005 0.007 0.007 0.008
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
70 and up -0.120*** 0.010 0.004 0.027***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Children in household 0.023*** -0.006 -0.001 -0.018***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Female -0.003 -0.006 -0.025*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Educ: Less than high school 0.026*** -0.000 -0.003 0.006
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Some college or tech. school -0.007 0.010* -0.007 0.002
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
College graduate -0.065*** 0.006 -0.005 -0.003
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Inc: Below $25,000 0.035*** -0.007 -0.005 -0.019**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
$25,000-49,999 0.008 -0.009 0.002 -0.007
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
$75,000 and up -0.046*** -0.001 0.003 0.004
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Race: Black, non-hispanic 0.128*** 0.002 -0.007 0.002
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Other, non-hispanic -0.006 0.017* 0.031*** -0.002
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Hispanic 0.034*** -0.006 -0.007 -0.003
(0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Constant 0.391*** -0.092** 0.028 -0.017
(0.031) (0.045) (0.050) (0.055)
B: Adjusted means
Obesity 0.298*** 0.289*** 0.285*** 0.266***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.5, but limits the sample to only include respondents interviewed by in-
terviewers with at least 10 interviews in each of the four difficulty categories (1,651 interviewers), and includes
interviewer-ID controls (and their difficulty interactions). N = 303, 034 (1 attempt: 78,998; 2–3: 91,931; 4–6:
66,194; 7+: 65,911). R2 = 0.06. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.16: Total expenditures, second-interview difficulty
Attempts 1 2 3–4 5+
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 16–29 -0.145*** 0.045 0.073** 0.062*
(0.028) (0.035) (0.033) (0.032)
30–39 -0.025 -0.011 0.019 -0.032
(0.025) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
50–64 -0.026 0.008 0.022 0.014
(0.023) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
65 and up -0.079*** 0.034 0.039 0.021
(0.025) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031)
Children in household 0.034 0.009 -0.025 0.025
(0.026) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031)
Female -0.016 0.017 0.009 0.002
(0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Educ: Less than high school -0.116*** -0.051* -0.017 0.002
(0.021) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Some college or tech. school 0.108*** -0.028 -0.019 -0.039*
(0.018) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
College graduate 0.258*** -0.035 -0.005 -0.018
(0.020) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Race: Black -0.080*** -0.069** -0.017 0.000
(0.023) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027)
Asian -0.111*** 0.012 0.044 0.058
(0.033) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039)
Other 0.047 -0.063 -0.099 -0.042
(0.052) (0.065) (0.061) (0.060)
Inc: Below $20,000 -0.637*** 0.030 0.043 0.046*
(0.022) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
$20,000-39,999 -0.229*** -0.027 -0.020 -0.015
(0.021) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
$70,000 and up 0.393*** 0.022 0.030 0.030
(0.021) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Constant 9.144*** 0.111** 0.087* 0.118**
(0.041) (0.052) (0.050) (0.050)
B: Adjusted means
Total expenditures (log) 9.099*** 9.145*** 9.163*** 9.181***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
8,942*** 9,369*** 9,536*** 9,711***
(66) (49) (43) (46)
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.7, but uses second-interview difficulty of reaching. N =
36, 722 (1 attempt: 5,076; 2: 8,781; 3–4: 11,507; 5+: 11,358). R2 = 0.56. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
154
Table B.17: Total expenditures, with additional interview controls
Attempts 1 2 3–4 5+
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 16–29 -0.071*** -0.019 -0.007 0.006
(0.024) (0.034) (0.031) (0.029)
30–39 -0.016 -0.002 0.001 -0.024
(0.022) (0.030) (0.027) (0.026)
50–64 -0.017 -0.030 0.004 -0.013
(0.020) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024)
65 and up -0.056** -0.027 -0.015 -0.038
(0.022) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028)
Children in household 0.055** -0.043 -0.035 -0.021
(0.022) (0.030) (0.028) (0.027)
Female -0.030** 0.019 0.006 0.021
(0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
Educ: Less than high school -0.137*** 0.025 0.018 0.002
(0.019) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024)
Some college or tech. school 0.094*** -0.022 -0.024 -0.035*
(0.016) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019)
College graduate 0.235*** -0.005 -0.023 -0.021
(0.017) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
Race: Black -0.065*** -0.014 -0.045* -0.020
(0.020) (0.027) (0.025) (0.023)
Asian -0.049 -0.018 -0.040 0.011
(0.031) (0.041) (0.038) (0.036)
Other 0.027 -0.093 -0.105* -0.036
(0.046) (0.061) (0.058) (0.053)
Inc: Below $20,000 -0.555*** -0.038 -0.014 0.006
(0.019) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024)
$20,000-39,999 -0.233*** -0.014 0.005 0.013
(0.017) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022)
$70,000 and up 0.384*** 0.011 0.009 0.015
(0.017) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021)
Constant 9.014*** 0.121** 0.148*** 0.033
(0.039) (0.054) (0.050) (0.048)
B: Adjusted means
Total expenditures (log) 9.124*** 9.143*** 9.168*** 9.165***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Total expenditures ($) 9,175*** 9,344*** 9,586*** 9,554***
(58) (53) (46) (42)
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.7, but adds additional controls (and number-of-attempts
interactions) for interview hour (4 categories: 1–2pm, 3–4pm, 5pm or later) and duration (4
categories: less than 37.15, 37.15–52.78, 52.78–73.72, more than 73.72 minutes). 2 observations
excluded due to missing interview duration. N = 36, 720 (1 attempt: 6,603; 2: 7,229; 3–4: 9,971;
5+: 12,917). R2 = 0.59. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.18: Total expenditures, second-interview difficulty and additional inter-
view controls
Attempts 1 2 3–4 5+
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 16–29 -0.125*** 0.043 0.073** 0.053*
(0.027) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032)
30–39 -0.005 -0.028 0.008 -0.047*
(0.024) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028)
50–64 -0.040* 0.004 0.020 0.017
(0.022) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026)
65 and up -0.094*** 0.013 0.025 0.010
(0.025) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Children in household 0.020 0.019 -0.016 0.035
(0.026) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030)
Female -0.022 0.015 0.005 -0.001
(0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Educ: Less than high school -0.102*** -0.054** -0.023 -0.009
(0.021) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Some college or tech. school 0.106*** -0.042* -0.032 -0.050**
(0.018) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
College graduate 0.245*** -0.047* -0.017 -0.027
(0.020) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Race: Black -0.077*** -0.056* -0.006 0.007
(0.022) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
Asian -0.084*** 0.007 0.039 0.039
(0.032) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038)
Other 0.018 -0.044 -0.089 -0.036
(0.051) (0.063) (0.060) (0.059)
Inc: Below $20,000 -0.594*** 0.028 0.037 0.035
(0.022) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
$20,000-39,999 -0.210*** -0.027 -0.027 -0.021
(0.020) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
$70,000 and up 0.377*** 0.015 0.020 0.022
(0.020) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Constant 8.993*** 0.137** 0.102** 0.134**
(0.042) (0.054) (0.052) (0.052)
B: Adjusted means
Total expenditures (log) 9.126*** 9.151*** 9.158*** 9.171***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
9,187*** 9,423*** 9,490*** 9,614***
(69) (49) (42) (45)
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.7, but uses second-interview difficulty of reaching. and
adds additional controls (and number-of-attempts interactions) for interview hour (4 categories:
1–2pm, 3–4pm, 5pm or later) and duration (4 categories: less than 37.15, 37.15–52.78, 52.78–
73.72, more than 73.72 minutes). 2 observations excluded due to missing interview duration.
N = 36, 720 (1 attempt: 5,075; 2: 8,781; 3–4: 11,506; 5+: 11,358). R2 = 0.59. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.19: Health expenditures
Attempts 1 2 3–4 5+
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 16–29 -1.140*** 0.187 0.012 0.317**
(0.123) (0.171) (0.156) (0.145)
30–39 -0.444*** 0.040 -0.012 0.029
(0.112) (0.149) (0.138) (0.130)
50–64 0.659*** -0.244* -0.242* -0.254**
(0.102) (0.135) (0.126) (0.120)
65 and up 2.075*** -0.096 -0.144 -0.054
(0.112) (0.151) (0.143) (0.139)
Children in household 0.100 -0.193 -0.228 -0.109
(0.112) (0.153) (0.142) (0.134)
Female 0.280*** -0.001 0.071 0.053
(0.061) (0.085) (0.079) (0.075)
Educ: Less than high school -0.422*** -0.054 -0.155 -0.227*
(0.095) (0.133) (0.126) (0.121)
Some college or tech. school 0.313*** -0.150 -0.091 -0.031
(0.079) (0.111) (0.103) (0.098)
College graduate 0.579*** -0.159 0.013 0.033
(0.086) (0.118) (0.110) (0.105)
Race: Black -0.493*** 0.007 -0.043 -0.072
(0.100) (0.138) (0.127) (0.118)
Asian -0.325** -0.220 -0.258 -0.196
(0.156) (0.206) (0.194) (0.182)
Other -0.145 -0.463 0.280 -0.026
(0.230) (0.307) (0.291) (0.268)
Inc: Below $20,000 -1.423*** -0.002 -0.015 -0.064
(0.095) (0.133) (0.124) (0.119)
$20,000-39,999 -0.564*** -0.049 0.013 -0.093
(0.087) (0.122) (0.114) (0.109)
$70,000 and up 0.403*** 0.166 0.161 0.306***
(0.088) (0.119) (0.111) (0.106)
Constant 4.958*** 0.249 0.104 -0.473**
(0.183) (0.252) (0.235) (0.225)
B: Adjusted means
Health expenditures (log) 5.080*** 5.076*** 5.048*** 4.940***
(0.032) (0.028) (0.024) (0.022)
Health expenditures ($) 160*** 159*** 155*** 139***
(5) (5) (4) (3)
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.7, but replaces the dependent variable with ln(total quar-
terly household expenditures on health +1) (and excludes households with negative net health
expenditures). N = 36, 568 (1 attempt: 6,571; 2: 7,199; 3–4: 9,926; 5+: 12,872). R2 = 0.27. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.20: Food expenditures
Attempts 1 2 3–4 5+
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 16–29 -0.092** -0.037 -0.026 -0.035
(0.036) (0.050) (0.046) (0.043)
30–39 -0.020 0.003 0.023 -0.052
(0.033) (0.044) (0.041) (0.038)
50–64 -0.017 -0.020 -0.022 -0.018
(0.030) (0.040) (0.037) (0.035)
65 and up -0.087*** 0.040 0.030 0.011
(0.033) (0.044) (0.042) (0.041)
Children in household 0.052 -0.007 -0.031 0.013
(0.033) (0.045) (0.042) (0.039)
Female -0.060*** 0.006 -0.010 0.004
(0.018) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022)
Educ: Less than high school -0.098*** 0.063 0.046 0.058
(0.028) (0.039) (0.037) (0.035)
Some college or tech. school 0.040* 0.003 0.003 -0.008
(0.023) (0.033) (0.030) (0.029)
College graduate 0.150*** 0.001 -0.004 -0.025
(0.025) (0.035) (0.032) (0.031)
Race: Black -0.045 -0.081** -0.078** -0.085**
(0.030) (0.041) (0.037) (0.035)
Asian -0.073 0.008 -0.017 0.034
(0.046) (0.060) (0.057) (0.053)
Other 0.041 -0.063 -0.066 -0.102
(0.068) (0.090) (0.086) (0.079)
Inc: Below $20,000 -0.358*** -0.030 -0.036 -0.057
(0.028) (0.039) (0.037) (0.035)
$20,000-39,999 -0.146*** -0.023 -0.008 0.005
(0.026) (0.036) (0.033) (0.032)
$70,000 and up 0.226*** 0.013 0.006 0.021
(0.026) (0.035) (0.032) (0.031)
Constant 7.340*** 0.007 0.125* 0.026
(0.054) (0.074) (0.069) (0.066)
B: Adjusted means
Food expenditures (log) 7.242*** 7.253*** 7.288*** 7.301***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Food expenditures ($) 1,397*** 1,412*** 1,462*** 1,481***
(13) (12) (10) (10)
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.7, but replaces the dependent variable with ln(total quar-
terly household expenditures on food +1). N = 36, 724 (1 attempt: 6,603; 2: 7,230; 3–4: 9,973;
5+: 12,918). R2 = 0.31. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.21: Total expenditures, telephone interviews
Attempts 1 2 3–4 5+
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 16–29 -0.090* -0.063 -0.017 -0.013
(0.053) (0.071) (0.064) (0.059)
30–39 -0.011 -0.010 -0.008 -0.027
(0.046) (0.060) (0.055) (0.051)
50–64 -0.002 -0.055 -0.014 -0.026
(0.042) (0.054) (0.049) (0.046)
65 and up -0.025 -0.065 -0.053 -0.081
(0.048) (0.063) (0.059) (0.055)
Children in household 0.082* -0.102 -0.088 -0.037
(0.047) (0.063) (0.057) (0.054)
Female -0.022 0.021 0.004 0.030
(0.026) (0.035) (0.032) (0.030)
Educ: Less than high school -0.110** 0.015 -0.008 -0.032
(0.046) (0.062) (0.057) (0.054)
Some college or tech. school 0.115*** -0.007 -0.039 -0.046
(0.033) (0.045) (0.041) (0.039)
College graduate 0.272*** 0.003 -0.025 -0.043
(0.035) (0.047) (0.043) (0.040)
Race: Black 0.023 -0.152*** -0.163*** -0.142***
(0.042) (0.056) (0.051) (0.047)
Asian 0.012 -0.049 -0.102 -0.093
(0.058) (0.076) (0.071) (0.066)
Other 0.219* -0.258* -0.288** -0.338***
(0.115) (0.153) (0.135) (0.125)
Inc: Below $20,000 -0.577*** -0.066 0.002 0.042
(0.041) (0.056) (0.051) (0.048)
$20,000-39,999 -0.215*** -0.011 0.016 -0.010
(0.038) (0.050) (0.046) (0.043)
$70,000 and up 0.424*** -0.018 -0.012 0.016
(0.036) (0.047) (0.043) (0.041)
Constant 9.045*** 0.141 0.243*** 0.163*
(0.076) (0.101) (0.093) (0.088)
B: Adjusted means
Total expenditures (log) 9.143*** 9.165*** 9.208*** 9.202***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007)
9,344*** 9,555*** 9,972*** 9,920***
(124) (107) (87) (71)
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.7, but restricts the sample to telephone interviews. N =
11, 719 (1 attempt: 1,593; 2: 1,992; 3–4: 3,185; 5+: 4,949). R2 = 0.55. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table B.22: Total expenditures, personal interviews
Attempts 1 2 3–4 5+
A: Regression with interactions
Base Interactions
Age: 16–29 -0.089*** -0.001 -0.000 0.019
(0.029) (0.040) (0.037) (0.035)
30–39 -0.024 -0.000 0.003 -0.023
(0.027) (0.036) (0.033) (0.032)
50–64 0.001 -0.022 0.003 -0.025
(0.024) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029)
65 and up -0.033 -0.016 -0.001 -0.020
(0.026) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034)
Children in household 0.054** -0.024 -0.022 -0.016
(0.026) (0.036) (0.034) (0.032)
Female -0.020 0.015 0.001 0.023
(0.014) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018)
Educ: Less than high school -0.166*** 0.032 0.041 0.026
(0.022) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028)
Some college or tech. school 0.095*** -0.016 -0.006 -0.018
(0.019) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024)
College graduate 0.248*** -0.002 -0.012 -0.006
(0.020) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
Race: Black -0.109*** 0.030 0.004 0.032
(0.024) (0.033) (0.031) (0.029)
Asian -0.115*** 0.008 0.004 0.072
(0.038) (0.051) (0.048) (0.046)
Other 0.022 -0.084 -0.078 0.064
(0.052) (0.069) (0.067) (0.062)
Inc: Below $20,000 -0.624*** -0.009 0.010 0.015
(0.022) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029)
$20,000-39,999 -0.270*** -0.012 0.011 0.028
(0.020) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026)
$70,000 and up 0.387*** 0.028 0.036 0.041
(0.021) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026)
Constant 9.218*** 0.068 0.076 -0.031
(0.043) (0.060) (0.056) (0.055)
B: Adjusted means
Total expenditures (log) 9.097*** 9.124*** 9.144*** 9.147***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Total expenditures ($) 8,923*** 9,170*** 9,355*** 9,387***
(66) (63) (56) (54)
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.7, but restricts the sample to personal interviews. N =
24, 305 (1 attempt: 4,912; 2: 5,131; 3–4: 6,611; 5+: 7,651). R2 = 0.57. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table B.23: Life satisfaction, uncontrolled OLS
Separate Cumulative
Attempts: 1 call 2-3 calls 4-7 calls ≥8 calls 1–3 calls 1–7 calls All
Inc. below $25,000 -0.317*** -0.319*** -0.313*** -0.301*** -0.318*** -0.316*** -0.312***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Inc. $25,000-49,999 -0.104*** -0.113*** -0.111*** -0.118*** -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.110***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Inc. $75,000 and up 0.110*** 0.107*** 0.115*** 0.126*** 0.108*** 0.111*** 0.114***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 3.487*** 3.487*** 3.477*** 3.464*** 3.487*** 3.483*** 3.479***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.056 0.057 0.059 0.060 0.056 0.057 0.058
Female 0.002 -0.002 -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.001 -0.005*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 3.369*** 3.384*** 3.401*** 3.403*** 3.377*** 3.386*** 3.390***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Age 18–39 0.042*** 0.027*** 0.013*** 0.006** 0.033*** 0.027*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 40–49 -0.006 -0.006** -0.004 -0.008** -0.006** -0.004** -0.004**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 60–69 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.081*** 0.076*** 0.085*** 0.082*** 0.079***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 70 and up 0.082*** 0.070*** 0.058*** 0.049*** 0.074*** 0.067*** 0.061***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 3.323*** 3.347*** 3.368*** 3.380*** 3.337*** 3.348*** 3.355***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003
Age ≤ 49 & child in house 0.121*** 0.107*** 0.096*** 0.080*** 0.113*** 0.106*** 0.099***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Age ≥ 50 0.115*** 0.107*** 0.098*** 0.084*** 0.109*** 0.103*** 0.096***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant 3.268*** 3.291*** 3.312*** 3.330*** 3.281*** 3.293*** 3.303***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
R2 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Constant 3.370*** 3.383*** 3.393*** 3.396*** 3.377*** 3.382*** 3.385***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 344,244 428,658 394,212 314,363 772,902 1,167,114 1,481,477
Notes: Source: Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 2005–2008. Each column reports
coefficients from five different OLS regressions (separated by horizontal lines). Dependent vari-
able: responses to the question “In general, how satisfied are you with your life?” coded as follows:
4=Very satisfied; 3=Satisfied; 2=Dissatisfied; 1=Very dissatisfied. Where relevant, regressions
include indicators for missing data (not reported). Regressions within a column are conducted on
the same subsample, based on the difficulty-to-reach category reported on the top row. Standard
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.24: Life satisfaction, controlled OLS
Separate Cumulative
Attempts: 1 call 2-3 calls 4-7 calls ≥8 calls 1–3 calls 1–7 calls All
Inc. below $25,000 -0.254*** -0.251*** -0.238*** -0.231*** -0.253*** -0.248*** -0.245***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Inc. $25,000-49,999 -0.090*** -0.095*** -0.086*** -0.088*** -0.093*** -0.090*** -0.090***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Inc. $75,000 and up 0.093*** 0.088*** 0.091*** 0.096*** 0.090*** 0.091*** 0.092***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.040*** 0.036*** 0.034***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 18–39 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.035***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 40–49 -0.035*** -0.028*** -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.025***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 60–69 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.122*** 0.114*** 0.127*** 0.124*** 0.121***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 70 and up 0.189*** 0.184*** 0.174*** 0.162*** 0.186*** 0.181*** 0.176***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age ≤ 49 & child in house 0.025*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.010*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.018***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 3.350*** 3.335*** 3.338*** 3.388*** 3.343*** 3.342*** 3.351***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
R2 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.094 0.097 0.097 0.096
Observations 344,244 428,658 394,212 314,363 772,902 1,167,114 1,481,477
Notes: Source: Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 2005–2008. Each column reports
coefficients from a single OLS regression. Dependent variable: responses to the question “In
general, how satisfied are you with your life?” coded as follows: 4=Very satisfied; 3=Satisfied;
2=Dissatisfied; 1=Very dissatisfied. Regressions include controls for education, marital status,
race, state, urban/rural, and missing data indicators that are not reported. The regression for
each column is conducted on a subsample, based on the difficulty-to-reach category reported on
the top row. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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